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Abstract 
The cognitive model of emotional disorders has inspired considerable research effort, 
much of it self-report and questionnaire-based. This methodological focus has been 
criticized on several grounds and poses a challenge for those attempting to index 
relevant cognitive constructs. The aim of the study described here is to further develop 
and validate the Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale-Revised (AABS-R). The measure 
was designed to index attitudes and beliefs that may represent a cognitive vulnerability 
to anxiety problems. The development of the scale involved an emphasis on avoiding 
confounding with affect, thus averting some of the criticisms of self-report cognitive 
measures. First, construct validation through cognitive interviewing was undertaken. 
Four undergraduate students completed 53 questions on the AABS-R while thinking 
aloud. The ensuing verbal protocols were coded by a blind rater according to the 
specific cognitive processes participants engaged in. Results indicated that items 
generally tap into cognitive rather than affective processes. Subsequently, the 
reliability, psychometric properties and validity of the scale were investigated in an 
online anxiety disorder support group and student sample. Participants (N  = 346) 
completed an online battery of tests, which included the AABS-R as well as criterion 
measures. Exploratory factor analyses suggested the existence of five factors, which 
index domains of theoretical interest. The final 33-item measure total and factor scores 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency. A correlational analysis was consistent 
with convergent, but only partly with the discriminant validity of the AABS-33. As 
predicted, the AABS-33 appears to be a reliable, valid and potentially clinically useful 
index of anxiety vulnerability, which may overcome the shortcomings of well-
established anxiety measures. The findings are discussed within the broader literature 
on cognitive theory and its’ operationalization, ‘transdiagnostic processes’ and notions 
of validity. 
  
 
 2
Acknowledgements 
Many thanks to Dr Gary Brown for suggesting a project, which interested me and 
engaged on so many levels. Thanks also to Mr Philip Tata and Dr Lorna Farquharson 
for their support in the field, and to Dr Hawkes for his help and expertise on cognitive 
interviewing. Sincere appreciation and thanks also to Emma Reilly for her support, 
practical and otherwise. This study was carried out with the aid of a research grant 
from the University of London Central Research Fund. 
 
I would like to express particular thanks and gratitude to the various online forums and 
communities that participated and welcomed me. 
 
Elsku Steini og Jón Bjartur, milljón sinnum takk fyrir allt! 
 
 
 
 3
List of Tables 
Table                               Page 
 
1. Full Sample Status on Gender, Ethnicity, Education level  48 
Employment Status, Marital Status and Recruitment  
Source 
 
2.  Predetermined Cognitive Interview Probes    59 
 
3.  The Cognitive Interview Coding System    62 
4.    Cognitive Interviewing Item Evaluation Criteria   67 
5.  Means and Standard Deviations for AABS-R Items, Item-  72 
Total Correlations and Cronbach’s Alpa if Item Deleted 
6.  Eigenvalues and Total Explained Variance for the Five-Factor  79 
Solution 
7.  AABS-33 item analysis      82 
8.   Differences in AABS-33 Scores Across Gender, Ethnicity and  86 
  Recruitment Source 
9.  AABS-33 Means and Standard Deviations Across Education          88 
  Level, Employment Status and Marital Status 
10.  Descriptive Statistics and Reliability for the BIPS, BARS and 90  
BSBS 
11. Descriptive Statistics and Reliability for the ASI-3, DASS-21, 91 
PSWQ, TAFS-R and BFNE-II 
12. Hypothesized relationships between AABS-33 Factors, BIPS 93 
BARS, BSBS, BFNE-II, PSWQ and the ASI-3 
13. AABS-33, BIPS, BARS and BSBS correlations   95 
 4
14.   AABS-33, BFNE-II, PSWQ, TAFS-R and ASI-3 Correlations 98 
15.  AABS-33 and DASS-21 Correlations    101 
16. Descriptive Statistics for the AABS-33 and DASS-21 Anxiety, 103 
Depression and Stress Scales, for the Student, Anxiety and Total  
Group Samples 
17.  Differences in DASS-21 Scores Across Student and Anxiety  104 
Groups 
18. AABS-33 and DASS-21 Correlations for the Student, Anxiety  105 
and Total Group Samples 
19.  Differences in AABS-33 Subscale Scores Across Groups  108 
20. Descriptive Statistics for the DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety 110  
and Stress Scales and AABS-33 across the NOS, Social Anxiety,  
OCD, Phobia and Panic Groups 
21. DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale and AABS-33  112 
scores for NOS, Social Anxiety, OCD, Phobia, Panic and  
Student Groups 
22.  AABS-33, BIPS, BARS and BSBS Partial Correlations  115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
List of Figures 
Figure                               Page 
 
1. AABS – R Scree Plot        77 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
 Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 9 
ANXIETY, PREVALENCE AND COST ..................................................................................................... 10 
COGNITIVE MODELS OF ANXIETY ....................................................................................................... 10 
Cognitive mediation ....................................................................................................................... 11 
Cognitive content-specificity.......................................................................................................... 12 
Cognitive vulnerability to anxiety .................................................................................................. 19 
Cognitive vulnerability-stress models: Stressful life events ........................................................... 24 
A TRANSDIAGNOSTIC PERSPECTIVE .................................................................................................... 24 
COGNITIVE VULNERABILITY: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES .................................................................... 28 
Self-report ...................................................................................................................................... 28 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index ................................................................................................................ 31 
The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale ............................................................................................ 32 
Reliability and validity ................................................................................................................... 34 
Studies of process........................................................................................................................... 37 
RATIONALE FOR A MEASURE OF ANXIETY-RELATED ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS.................................. 37 
AIMS.................................................................................................................................................... 38 
METHOD............................................................................................................................................... 43 
OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................... 43 
PARTICIPANTS ..................................................................................................................................... 44 
Recruitment of participants for the main study.............................................................................. 45 
Full sample participant demographics .......................................................................................... 47 
Sub-sample participant demographics........................................................................................... 48 
Sampling procedure and sample rationale .................................................................................... 50 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................................. 50 
MEASURES .......................................................................................................................................... 51 
Provisional scales .......................................................................................................................... 51 
Established scales .......................................................................................................................... 54 
PROCEDURE......................................................................................................................................... 57 
Cognitive interviewing study.......................................................................................................... 57 
Validation study ............................................................................................................................. 63 
RESULTS............................................................................................................................................... 65 
OVERVIEW........................................................................................................................................... 65 
OPERATIONALIZING EVIDENCE IN THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS ....................................... 65 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS................................................................................................................... 70 
Data coding.................................................................................................................................... 70 
Data distribution and preliminary analysis ................................................................................... 71 
Full sample AABS analysis ............................................................................................................ 71 
Reliability....................................................................................................................................... 84 
Relationship between the AABS-33 and demographic information ............................................... 84 
Criterion measures......................................................................................................................... 89 
Hypothesized relationships between AABS-33 subscales and criterion measures......................... 92 
Hypothesized relationships between AABS-33 subscales and DASS-21 ........................................ 94 
Correlational analysis: Convergent validity.................................................................................. 94 
Correlational analysis: Discriminant validity ............................................................................. 100 
Group comparisons...................................................................................................................... 102 
Partial Correlations..................................................................................................................... 114 
DISCUSSION....................................................................................................................................... 116 
COGNITIVE INTERVIEWS AND CONSTRUCT VALIDITY ....................................................................... 116 
QUANTITATIVE STUDY ...................................................................................................................... 118 
AABS factor structure .................................................................................................................. 118 
Reliability..................................................................................................................................... 119 
Discriminant validity.................................................................................................................... 119 
Convergent validity ...................................................................................................................... 129 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS............................................................................................ 134 
 7
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 141 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 143 
APPENDIX 1: RECRUITMENT INFORMATION SHEET FOR COGNITIVE INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS.......... 170 
APPENDIX 2:  RECRUITMENT MESSAGE FOR STUDENTS AND WEB COMMUNITY MEMBERS ................. 171 
APPENDIX 3: E-MAIL SENT TO WEB COMMUNITY MODERATORS ........................................................ 172 
APPENDIX 4: PARTICIPATING INTERNET COMMUNITIES AND FORUMS................................................ 173 
APPENDIX 5: NHS RECRUITMENT FLYER ........................................................................................... 174 
APPENDIX 6: INFORMATION LETTER SENT WITH NHS OPT-IN LETTERS.............................................. 175 
APPENDIX 7: ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL ........... 177 
APPENDIX 8: ROYAL HOLLOWAY, PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL...... 178 
APPENDIX 9: RIVERSIDE RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL ................................................ 179 
APPENDIX 10: THE ANXIETY ATTITUDE AND BELIEF SCALE-R (AABS-R) ....................................... 182 
APPENDIX 11: THE BRIEF INFLATED PROBABILITIES SCALE-13 (BIPS-13) ....................................... 186 
APPENDIX 12: THE BRIEF SAFETY BEHAVIOUR SCALE -17 (BSBS-17) ............................................. 187 
APPENDIX 13: BRIEF AVERSIVENESS TO RISK SCALE-10 (BARS-10)................................................ 189 
APPENDIX 14: ANXIETY SENSITIVITY INDEX -3 (ASI-3).................................................................... 190 
APPENDIX 15: THE DEPRESSION ANXIETY STRESS SCALE- 21 (DASS -21) ....................................... 191 
APPENDIX 16: PENN STATE WORRY QUESTIONNAIRE (PSWQ)......................................................... 192 
APPENDIX 17: THOUGHT-ACTION FUSION SCALE-R (TAFS-R) ........................................................ 193 
APPENDIX 18: BRIEF FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION -II (BFNE-II).............................................. 195 
APPENDIX 19: COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING SCHEDULE ........................................................................ 196 
APPENDIX 20: INFORMATION AND CONSENT SHEET FOR COGNITIVE INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS ........ 198 
APPENDIX 21: INFORMATION AND CONSENT SHEET FOR VALIDATION STUDY PARTICIPANTS............. 201 
           
 8
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature for the reported 
study, the aim of which is to further improve and validate the Anxiety Attitude and 
Belief Scale (Brown, Craske, Tata, Rassovsky & Tsao, 2000). This self-report measure 
was developed to index enduring appraisals, attitudes and beliefs, believed to represent 
a distal cognitive vulnerability to anxiety. Drawing on clinical cognitive models of 
emotional disorders, this vulnerability, in interaction with precipitating negative life 
events, is hypothesized to increase the likelihood that a predisposed individual will 
develop anxiety symptoms. Little theoretical and research effort has been focused on 
conceptualizing and measuring phenomena that constitute durable anxiety-related 
cognitive styles, not contaminated by anxiety symptoms. Because such a cognitive 
predisposition is seen as antecedent to the later development of anxiety symptoms, it is 
anticipated that the measure will be a useful clinical tool. The review that follows will 
consider the relevant literature and concepts. 
 
First, an overview of anxiety disorders, prevalence and cost will be provided. 
Subsequently, cognitive models are presented in order to provide a general cognitive 
framework for conceptualizing anxiety.  Next, the concept of anxiety vulnerability is 
examined to develop the background to the field, clarify the role of cognitions 
generally, and attitudes and beliefs in particular, in anxiety, and in order to define key 
variables. This section serves also to provide a general introduction to the topic matter. 
Subsequently, the focus is on ‘transdiagnostic processes’, methodological issues, the 
measure itself and notions of validity. Finally, the rationale for and purpose of the 
research will be stated in terms of the research aims. 
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Anxiety, Prevalence and Cost 
The notion of ‘anxiety disorders’ applies to a group of psychiatric disorders that are 
characterized by disabling feelings of anxiety. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) identifies twelve different anxiety diagnoses, including 
agoraphobia, panic disorder, social phobia, specific phobias, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety 
disorder not otherwise specified. 
 
In Europe, anxiety disorders are the most common mental health problem and 12% of 
the population will have had an episode in the previous year (Andlin-Sobocki & 
Wittchen, 2005). Anxiety disorders are principally disabling, persistent and associated 
with various co-morbidities (Kessler, Chiu, Demler & Walters, 2005).  These disorders 
account for up to 30 per cent of the total expenditure for mental health (Arikian & 
Gorman, 2001; DuPont et al., 1996) as individuals with anxiety disorders utilize 
services to a greater extent than those with other mental health problems (Lepine, 
2002). When co-morbidity is present, expenditure more than doubles (Dozois, Dobson 
& Westra, 2004; Ohayon, 2006). Such figures have led to recent calls for research with 
a preventative focus (Schmidt & Zvolensky, 2007). 
 
Cognitive Models of Anxiety 
Cognitive models emphasise that cognition plays a significant role in the aetiology, 
maintenance and treatment of anxiety. Beck and his colleagues have put forward a 
cognitive model of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985). They 
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suggest anxious individuals interpret innocuous phenomena (both external and 
internal) as threatening, and underestimate their ability to cope. This bias consequently 
results in cognitive (e.g., hypervigilance for threat), physiological (e.g., autonomic 
arousal) and behavioural (i.e., maximising avoidance and safety-seeking and 
minimising risk-taking) effects, which serve to maintain anxiety (Wells, 1997).  This 
model illuminates the general assumptions of cognitive models. First, cognition affects 
behaviour. Second, cognition can be observed and altered. Third, behaviour change is 
achieved through changes in cognition (Dobson, 1988).  
 
Cognitive mediation 
In explaining emotional disorders, cognitive-mediational models predominate, a state 
of affairs that has been described as the ‘cognitive revolution’ (Mahoney, 1974). Such 
models have greatly influenced theorizing in the area of depression and more recently, 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck & Clark, 1997). 
Cognitive-mediational models are derived from early emotion theories, which propose 
that cognitive appraisal and information processing mediate the relationship between 
events in the world and their emotional impact (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1968).  
The cognitive constructs employed by different cognitive theories to account for such a 
mediation are debated and involve different levels of analysis (Brewin, 1996; Clark, 
Beck & Brown, 1989). Ingram and Kendall (1986, 1987) suggest four distinct 
components of ‘cognition’. ‘Structure’ (or ‘schemata’) signifies how information is 
organized internally (e.g., associative networks) and ‘propositions’ refer to its’ stored 
content – the information or knowledge that is considered and represented. 
Dysfunctional attitudes and beliefs are typically conceptualised as being represented at 
the propositional level (Segal & Dobson, 1992).  ‘Operations’ involve information-
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processing system processes (e.g., selective attention); ‘products’ are the output of that 
system (e.g., negative automatic thoughts).  
 
Though this categorization is useful, recent cognitive system models are more complex 
and suggest that a stimulus can have multiple representations. For example, Teasdale 
and Barnard (1993) suggest two qualitatively different levels of meaning, in the form 
of  ‘meaning structures’. The propositional system is based on language and involves 
rational analysis. The implicational system encodes new information in terms of 
feelings, images and kinaesthetic sensations (Teasdale, 1996). This view is similar to 
the distinction that Epstein (1990, 1998) makes between a cognitive and an 
experiential system. Though these are seen to operate relatively independently, they 
can also interact and influence each other (Salas-Auvert & Felgoise, 2003). 
 
Beck’s (1967, 1976) influential cognitive theory of emotional disorders suggests that 
cognitive mediation involves an interaction between such factors. In emotional 
disorders, maladaptive and stable structures are activated when information consistent 
with their content is received. Subsequently, information-processing biases and 
negative automatic thoughts result (Clark et al., 1989). 
 
Cognitive content-specificity  
Depression and anxiety commonly co-occur, an overlap that can be observed in terms 
of symptoms, mood and diagnosis, in samples of children, adolescents and adults 
(Barlow, DiNardo, Vermilyea, Vermilyea & Blanchard, 1986; Maser & Cloninger, 
1990; Mineka, Watson & Clark, 1998; Watson et al., 1995). For example, about half of 
those who receive a clinical diagnosis of depression are diagnosed with comorbid 
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anxiety and vice versa (Mineka, et al., 1998). Similarly, numerous reviews of the 
depression and anxiety psychometric literature have found that clinical rating and self-
report scales of depressive and anxious mood state and symptoms are highly associated 
(e.g., Dobson, 1985; Gotlib & Cane, 1989). L. A. Clark and Watson’s (1991) 
comprehensive review indicated that concurrent correlations between various well-
established measures of depressive and anxious symptoms averaged .66 in patient 
populations and .70 in non-patient populations.  Such observations have been seen to 
support the view that depression and anxiety are best defined as variations of a unitary 
disorder (e.g., Stavrakaki & Vargo, 1986).  
 
Indeed, Beck and his colleagues theorise that these emotional disorders involve 
comparable cognitive processes. However, they are seen to vary in terms of cognitive 
content at all levels of conceptualization. Thus, the observed overlap between 
depression and anxiety is seen to reflect co-occurring but phenomenologically distinct 
phenomena, each with a particular cognitive profile (Beck, 1967; 1976; Beck & Clark, 
1988; Clark et al., 1989; Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999). Also, Clark, Beck and Stewart 
(1990) specify that although depression and anxiety have common features, 
differences between them in terms of course, symptomatology and treatment provide 
grounds for viewing them as distinct.  
 
Research on this cognitive ‘content-specificity’ hypothesis has repercussions for those 
attempting to measure anxiety and depression. Much research effort has focused on the 
cognitive operations level and this has largely been supportive of Beck’s specificity 
hypothesis in that anxiety has been found to involve selective encoding of and 
attention to threatening information (for reviews see Clark & Steer, 1996; MacLeod, 
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1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Wilson & MacLeod, 2007). However, more 
relevant for developing a background to a self-report measure are the propositional and 
product levels and their measurement.  
 
In Beck’s theory, in anxiety, automatic thoughts are seen to involve themes of 
anticipated danger or harm (Beck & Emery, 1985) and anxious thinking is said to be 
more future-oriented, probabilistic and situational than depressive thinking (Beck & 
Clark, 1988; Ingram & Kendall, 1987). Such danger perceptions result in feelings of 
fear and dread as well as tension and autonomic arousal (Feldman, 1993). Thus, 
according to Beck, it is possible to differentiate depression and anxiety as each is 
associated with specific cognitive content. 
 
Clark and colleagues (1990) suggest measures of anxiety and depression typically 
contain a mixture of anxious and depressive items, resulting in low discriminant 
validity and high correlations (Dobson, 1985). It follows from Beck’s hypothesis that 
higher discriminant validity can be achieved by developing depression and anxiety 
inventories that index distinct cognitive constructs.  
 
Clark, Steer and Beck (1994) performed a succession of factor analyses on two widely-
used measures of depression and anxiety, which include cognitive items, the Beck 
Depression Inventory and the Beck Anxiety Inventory. They found a general second-
order factor that accounted for 40% of the two measures’ shared variance. When its 
effects were partialed out, first-order Anxiety and Depression Factors still explained 
more than 20% of the measures’ common variance. The authors conclude that 
depression and anxiety measures that comprise cognitive symptoms do assess 
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dimensions that are specific to depression and anxiety, in addition to a non-specific 
and large general distress (affect) component.  
 
L. A. Clark and Watson’s (1991) tripartite model specifies that depression and anxiety 
consist of a non-specific component (conceptualised as negative affect) as well as 
specific depression and anxiety mood components. Clark et al’s (1994) findings 
therefore provide support for the tripartite model in terms of mood as well as for 
Beck’s specificity hypothesis in that including cognitive items can increase the 
specificity of depression and anxiety symptom measures. 
 
Numerous self-report measures aim to assess specific cognitive aspects of depression 
and anxiety (e.g., Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson & Riskind, 1987; Beck, Epstein, 
Brown & Steer, 1988). These measures may be more able to discriminate between 
depression and anxiety (e.g., Steer, Beck, Clark & Beck, 1994) and numerous research 
studies that have deployed these have been supportive of Beck’s formulation. For 
example, Clark and colleagues (1990) performed factor analysis to verify that 
depressive symptoms and cognitions, and anxious symptoms and cognitions, loaded on 
distinct factors.  Cognitions of failure and loss have been found to be related to 
depression, whilst thoughts of danger and harm have been found to predict anxiety in 
clinical and adult outpatient (Beck et al., 1987; Clark et al., 1989; Lamberton & Oei, 
2008), inpatient (Clark, Steer, Beck & Snow, 1996) and adolescent inpatient samples 
(Jolly & Dykman, 1994). In addition, Kendall and Chansky (1991) find that cognitive 
content can differentiate childhood disorders as automatic thoughts of anxious youth 
were found to centre around threat, danger and anticipated harm.  
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Despite these encouraging findings, vulnerability and threat cognitions, in various 
studies of college students, have been found to be similar or better predictors of 
depression than anxiety (e.g., Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg & Holt, 1993; McDermut & 
Haaga, 1994). Also, R. Beck and Perkins (2001) included 13 studies in their meta-
analysis of the evidence for cognitive content-specificity for depression and anxiety. 
They operationalized Beck’s specificity hypothesis as “depressive symptomatology 
should share significantly more variance with depressive cognition than anxious 
cognition (the same reasoning would also apply for the anxiety constructs)” (p. 657). 
Significant specificity was found for depressive but not for anxious cognitive content. 
Thus, cognitions that are typically conceptualised as related to anxiety were common 
to both depression and anxiety. 
 
Clark and Steer (1996) state “it would be interesting to know why cognitive content-
specificity has not been as robust in anxiety as in depression” (p. 89). They maintain 
that it is possible to improve the discriminant validity of depression and anxiety 
measures by including specific cognitive items, though this may not always be an 
effective strategy as more support has been found for specificity in clinical than 
nonclinical samples (e.g., Clark et al., 1996). Thus, it is possible that with decreased 
symptom distress, cognitions become less-specific predictors of symptoms. 
 
Other hypotheses have been offered to account for inconsistent findings with regards 
to anxiety-related specificity, which relate to the perceived heterogeneity of anxiety. 
Various authors (e.g., Bruch et al., 1993; Cho & Telch, 2005, Epkins, 1996; Smith & 
Mumma, 2008) suggest that specificity findings for anxiety may be inconsistent 
because anxiety-related cognitions are conceptualised in an overly broad manner and 
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that anxiety disorder related cognitions may provide more support for specificity. 
Some evidence exists for this explanation. In a recent study (R. Beck, Benedict & 
Winkler, 2003) it was possible to discriminate between depression and panic disorder 
on the basis of specific cognitions. However, worry (the central characteristic of 
generalized anxiety) was a shared feature of depression and anxiety. Similarly, on the 
basis of two studies, depressive and anxious cognitions distinguished depression and 
panic disorder. However, the researchers failed to differentiate generalized anxiety 
disorder from depression on the basis of danger and threat cognitions (Clark, Beck & 
Beck, 1994; Riskind et al., 1991). Finally, Woody and colleagues (Woody, Taylor, 
McLean & Koch, 1998) found panic-related cognitions to correlate significantly with 
agoraphobic and panic, but not depressive symptoms. In contrast, general anxiety-
relevant cognitions were related to anxiety as well as depression. This may suggest that 
cognitive-specificity is less apparent in generalized anxiety disorder than panic and 
that specific cognitions may relate to specific anxiety disorders. It is important to note 
here that this disorder-specific focus has been challenged recently by emerging 
findings regarding the anxiety disorders and their similarities. This ‘transdiagnostic’ 
perspective (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004) is discussed below, following 
further discussion of the cognitive model. 
 
As noted, it has been suggested that anxiety and depression have unique and shared 
mood components (L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991). A recent neuropsychological study 
(Keller et al., 2000) supports this. The authors found support for Heller’s (e.g., 1993) 
model of regional brain activity in depression and anxiety, in that depression was 
related to a smaller right hemisphere bias and anxiety to a larger right-hemisphere bias 
on the Chimeric Faces task, a measure of a hemispatial bias, which is thought to index 
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arousal levels. Following from this the authors suggest that inconsistencies among 
empirical studies of anxious and depressed groups may be the result of anxiety and 
depressive symptom balance being inconsistent across studies.  In addition, they found 
support for the view that depression and anxiety comorbidity reflects a combination of 
unique and shared features. Thus, once common variance has been removed, distinct 
features become apparent. The authors theorise that common variance may reflect 
negative affect, as suggested by L. A. Clark and Watson (1991) and unique features 
may be represented by low arousal for depression and high arousal for anxiety. In 
mixed samples (depression and comorbid anxiety samples), this opposing relationship 
may, in effect, cancel the other. Alternatively and depending on the strength of self-
reported arousal levels in the sample, it may result in inconsistent results. This may 
explain why measures of anxiety, many of which contain items that index affective 
rather than purely cognitive phenomena, have produced inconsistent findings. The 
issue of the mixing of cognitive and affective content is of central relevance and will 
be further discussed below, along with other methodological issues.  
 
Finally, it has been suggested that cognitive variables, like mood components, can be 
divided into those that are common or distinctive to depression and anxiety (Ingram & 
Kendall, 1987; Kendall & Ingram, 1987). There is some support for this view (e.g., 
Cho & Telch, 2005). 
 
The inconsistencies evident in cognitive content-specificity research do not at present 
appear to have a clear explanation.  However, recent studies indicate that the 
relationship between putative anxiety-related cognitions and the anxiety disorders is 
more complex than Beck and his colleagues initially theorized.  
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Despite this, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for accepting that depression 
and anxiety can be differentiated on the basis of particular cognitions. It obviously 
follows from Beck’s cognitive content-specificity hypothesis that it is possible to 
differentiate depression and anxiety by deploying measures of unique cognitive 
content and that discriminant validity can be enhanced by incorporating the 
appropriate cognitive constructs (Clark & Steer, 1996). Such specificity may be more 
evident in clinical groups and specific cognitive constructs may relate to the different 
anxiety disorders in varied ways.  
 
Cognitive vulnerability to anxiety 
Though distinct cognitive variables may be specific to a disorder, content-specificity 
does not establish cognitive causality (Lazarus, 1991). Indeed, Beck and Weishar 
(1989) emphasize that certain cognitions can be seen as “an intrinsic part of the 
disorder” (p. 23). As noted, content-specificity findings are less robust in non-clinical 
than in clinical samples and it is possible that during the symptomatic state, avoidance 
as well as mood-congruent processing perpetuate established difficulties (Beck, 1987; 
Brown et al., 2000, Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1996; Salkovskis, 1991). For example, 
individuals can adopt coping strategies or misinterpret their symptoms in ways that 
serve to exacerbate their difficulties (Bower, 1981; Brewin, 1996; Teasdale, 1993). In 
terms of depression, Teasdale (1996) argues that different mechanisms may be 
responsible for its onset as opposed to maintenance. In terms of anxiety, a recent study 
found that manipulating interpretive biases influenced emotional reactivity in response 
to a subsequent and potential stressor (Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews & Rutherford, 
2006). The authors conclude that an enduring tendency to selectively attend to material 
that is emotionally threatening may be causally implicated in anxiety vulnerability. It 
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is therefore possible that specific cognitive biases play a part in not just the 
maintenance but also the onset of anxiety disorders.  
 
 
Dysfunctional beliefs and attitudes 
Beck’s model goes beyond the descriptive and includes a causal level implicating 
specific cognitive constructs. Ingram, Odom and Mitchusson (2004) propose that 
though cognitive models vary somewhat in their conceptual details, they usually 
converge in viewing dysfunction in cognitive self-structures as being at the core of 
emotional disorders. Similarly, successful cognitive therapy is often seen to depend on 
the modification of such structures (Padesky, 1994).  
 
Beck equates such structures with underlying assumptions, attitudes and beliefs. He 
argues that dysfunctional schemas can be defined as enduring cognitive patterns, in the 
form of stable unconditional beliefs and conditional assumptions. These are acquired 
from early experience and direct how individuals conceptualize sets of stimuli (Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck, Epstein & Harrison, 1983). In anxiety, beliefs and 
rules embodied in the schemas centre on a sense of vulnerability and the perception 
that one will be unable to cope. These beliefs and rules provide the basis for the 
interpretation of ambiguous information, prompting negative automatic thoughts in 
specific situations (Beck & Emery, 1985). For example, in social anxiety, the threat is 
related to the perception and possibility that others may evaluate one negatively 
(Ingram & Kendall, 1987). In panic disorder, internal changes are viewed as 
threatening and are catastrophically misinterpreted (Clark, 1986). This view gives 
primacy to the propositional content of cognitive structures, which is viewed as 
verbally accessible. 
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Equating schemas with beliefs and assumptions has been criticised. Epstein (1998) 
views beliefs as representations in the cognitive-propositional system. Teasdale (1993) 
argues that schematic models contain implicit meaning, capable of eliciting emotion. 
Propositional representations of such emotion-related material can correspond to that 
of the implicational level. However, no causality can be attributed to it. Thus, beliefs 
and assumptions at the propositional level are not seen to directly influence depression. 
Teasdale’s views fit with the conclusion of researchers who have argued that though 
dysfunctional attitudes could be stable vulnerability factors, they are mood-state 
dependant and require priming to be accessed (e.g., Miranda, Persons & Byers, 1990). 
According to this view, cognitive vulnerability factors may exist. However, these will 
not be apparent until an individual experiences a change in emotional state. Thus, 
cognitive vulnerability factors may be implicated in vulnerability to future relapse, 
rather than onset. 
 
According to Teasdale (1993) the goal of Beckian therapy, to modify dysfunctional 
beliefs, is not sufficient to combat depression. This is because underlying schematic 
models (implicational) remain unchanged. However, arguably, emotional changes can 
come through the cognitive-propositional system. For example, when an individual re-
evaluates information, which her beliefs have been based on, the experiential system 
may subsequently undergo change (Salas-Auvert & Felgoise, 2003). Such change may 
be especially relevant to anxiety disorders where only minimal psycho-education and 
corrective information can result in changes in anxiety symptoms (e.g., Craske & 
Freed, 1995), arguably the result of changes in beliefs or conditional rules (Beck, 
1996). Similarly, an anxious individual can give herself instructions to remain in an 
aversive situation (Meichenbaum, 1977), which could lead to changes in cognitive 
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appraisals and beliefs (Beck, 1996). 
 
Beck (1996), in response to various criticisms, has expanded his original model of 
linear schematic processing in order to incorporate findings from cognitive psychology 
and science (e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981, Power & Champion, 1986; Segal, 1988; 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). He invokes the concept of ‘modes’. These can be defined 
as networks of affective, motivational, cognitive and behavioural structures of 
personality, that function together to handle specific demands. Each system is 
comprised of structures called schemas. Thus, the cognitive system is comprised of 
cognitive schemas, which are implicated in meaning assignment and information 
processing. Beck agrees with Kihlstrom (1987) that processing typically takes place 
outside of awareness but argues that content is in theory knowable. 
 
Beck suggests that the emotional disorders can be represented by specific modes. Their 
cognitive structure consists of a belief hierarchy, comprised of core beliefs and 
conditional rules. These shape meaning, explanations, expectations and interpretations. 
In phobic anxiety, a core belief might be “I am vulnerable to physical disaster”. A 
conditional rule might be “if I take the elevator, I am likely to get killed”. Should this 
person decide to use an elevator, the ‘phobic mode’ is activated (Beck, 1996, p. 14). 
Though this model departs somewhat from viewing cognitions as primary (Gurnan, 
2007), Beck (1996) maintains “the preliminary framework of a dysfunctional mode is 
already in place prior to the onset of psychological disorders” (p.12). In addition, 
Alford and Beck (1997) have emphasized that verbal propositions represent the key 
informational code at every level of processing.  
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There is evidence to suggest that existing in memory is an interconnected and broad 
knowledge base related to the self, which an individual draws upon in order to process 
emotive information in particular situations (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). Also, a 
distinction between fleeting automatic thoughts and more enduring cognitive variables 
(attitudes, assumptions and beliefs) is generally accepted (Kwon & Trey, 1994).  The 
implication of the above discussion is that a specific and causal cognitive vulnerability 
to anxiety may exist in the form of stable and enduring attitudes and beliefs, which are 
verbally accessible and differ from more transient cognitive factors. It is unclear at the 
moment whether these are risk factors in terms of onset, maintenance or both. Clearly 
symptomatic samples cannot be deployed exclusively to index such a predisposition.   
 
Proximal and distal cognitive factors 
Given the above discussion, it may be possible to distinguish between cognitive factors 
that are distal, existing before an individual developed a disorder and influencing 
onset, and those proximal or precipitating factors that are observable around the time 
of onset or during an episode of anxiety (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989; Beck, 
1987; Teasdale, 1993). As noted, findings related to cognitive specificity for cognitive 
content at the product and descriptive levels have been inconsistent. However, it has 
proved even more difficult to demonstrate specificity at the causal level (e.g., Beck et 
al., 1987; Haaga, Dyck & Ernst, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Some of the 
reasons for this are obvious, in that causality tests require longitudinal designs. 
However, there are also methodological issues that are of relevance. These will be 
reviewed below, following a discussion of the hypothesized role of stress in anxiety 
and the ‘transdiagnostic’ view. 
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Cognitive vulnerability-stress models: Stressful life events  
As noted, cognitive models suggest that individuals who possess certain cognitive 
characteristics are vulnerable to developing anxiety. However, because emotional 
disorders are theorized to result when congruent precipitating factors interact with such 
predispositions, cognitive vulnerability factors cannot, in isolation, explain why an 
individual develops a particular emotional disorder (Beck, 1996). Adopting such a 
cognitive vulnerability-stress framework indicates that emotional problems result when 
specific events trigger an emotional response in those who are cognitively predisposed 
(Alloy, Abramson, Raniere & Dyller, 1999; Beck, 1967, 1976). Congruency between a 
cognitive vulnerability and a matching negative event has not been studied in-depth 
but has tentative support (e.g., Mongrain & Zuroff, 1989). However, a substantial body 
of research confirms that stressors typically precede onset. In terms of anxiety, 
stressful events are associated with both the incidence and onset of anxiety disorders in 
children and teenagers (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus & Seligman, 1992). Stressful events 
have also been found to precipitate the development of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Barlow, 2002), agoraphobia (Last, Barlow & O’Brien, 1984), panic disorder (Roy-
Birne, Geraci & Udhe, 1986) and some phobias (Öst, 1987; Thyer, Nesse, Cameron, & 
Curtis, 1985). Thus, theory and evidence suggests that those attempting to 
conceptualize cognitive vulnerability factors in anxiety need to consider the role of 
stressful events.  
 
A Transdiagnostic Perspective 
The dominance of the cognitive model has precipitated a ‘disorder-focus’ as clinicians 
and researchers have tended to target a particular disorder in terms of understanding 
and treating it. This focus has largely come about as a result of the specificity 
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hypothesis (Butler, 2004), has been beneficial in terms of better understanding 
maintenance processes and has consequently led to the development of effective 
treatments for depression and specific anxiety disorders (Clark, 2004). For example, 
specific cognitive models and treatments have been proposed for obsessive compulsive 
disorder (e.g., Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985), generalised anxiety disorder (e.g., 
Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Wells, 1997), panic disorder (e.g., Clark, 1986; Reiss, 1991) 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000).   
 
However, this disorder-specific focus has arguably failed to accommodate those 
individuals who meet criteria for more than one anxiety disorder at any one time. A 
large-scale research study, involving over one thousand patients, found that over 50% 
of those diagnosed with an anxiety disorder also met criteria for at least an additional 
anxiety disorder or depression (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham & Mancill, 2001; 
Rodriguez et al., 2004).  
 
This disorder-specific focus has been challenged recently by accumulating findings 
that indicate that the anxiety disorders, as a group, are more alike, with regard to 
development and maintenance, than previously thought (Harvey et al., 2004).  
Remarkable similarities have been reported in terms of the processes that are 
hypothesised to be involved in the aetiology and maintenance of the various anxiety 
disorders, suggesting that they are ‘transdiagnostic processes’ (Harvey et al., 2004). 
For example, in terms of clinical features, compulsive checking behaviours, a central 
feature of obsessive compulsive disorder can also be observed in generalised anxiety 
disorder (Schut, Castonguay & Borkovec, 2001). Worry is a generalised anxiety 
disorder diagnostic criteria (APA, 1994). However, worry is also a feature of panic 
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disorder (with and without agoraphobia), specific and social phobia, obsessive 
compulsive disorder and depression (Andrews & Borcovec, 1988; Barlow, 1988; 
Brown, Antony & Barlow, 1992; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp & Vervaeke, 1999). As 
noted in the DSM-IV (1994), panic attacks occur in anxiety disorders other than panic 
disorder and more than 50% of individuals diagnosed with panic disorder have 
obsessive compulsive disorder symptoms (Torres, Dedomenico, Crepaldi & Miguel, 
2004).  Also, somatic symptoms and a degree of avoidance can be observed in all the 
anxiety disorders (Kessler et al., 2005). For example, anxiety-related somatic signs 
(e.g., increased heart rate and sweating) are diagnostic criteria for panic disorder, 
generalised anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. Symptom overlap 
amongst the anxiety disorders is acknowledged in DSM-IV and extensive guidelines 
for differential diagnosis are therefore delineated.   
 
A recent theory of the diathesis and persistence of emotional disorders (Allen, 
McHugh & Barlow, 2008; Moses & Barlow, 2006) suggests that depression and the 
anxiety disorders result from common underlying psychological vulnerabilities and 
that they are both maintained by behaviours that are emotion-driven (i.e., safety 
behaviours), emotional avoidance and maladaptive (cognitive) appraisals.  
 
Safety or ‘emotion-driven’ behaviours are motivated behaviours that occur as a 
reaction to emotional states (Moses & Barlow, 2006). They are common in panic 
disorder (Salkovskis, Clark & Gelder, 1996), social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (Harvey et al., 2004), post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and specific phobias (Sloan & Telch, 2002). More generally,  
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Wells and his colleagues (1995) have described such behaviours as the ‘major cause’ 
of the persistence of anxiety. 
 
Risk avoidance, the tendency to make particular decisions that avoid outcomes judged 
by the individual as potentially risky or dangerous (Maner et al., 2007), is another 
commonly observed transdiagnostic process. Thus, particular avoidance behaviours 
can be observed in panic disorder (Wells, 1997), specific phobias (Barlow, Raffa & 
Cohen, 2002), social phobia (Barlow, 2002) and in post-traumatic stress disorder 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). More generally, it has been proposed that, in addition to 
particular disorder-related risk avoidance behaviours, risk avoidance may be an 
influential aetiological and maintenance factor in all the anxiety disorders (Brown & 
Bohn, personal communication, February 24, 2008; Maner et al., 2007; Maner & 
Schmidt, 2006).  
 
Finally, overestimating the probability of the occurrence of negative events (i.e., 
‘probability inflation’ or ‘biased expectancy reasoning’) is a common feature of the 
anxiety disorders (Barlow & Craske, 2000; Moses & Barlow, 2006) and results in 
increased anxiety and avoidance (Constans & Mathews, 1993). This bias has been 
observed in generalised anxiety disorder (Butler & Mathews, 1983), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980), panic disorder (Arntz, Rauner & 
van den Hout, 1995) and social phobia (Foa, Franklin, Perry & Herbert, 1996). More 
generally, Moses and Barlow (2006) suggest this particular cognitive misappraisal may 
be common to all the emotional disorders.  
 
In conclusion, there is reason to believe that these transdiagnostic phenomena are not 
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linked to a particular anxiety disorder, as the cognitive model has emphasised, but may 
instead be observed across many of the anxiety disorders. It should be noted that 
another implication of the above is that it is again, in opposition to the cognitive 
model, being empahsized that it is not just the anxiety disorders, but the emotional 
disorders, that are more alike than different. In order to cope with the challenge of 
explaining anxiety and depression comorbidity, it has been suggested that it is possible 
that commonalities can now become the focus, given that much is known about 
differences (Butler, 2004; Hertel, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
 
Given that a discussion of transdiagnostic processes is a relatively new topic, 
established measures of the above mentioned constructs have been developed within 
an anxiety disorder specific framework. However, recently Brown (Brown & Bohn, 
personal communication, February 24, 2008) has developed three provisional scales in 
light of recent theoretical developments that promote a transdiagnostic approach to 
anxiety disorders. These index risk aversiveness or avoidance, behaviours engaged in 
to create a sense of safety (safety behaviours) and a tendency to overestimate the 
likelihood of negative events occurring. These scales will be discussed further in the 
Method section and are deployed in the reported study as general anxiety-related 
criterion validation measures.  
  
Cognitive vulnerability: Methodological issues  
Self-report 
In clinical psychology, self-report predominates, a state of affairs that has been 
frequently criticised (e.g., Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). It has been pointed out that survey 
respondents often offer answers that are inaccurate or unreliable, in response to 
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seemingly direct and objective questions (Bradburn, 1983; Burton & Blair, 1991; 
Sudman & Bradburn, 1974; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). Despite this, self-report 
measures also have clear advantages. They are arguably able to access subjective 
experience, facilitate normative comparisons and inferential testing, whilst being easy 
to administer and economical. However, given the criticisms raised, it is essential that 
self-report measures are valid. 
 
The arguably scant research accrued on dysfunctional beliefs in emotional disorders 
has typically adopted either a cognitive psychology or a paper-and-pencil methodology 
(Rector, Segal & Gemar, 1998).  The best-known example of this latter methodology is 
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS: Weissman & Beck, 1978), which aims to 
measure beliefs thought to be causally related to depression, as specified by Beck’s 
model. Whilst researchers have at times questioned the construct validity of the 
measure (e.g., Muran & Segal, 1992), it has been found to predict future depressive 
symptoms in remitted patients (e.g., Rush, Weissenberger & Eaves, 1986).  
 
Various authors argue that some of the difficulties associated with self-report arise 
from the fact that cognitions and affect can only be indirectly inferred (Hammen & 
Krantz, 1985). For example, a researcher who is interested in demonstrating the effect 
of negative automatic thoughts on mood may be unable to exclude the possibility that 
participants highly endorse a negative automatic thought item because they are 
experiencing high negative affect (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997).  
 
As noted, it has proved difficult to verify a basic principle of cognitive models - that 
cognition is a causal factor in affect and emotional difficulties (e.g., Haaga, Dyck & 
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Ernst, 1991). There may be two important reasons for this. First, it has been pointed 
out that many affect measures overlap with cognition measures, in terms of content 
(see Hammen & Krantz, 1985). 
 
Also, even those measures that seemingly index only cognitive phenomena, it is 
frequently not clear whether cognitive products or more stable phenomena are being 
indexed. Thus, as pointed out by Hawkes (2004), when a researcher attempts to 
interpret questionnaire scores, it is difficult to establish “whether responses represent a 
fleeting, surface level, situationally specific stream of thoughts, or whether they 
represent enduring, underlying beliefs, assumptions or propositions” (p. 13). Kwon 
and Trei (1994) emphasise that distinguishing beliefs from cognitive products such as 
negative thoughts, on the theoretical and measurement levels, is essential to an 
improved understanding of onset and persistence of depression. It seems obvious that 
the same argument can be applied to the study of anxiety.  
 
With respect to anxiety, various measures exist that aim to assess proximal variables in 
the form of situational and automatic thoughts (for a review see Glass & Arnkoff, 
1997). However, few measures attempt to index those more enduring respondent 
modes that may predispose individuals to anxiety. A noteworthy exception is the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index, which will be discussed below to highlight some of the 
methodological challenges involved in conceptualising and measuring a cognitive 
vulnerability to anxiety.  
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Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI: Reiss, Peterson, Gursky & McNally, 1986) is a 
self-report measure designed to index ‘anxiety sensitivity’ (AS). AS is defined as a 
fear of anxiety symptoms, arising from beliefs about the harmful effects of anxiety 
(Reiss & McNally, 1985). Though AS was initially viewed as a vulnerability to 
anxiety disorders generally, subsequent research has largely confirmed that AS is a 
specific predictor of panic disorder (Schmidt & Woolaway-Bickel, 2006). Other 
concerns have been raised. Lilienfeld, Jacob and Turner (1989), questioning the 
construct validity of the ASI, have suggested that the measure accesses fear of anxiety 
symptoms rather than underlying beliefs. A recent study by Brown and Hawkes (2008) 
found evidence to support this view. Adopting a cognitive interviewing procedure, 
they found that outpatients with anxiety problems, responding to items on the ASI 
whilst thinking aloud, mainly based their responses on retrieved instances of anxiety. 
Rather than accessing beliefs, the measure may therefore prompt the retrieval of 
previous affective experiences. In this way the measure may be confounded with 
anxiety symptoms. Therefore, it is not surprising that it has been found to be a good 
predictor of panic. “A predictor that is actually measuring the criterion will appear to 
be a very good predictor indeed” (Brown and Hawkes, 2008, p. 25).  
 
These findings do not indicate that the ASI is not a useful measure, as it may be a 
proximal predictor of symptoms, especially panic. In order to illustrate how this might 
come about, an example provided by Brown et al. (2000) is presented. Individual ASI, 
and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988) items can be considered. Items 
from the ASI (e.g., ‘When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be 
going crazy’) and the BAI (‘Fear of losing control’) are clearly conceptually related 
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and should therefore correlate. However, if the content of the items is thoroughly 
inspected it becomes clear that such a correlation is suspect as it is logical to assume 
that a considerable proportion of the possible covariance between ASI and BAI items 
is “’built-in’ as a logical consequence of their respective content” (Brown et al., 2000, 
p. 237). Thus, an individual cannot logically agree that when they cannot concentrate 
on a task they are concerned that they might go crazy, and simultaneously disagree 
with the BAI item, “claiming that they never fear losing control, because they do 
sometimes – namely when they cannot keep their mind on a task” (p. 237).  
 
Thus, various criticisms have been levied against the ASI, the measure most 
commonly seen to index an anxiety vulnerability factor, thereby supporting Beck’s 
(Beck & Emery, 1985) view that anxiety disorders have a cognitive aetiology 
(Teachman, 2005). The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale has been developed bearing 
the above-mentioned issues in mind.  
 
The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale 
The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale (AABS) was developed by Brown and 
colleagues (2000) with the aim of indexing enduring appraisals, attitudes and beliefs 
seen to constitute a cognitive vulnerability to anxiety, as outlined by cognitive-
behavioural models. The initial content of the scale was derived from the clinical 
cognitive literature in order to ensure sampling adequacy. To tackle potential 
limitations of scales such as the ASI, the wording of items is such that previous 
experiences of anxiety symptoms are not thought likely to be brought to mind. Items 
on the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978) also served as a 
blueprint for how to word items to ensure that they take account of clinical cognitive 
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theories (Brown et al., 2000). To further ensure content, and arguably also construct 
validity, initial items were sent to experts in the area of cognitive approaches to 
anxiety (Tenopyr, 1977). These experts provided validity ratings and answered open-
ended questions regarding the content of items (see Brown et al., 2000, for a full 
discussion of the development of the AABS). Thus, the development of the scale 
followed scale development best-practice guidelines (see Glass & Arnkoff, 1997). 
The AABS has been described in terms of its factor structure and psychometric 
properties in a student sample (Brown et al., 2000). From a 58-item pool, the authors 
retained 36 items that loaded on three factors (Catastrophizing, Vigilance-Avoidance 
and Imagination). The authors also found evidence to support the view that the scale 
measures theoretically relevant constructs reliably. A cross-lagged panel analysis 
suggested that a causal relationship exists between the constructs measured and 
anxiety, but not depression, indicating discriminant validity. Additionally, analyses 
were consistent with the prediction that constructs indexed by the AABS precede 
anxiety symptoms, suggesting predictive validity (Brown et al., 2000).  
 
Recently, evidence has been found to further support the construct validity of the 
AABS. As noted, Brown and Hawkes (2008) conducted a cognitive interviewing 
study, which required that respondents provide think aloud protocols (i.e., verbal 
reports) while responding to items on the AABS (as well as the ASI). As anticipated, 
responses to the AABS were based on appraisals and were mostly unconfounded with 
the previous experience of affect. Thus, it appeared that the AABS could potentially 
meet the requirements of an unconfounded scale of anxiety vulnerability.   
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Expanding on the example provided above regarding the relationship between the ASI 
and symptom measures such as the BAI, AABS scores (as a distal index of anxiety 
vulnerability) should be related to scores on the ASI (more proximal index of 
symptoms) and finally to symptom measures. Thus, the relationship between AABS-
type items and symptom scores would be expected to increase in more symptomatic 
groups as it is (theoretically) possible to hold beliefs that predispose one to anxiety, 
without experiencing anxiety symptoms. 
 
Following the Brown et al. (2000) study, a fundamental review of the scale was 
undertaken to examine its validity (Brown & Hawkes, 2008). Additionally, 
examination of item content to ensure best wording and coverage of relevant content 
domains resulted in duplicative and redundant items being dropped and other items 
being reworded. Consequently, the measure that resulted, the AABS-Revised (AABS-
R) includes 53 items that require endorsement on a seven-point scale. The scale will be 
further discussed in the Method section.  
 
Reliability and validity 
When developing a measure, there exist a collection of criteria that researchers must 
chose from. These criteria are subsumed by the topics of measurement consistency 
(reliability) and what a particular questionnaire measures (validity). Reliability is an 
essential but not sufficient requirement for high validity. Because all estimations of 
reliability are basically concerned with the level of agreement or consistency between 
sets of scores, the correlation (reliability) coefficient is the appropriate index of 
agreement. Chronbach’s alpha (Chronbach, 1951) can be deployed to examine the 
internal consistency of a scale or subscale (Cortina, 1993). It is also possible to 
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improve the internal consistency of a scale by removing those items that fail to 
correlate well with other scale items (Loewenthal, 1996). L. A. Clark and Watson 
(1995) argue that Chronbach’s alpha above .80 is acceptable, though for research 
purposes an alpha level of .70 may be acceptable (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
 
Construct validation provides the basis required for interpreting scores and is 
traditionally seen to necessitate accumulation of theoretically consistent evidence 
derived from various sources (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Messic, 1995). Various 
strategies can be deployed to develop this network of cumulative findings that supports 
a construct’s definition.  Criterion-related evidence involves testing the prediction that 
scores on a measure are associated or not associated with scores on a criterion measure 
that it is supposed to predict or be dissimilar from (convergent and discriminant 
validation, respectively). Such validation can involve predictive or concurrent designs 
(Wernimont & Campbell, 1968) and highlights the need for criterion measures to be 
relevant, reliable and valid (Guion, 1987). Also, if criterion ratings are undertaken, the 
rater must be blind (Brown, 1979). Finally, internal consistency and factor analyses 
can contribute to a better understanding of the construct (e.g., Shore & Tetrick, 1991). 
 
It is important to note that construct validation, in effect, combines two separate issues 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). The first issue is concerned with supporting the validity of 
a particular construct (e.g., beliefs). The second issue is related to establishing that a 
particular measure actually measures the particular construct (i.e., beliefs). These 
issues could be disregarded if a particular construct had been empirically proven as 
valid. However, it is often the case that this cannot be assumed. As discussed 
previously, there is a general assumption in the literature that attitudes and beliefs 
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exist, can be distinguished from automatic thoughts and that they possibly are causal 
factors in the aetiology of anxiety. However, these suggestions have not been 
consistently confirmed and therefore, the construct validity of these phenomena (i.e., 
causal attitudes and beliefs) remains an empirical question. A measure of such 
phenomena, if found to be valid, may contribute to the evidence required for construct 
validation of the constructs themselves.  
 
The strategies listed above can be seen to constitute construct-related evidence. 
However, Feldman and Lynch (1988) argue that experimental artefacts sometimes 
account for predicted effects in self-report, as questionnaire cues (e.g., wording of 
items) can affect the structural relations among items. Coyne (1989) similarly suggests 
that participants completing a questionnaire, when faced with an item that does not 
apply to them, may endorse an item. However, this endorsement will not be a valid 
reflection of their cognitive activity.  
 
Along with an emphasis on self-report has come an emphasis on quantitative 
validation studies, investigating concurrent associations. Campbell and Fiske (1958) 
suggest that broadening validation efforts to include different types of validity 
correlations, such as discriminant ones, will increase a researcher’s confidence that a 
scale is valid. However, discriminant validity correlations can be difficult to interpret. 
For example and as previously noted, some types of cognitions are thought to be 
shared among the emotional disorders. Thus, finding evidence of discriminant validity 
can also be interpreted as evidence for the opposite (Glass & Arnkoff, 1997).  
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Studies of process 
The previous discussion implies that traditional notions of validity, though obviously 
useful, may be limited. Cronbach and Meehl (1955) suggest a logical method for 
examining what explains variability on a measure: observe closely the performance 
process of respondents. Inviting individuals to think aloud as they respond to questions 
is one methodology that has been proposed. The ensuing verbal protocols can then be 
examined and underlying processes deduced (Bickart & Felcher, 1996). This strategy 
allows researchers to ensure that those responding to a measure intended to access 
cognitions are indeed accessing cognitions more often than not. The cognitive 
interviewing approach provides a means to this end (e.g., Tourangeau, 1984). It can 
take the form of ‘think-aloud- interviewing’ (Ericsson & Simon, 1980) whereby 
respondents are asked to ‘think-aloud’ whilst they respond to items on a measure. This 
methodology facilitates construct validation by allowing access to the thought 
processes that participants engage in when responding to a self-report measure. 
Consequently, it can increase confidence that the measure in fact measures what it is 
intended to measure. As noted by Borsboom, Mellenbergh and van Heerden (2004) in 
their critique of traditional conceptions of validity, correlational tables can never 
replace an understanding of processes that underlie responses. 
 
Rationale for a Measure of Anxiety-Related Attitudes and Beliefs 
A case can be made for the importance of developing a measure of enduring cognitive 
constructs thought to be causally implicated in anxiety, and not contaminated by 
affective symptoms. Because such a cognitive predisposition is seen as antecedent to 
the later development of anxiety symptoms, it is anticipated that the measure will be a 
useful clinical tool that can enhance the identification of those who are at risk (e.g., of 
 37
relapse), leading to more effective prevention and intervention. Given the cognitive 
models reviewed, it is anticipated that the measure could index more distal risk than 
existing measures, and could in this way be used to predict who is likely to develop 
anxiety sensitivity and eventually a diagnosable anxiety disorder (Brown et al., 2000). 
Similarly, the measure may be of use in testing some of the prediction of the cognitive 
model and if found to be valid, could allow clinical practitioners to identify targets and 
monitor progress in therapy. Based on the review of the literature, the aims of the 
study will be presented. 
 
Aims 
Guided by the literature, the overall aim of the study reported here is to further develop 
and validate a questionnaire of attitudes and beliefs thought to predispose individuals 
to anxiety disorders, in a student and analogue clinical sample. Despite initial 
encouraging findings, there are a number outstanding issues. First, the revised 
measures construct validity needs to be assessed with another cognitive interviewing 
study. This approach will also indicate whether any items need to be eliminated or 
revised before they are included in the final measure and before that measure is 
validated in the larger sample. Second, a large sample is needed to perform a factor 
analysis in order to determine the factor structure of the revised AABS. Third, the 
reliability of the AABS and its subscales needs to be determined. Fourth, concurrent 
criterion-related (convergent and discriminant) validation is required. Thus, it is 
important to administer the AABS to a relevant sample in order to look at the 
associations between items on the AABS and criterion measures.  Given that a 
previous investigation (Brown et al., 2000) involved a student sample, the above needs 
to be investigated in a more symptomatic sample, in addition to a student sample. 
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Student samples are important given that many in such groups are likely to develop 
anxiety disorders, which the AABS is hypothesized to predict (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). As previously noted, non-
symptomatic groups are important in order to investigate temporal questions. 
 
In terms of the fourth aim, given that the scale constructs were not developed with the 
aim of mapping onto diagnostic criteria directly, but to rather be present across the 
anxiety disorders to a varying degree, specific predictions are based on the findings of 
Brown et al (2000) as well as the reviewed literature. Criterion measures were selected 
on the same basis. The predictions made for particular criterion measures are depicted 
in the Results section but are discussed in detail below. 
 
In particular, scores on the AABS are predicted to be associated with the ASI, as well 
as with a general measure of anxiety symptoms, and given Beck’s vulnerability-stress 
model, with stress levels. Given the finding that depression and anxiety symptom 
measures are typically correlated and the fact that common factors have been 
suggested, the AABS is expected to correlate with depression. However, here the 
cognitive-content specificity hypothesis is operationalized by predicting that the 
correlation between the AABS and anxiety should be higher than that between the 
AABS and depression.  
 
A key prediction is that scores on the AABS will be differentially associated with 
scores on anxiety symptom measures in clinical and non-clinical samples.  The AABS 
aims to access underlying beliefs, which can be endorsed without having experienced 
anxiety problems in the past. On the other hand, endorsing items on symptom 
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measures and measures such as the ASI, which may be a more proximal predictor, 
logically implies that one would also endorse items on the AABS. Therefore, the 
relationship between items on the AABS and anxiety symptom measures should be 
stronger in clinical samples (Brown et al., 2000). 
 
In addition, the AABS is predicted to be associated with various proposed correlates of 
anxiety. An inspection of AABS item content suggested that the measure potentially 
indexed catastrophic beliefs. Given that panic disorder is seen to involve catastrophic 
cognitions, such beliefs were predicted to be related to safety behaviours (Salkovskis 
et al., 1996), a tendency to overestimate the probability of the occurrence of negative 
events (Arntz et al., 1995) and concerns about physical and cognitive phenomena, 
which are often catastrophically misinterpreted in panic (Clark, 1986).  
 
Other items appeared to represent beliefs about the importance of certainty, caution, 
planning and vigilance. Such beliefs were predicted to be associated with a tendency to 
adopt safety behaviours, a tendency to overestimate the occurrence of negative 
outcomes and being aversive to taking risks, all of which could potentially raise 
individuals’ risk of developing difficulties with anxiety (Maner & Schmidt, 2006; 
Maner et al., 2007; Miranda & Mennin, 2007; Moses & Barlow, 2006). These items 
appeared to be conceptually related to the concept of intolerance of uncertainty, which 
represents “beliefs about the necessity of being certain, about the capacity to cope with 
unpredictable change” (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997). 
Such beliefs have been found to be associated with worry, generalised anxiety, 
obsessive compulsive disorder (as well as with compulsive checking behaviours) and 
anxiety sensitivity (e.g., Dugas, Gosselin & Ladouceur, 2001; Ladouceur, Gosselin & 
 40
Dugas, 2000; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi & Foa, 2003). Therefore, these items were 
predicted to be related to measures of these constructs. 
 
An additional cluster of items appeared to index social beliefs and was therefore 
expected to be associated with social anxiety, social AS concerns, safety behaviours, 
social risk avoidance and a tendency to expect negative outcomes (Carleton, Collimore 
& Asmundson, 2007; Clark & Wells, 1995; Foa et al., 1996; Wells, 1997). Given the 
noted relationship between social anxiety and worry, these items were additionally 
predicted to be associated with a measure of worry. 
 
A different item cluster seemed to represent beliefs about the negative consequences of 
emotional experiences. Similar to the concept of ‘emotional reasoning’ (Beck & 
Emery, 1985), whereby individuals make invalid inferences about phenomena based 
on subjective affective responses (Arntz et al., 1995), these items where hypothesized 
to be associated with the ASI and physical and cognitive concerns in particular (Clark, 
1999). As noted, AS is defined as a fear of anxiety symptoms, arising from beliefs 
about the harmful effects of anxiety. Arntz and colleagues have suggested emotional 
reasoning is a predisposing factor in anxiety that is not disorder specific. This item 
cluster was therefore expected to be related to anxiety-relevant measures generally.  
 
The final item cluster appeared to measure beliefs about the importance and role of 
thoughts in having real life negative outcomes. The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group (e.g., 2003) has described such beliefs as a key feature of obsessive 
compulsive disorder. Such beliefs may result in an inflation of felt personal 
responsibility and observable behaviours such as compulsive checking (Shafran, 
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Thordarson & Rachman, 1996) As such, these items were predicted to be associated 
with a measure of obsessive compulsive correlates, a tendency to overestimate the 
likelihood of negative events occurring, as well as with the adoption of particular 
safety behaviours (Harvey et al., 2004; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).  
 
In summary, the research aims to: 
i) Investigate whether the AABS appears to index attitudes and beliefs 
ii) Determine the underlying factor structure of the AABS 
iii) Assess whether the AABS and its subscales are reliable 
iv) Perform a correlational analysis in order to assess whether the AABS 
correlates more highly with anxiety than depression 
v) Perform a correlational analysis to investigate whether the relationship 
between items on the AABS and anxiety symptom measures is stronger in a 
clinical sample 
vi) Perform a correlational analysis to investigate whether the measure and its 
subscales correlate with anxiety-related criterion measures in predictable 
ways  (the specific predictions are depicted in the Results section) 
 
Given that different prediction can be derived from cognitive models and the 
transdiagnostic perspective, an exploration of the relationship between attitudes and 
beliefs and the various anxiety-related criterion measures, may also cast light on which 
of these perspectives gain more support generally.  
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Method 
Overview 
Prior to administering the Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale-Revised (AABS-R) and 
accompanying validation measures, cognitive interviews were carried out and the 
resultant verbal protocols analysed. This was largely to assess the acceptability of 
items on the AABS-R and to gauge the measure’s construct validity (i.e., the 
hypothesis that participants respond to items on the basis of cognitive appraisals rather 
than episodic or affective-based retrieval).   
 
Following evaluation of the AABS-R items through the cognitive interviewing task, a 
large sample of participants completed an online battery of measures. This main 
portion of the study proceeded in two phases and can be described as a cross-sectional, 
correlational and factor analysis survey. As such, all variables were collected at a 
single point in time. In the first phase, a shorter battery was administered in 
conjunction with a parallel study (Brown & Bohn, personal communication, February 
24, 2008)1, sharing data with the current study, in which three anxiety-related 
transdiagnostic criterion measures are being developed (Brief Safety Behaviour Scale, 
Brief Inflation of Probability Scale, and the Brief Aversiveness to Risk Scale, all of 
which are described below). This was done as longer versions of these new scales were 
initially administered and the resulting battery would have been too lengthy and 
therefore burdensome.  The initial subset of data permitted shortening of the three new 
scales, thus making room for a longer battery of criterion measures in the second 
                                                 
1 This study was carried out independently from the one here described. However, data 
were shared.  
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phase.  The psychometric analyses of the three scales are only reported in general 
terms in the present study.  
 
Participants 
For the cognitive interviewing task, a convenience sample of four undergraduate 
female students (18-22 years old) from Royal Holloway’s, University of London 
research participation scheme, was recruited to provide cognitive interviews. 
Participants, sought through an information sheet (see Appendix 1) posted in the 
research participation area at Royal Holloway, were fluent English speakers who 
received course credit for taking part.  
 
The sample in the main validation portion of the study included 346 participants, of 
which 151 participants completed the shorter initial battery and 195 (139 females and 
56 males, mean age = 33.61, SD = 10.22, range = 13-64) participants completed the 
longer battery that included additional measures.  
 
Of those who completed the shorter battery, 97 (78 females and 19 males, mean age = 
21.98, SD = 5.48, range = 18-48) were undergraduates at Royal Holloway, University 
of London. The remaining 54 participants (39 females and 15 males, mean age = 
35.43, SD = 12.79, range = 16-65) who completed the shorter battery were recruited 
from online communities for specific anxiety disorders in the United Kingdom. The 
195 participants who completed the longer battery were also members of online 
communities for specific anxiety disorders. As motivation to participate, student and 
members of web communities for anxiety disorders had the option of being entered 
into a prize draw.  
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In addition, 20 NHS patients were recruited from West London Mental Health Trust 
Primary and Secondary Care Psychological Therapies Service in Hammersmith, as 
well as practices in the Hammersmith and Fulham area of London. These respondents 
had the option of receiving a high street store voucher in return for their participation. 
Because the number of recruited NHS participants was less than what was anticipated 
and required for statistical analysis, these participants were eventually excluded. Given 
the low response rate the representativeness of the sample was also suspect. A 
discussion of the recruitment of these participants is discussed for the sake of 
completeness. It should be noted that because participants could interrupt their Internet 
sessions at any point, the numbers who completed any given scale varied. 
 
Recruitment of participants for the main study 
Student recruitment 
Students at Royal Holloway, University of London, received a recruitment message on 
the college intranet asking for their participation (see Appendix 2). The message 
contained a hyperlink2, through which students could access the website that hosted 
the survey. Flyers (with the same content) were also left in the research participation 
area at Royal Holloway and on college grounds.  
 
Online recruitment 
A list of web sites and communities for individuals with specific anxiety disorders was 
compiled by using the Internet search engine Google and entering the key words, 
                                                 
2 A hyperlink is an Internet address that individuals can click on to be directed to a 
particular site. 
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“anxiety support group” or “anxiety support forum3”. Further web sites and 
communities were found from those cited on previously identified sites. If forum 
members had not posted comments in the previous week, the forum was excluded.  
 
Once the list had been finalised, the researcher familiarised herself with the philosophy 
and rules of the community and then contacted the sites and forums. If an 
administrator or moderator4 could be identified, the researcher contacted this person 
via email (see Appendix 3). If no one person was responsible for a forum, the 
researcher posted a short message on the forum, asking members whether they were 
happy for her to post a brief description of a study she was hoping to recruit for. If 
permission was granted, a recruitment message like the one for students (see Appendix 
2), but containing a different hyperlink, was posted in an appropriate place on the 
website. This was done either by the administrator or moderator, or in the case of 
forums without moderators, by the researcher herself. In the latter case, the message 
was listed as a separate topic thread5 in an appropriate section. Forum members 
frequently commented on the thread and asked questions about the study. The 
researcher made sure to answer every question and respond to every comment, as any 
other responsible and active member. The researcher remained transparent throughout. 
None of the forums that the researcher approached denied her membership.  
The online communities that took part, included sites and forums designed for 
individuals experiencing symptoms of panic, social anxiety, specific phobias, 
                                                 
3 A forum is an online discussion group, which allows participants with a common 
interest to exchange messages. 
4 Administrators and moderators are individuals accountable for managing and running 
an online community as well as ensuring appropriate use. 
5 A topic thread is an online conversation that is grouped by a specific topic. 
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obsessive compulsive symptoms and anxiety generally (see Appendix 4 for a list of the 
communities that agreed to take part).  
 
NHS recruitment 
Various recruitment methods were employed for recruiting NHS patients. First, a flyer 
with a website link on it (see Appendix 5) was posted in the reception areas of seven 
GP services in the Hammersmith and Fulham area. Second, an information letter (see 
Appendix 6) was posted with all opt-in letters sent out between 25th March and 10th 
June 2008 from the Psychological Therapies Service in Hammersmith. The aim was to 
have represented individuals who present in primary and secondary care for both 
psychological and medical reasons. 
 
Full sample participant demographics 
As noted, the total sample was comprised of 346 participants (256 females and 90 
males, mean age = 30.63, SD = 11.04, range = 13-64). In addition to age and gender, 
basic information was collected on ethnicity, education level, employment status, 
marital status and recruitment source, and is presented in Table 1. Group membership 
in terms of ethnicity was re-classified into ‘white’ and ‘other’, as only very few 
participants assigned themselves to each non-white group. Two individuals did not 
offer information regarding employment status. 
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Table 1. 
Full Sample Status on Gender, Ethnicity, Education level, Employment Status, Marital 
Status and Recruitment Source 
Variable Category n % 
Ethnicity White 
Other 
318 
28 
92 
8 
Education Level No Qualifications 
GCSE/O’level 
Vocational/A’level 
Degree or Higher 
16 
49 
146 
135 
4.6 
14.2 
42.2 
39 
Employment Status Part/Full Time Employment 
Full Time Student 
Leave/Unemployed/Retired 
205 
49 
90 
59.2 
14.2 
26 
Marital Status Married 
Relationship/Cohabiting 
Single/Separated/Divorced 
79 
84 
183 
22.8 
24.3 
52.9 
Recruitment Source Royal Holloway 
Anxiety Internet Support Groups 
97 
249 
28 
72 
 
Sub-sample participant demographics 
The undergraduate sample had a demographic profile that was broadly similar to that 
of UK undergraduates (National Statistics Online, 2006) in terms of marital status, 
education and age. However, they were somewhat less likely to identify as White 
British (61.9% of the sample identified themselves as White British) and females 
(80.4%) were overrepresented. Finally, 34% of undergraduates reported experiencing 
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(currently or in the past) mental health difficulties. This is higher than a recently 
estimated prevalence rate of 25% for diagnosable mental health difficulties in the adult 
UK population (Mental Health Foundation, 2008). However, not all students who 
reported mental health difficulties are expected to have had a formal diagnosis and 
consequently mental health difficulties are likely to have been over-reported.  
The Internet support group sample was broadly similar to the general UK adult 
population (Office for National Statistics Reports, 2000, 2001) in terms of marital 
status and ethnicity. However, the sample was more highly educated (45% indicated 
that they had a ‘degree or higher’) and women were again overrepresented (71%). 
These participants were also more likely to be unemployed or on leave (25%). As 
expected, they were also much more likely to report having experienced mental health 
difficulties. Thus, 82% indicated that they had a mental health problem. Respondents 
had the option of specifying their particular difficulties. Because not everyone 
completed this section, it is not possible to accurately specify the particular categories, 
apart from saying that generally, depression and anxiety were the most commonly 
stated mental health difficulties. As with the students, it is unclear how many of these 
participants had a formal diagnosis, though most of them stated that they did. 
 
In conclusion, as a whole, the sample was generally younger and more highly educated 
than the general UK population. In addition, females were overrepresented. Members 
of Internet support groups were more likely to be unemployed or on leave than is 
typical of the UK population, and mental health difficulties were overrepresented as 
expected. 
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Sampling procedure and sample rationale 
The sample was a non-probabilistic and self-selected one. As such, a response rate 
could not be determined. 
 
Traditionally, it has been advised that a participants-to-variables ratio of either 4:1 or 
5:1 is adequate for exploratory factor analysis (Floyd & Widaman, 1995) and that at a 
minimum the sample size should be N = 200 (Gorsuch, 1983). Therefore, in order to 
identify the dimensions of the AABS-R, a measure comprised of 53 items, a sample 
size of N = 208 was deemed adequate, which the current study exceeded.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
The study was given a favourable opinion by the Royal Holloway Ethics Committee 
(Appendix 7), the Royal Holloway, University of London Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee (Appendix 8) and the Riverside Research Ethics Committee 
(Appendix 9).  
 
As all participants took part online, ethical guidelines specific to Internet-mediated 
research (British Psychological Society, 2007; Mathy, Kerr & Haydin, 2003) were 
consulted to supplement general ethical principles (i.e., BPS, 2006). Thus, research 
instruments were accessed and hosted on a secure, specific and credible web page6. 
Informed consent was obtained on the very first web page, which also contained 
information about the study, along with the researcher’s complete contact details. The 
researcher aimed to make the initial study information easy to understand and clear to 
                                                 
6 The survey was hosted by www.surveymonkey.com, a site given a favourable 
opinion by the American Psychological Association (Kraut et al., 2004). 
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ensure that consent was informed. The page was customised to ensure that consent was 
obtained before participants could proceed. Participants were also provided with the 
option of refusing consent and terminating their participation. As respondents did not 
have direct contact with the researcher whilst responding to questions, upset could not 
be monitored. Therefore, the information section provided contact details for 
organizations that could offer support. 
 
Given that incentives were used and in order to offer participants a summary of the 
findings upon the study’s conclusion, participants had the option of providing contact 
details. To ensure anonymity, participants who completed the survey were directed to a 
separate webpage where they could provide their details. Finally, the researcher 
followed Cho and La Rose’s (1999) recommendations for communicating with online 
communities. Consequently, the researcher maintained transparency about her reasons 
for being online, her name and position as well as contact details. The researcher also 
obtained full consent of community leaders before approaching participants. 
 
Measures 
Provisional scales 
The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale- Revised (AABS-R) 
As previously noted (see p. 32), the AABS was developed by Brown and his 
colleagues (2000) as a measure of enduring attitudes and beliefs believed to constitute 
a cognitive vulnerability to anxiety. Following a fundamental review of the scale, it  
(AABS-R) includes 53 items that require endorsement on a seven-point scale (see 
Appendix 10).  
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The Brief Inflated Probabilities Scale-13 (BIPS-13) 
 The BIPS (see Appendix 11) contains 13 items and requires that respondents indicate 
what they believe is the probability of experiencing negative life events such as 
‘getting the flu this year’.  Items were sampled from Ropeik and Gray’s (2002) 
discussion of undesirable events that people are commonly concerned about, as well as 
the actual odds of these events taking place. Data collected in the initial portion of the 
validation study was analysed by Brown & Bohn (personal communication, February 
24, 2008) to investigate the internal consistency of the measure. The measure appeared 
to be internally consistent (alpha = .78) and consequently was used in the second phase 
of the reported validation study. Further psychometric data on the BIPS are presented 
in the Results section. 
 
The Brief Safety Behaviour Scale-17 (BSBS-17) 
The initial BSBS was a 30-item scale that was developed to enquire about various 
safety behaviours that anxious respondents might engage in to make themselves feel 
safe. Items were drawn from previous scales of diagnosis-specific safety behaviours, 
such as The Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987).  Participants are asked 
to rate how often they engage in behaviours such as ‘take deep breaths before going 
into a social situation’, using a four-point response format, where 0 = never or almost 
never and 3 = always. The BSBS was reduced to 17 items based on analyses 
conducted in the previously mentioned Brown and Bohn (personal communication, 
February 24, 2008) parallel study, using a subset of the current sample that completed 
the longer version of the scale.  They conducted principal components analyses, which 
resulted in a reduction of items and the identification of two factors, a general safety 
subscale (11 items) as well as a checking subscale (6 items). These accounted for 45% 
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of the variance. The new scale, the BSBS-17 (see Appendix 12), appeared to be 
internally consistent (the alpha for the full scale = .86, alpha for the general scale = .84 
and for the checking subscale = .81). Further psychometric data on the BSBS are 
presented within the Results section. 
 
The Brief Aversiveness to Risk Scale-10 (BARS-10) 
The initial BARS contained 25 items and was developed to index behaviours that 
might be considered risky in some respect. Respondents are asked to rate the percent 
likelihood (from 0 to100 %) that they would engage in behaviours such as 
‘complaining about unacceptable service’.  Items were drawn from pre-existing 
measures of risk (e.g., Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002) and from typical avoidance 
behaviours observed in clinical practice.  
 
Data from the initial portion of the validation sample was used by Brown and Bohn 
(personal communication, February 24, 2008) to ascertain the underlying structure of 
the BARS, using principal factor analysis. Consequently, the scale was reduced to 10 
items (see Appendix 13). A two-factor solution was obtained and the factors together 
accounted for 66% of the variance. Items that loaded strongly onto the first factor 
mainly represented risk taking in social situations (e.g., openly taking the unpopular 
side in a group of people). Items that loaded onto the second factor represented risk 
taking that might involve physical harm (e.g., rafting down a fast moving river). The 
two factors were named ‘social’ and ‘physical’ concerns, respectively. The internal 
consistency of the full scale was .83, whereas the internal consistency of the ‘social’ 
and ‘physical’ concerns scales was .89 and .83 respectively. Further psychometric data 
on the BARS are presented within the Results section. 
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Established scales 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3) 
The ASI-3 (see Appendix 14) is an 18-item self-report measure designed to index 
anxiety sensitivity (AS) using a five-point response format, where 1 = very little and 5 
= very much (Taylor et al., 2007). As noted, AS is defined as a fear of anxiety 
symptoms, arising from beliefs about the harmful effects of anxiety (Reiss & McNally, 
1985). The measure was derived from the previously discussed (see p. 30) Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index (ASI: Reiss et al., 1986) and is an attempt to improve its’ unstable 
factor structure. The ASI-3 is comprised of three factors: Cognitive, Social and 
Physical concerns. The authors claim that cognitive concerns are represented by beliefs 
about the harmful effects of cognitive difficulties (e.g., concentration difficulties). 
Social concerns are comprised of beliefs about the negative effects of observable 
anxiety reactions. Finally, physical concerns are represented by beliefs about the 
harmful effects of physical reactions that are related to anxiety. 
 
Taylor and colleagues (2007) conducted a series of studies (using clinical and 
undergraduate samples) and found that the internal consistency of the measure was 
acceptable  (internal consistency was at or above .70 for the total scale and three 
subscales). They conclude that the scale displayed good functioning on validity indices 
and that it has better psychometric properties than the original scale.  
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21) 
 The DASS-21 (see Appendix 15) is a short form of the 42-item self-report measure 
developed by Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) to assess current emotional states of 
anxiety, depression and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 2002). This self-report measure 
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contains 21 items and its’ three scales are comprised of seven items each. Respondents 
indicate the extent to which statements such as ‘I found it hard to wind down’ applied 
to them over the preceding week, using a four-point response format, where 0 = did 
not apply to me at all and 3 = applied to me very much. Henry and Crawford (2005) 
found that the scales appeared to possess good validity and concluded that the internal 
consistency of the scales was satisfactory (alpha = .88 for the total scale) in a non-
clinical sample. Cronbach’s alphas for the stress, anxiety and depression subscales 
were .93, .90 and .88, respectively. A previous study has reached similar conclusions 
in a clinical and community sample (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns & Swinson, 1998). 
Because the scales were developed with the aim of being discriminant measures of 
depression and anxiety, these were seen as more appropriate measures of the 
constructs than other well-validated measures (Norton, 2007). 
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
 The PSWQ (see Appendix 16) is a 16-item self-report instrument that indexes an 
individual’s general propensity to worry, on a five-point scale, where 1 = not at all 
typical and 5 = very typical (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990). The authors 
found evidence to suggest that the measure is highly internally consistent, possesses 
good test-retest reliability (overall alpha = .95; test-retest reliability = .93) and is a 
valid measure of worry. This conclusion has been supported by other studies (e.g., 
Brown, 2003). The measure has been used to identify individuals who meet criteria for 
a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Fresco, Mennin, Heimberg, & 
Turk, 2003) and has been used to discriminate between those with a diagnosis of GAD 
and other anxiety presentations (e.g., obsessive compulsive disorder) (Brown et al., 
1992).  
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Thought-Action Fusion Scale-Revised (TAFS-R) 
 The TAFS-R (see Appendix 17) is a 19-item self-report questionnaire designed to 
measure thought-action fusion (TAF) beliefs (Shafran et al., 1996). These are cognitive 
biases in which individuals fuse (psychologically) thoughts and actions, which are 
considered to be implicated in obsessive compulsive disorder. The scale is composed 
of two subscales, Moral and Likelihood beliefs. Moral TAF beliefs are represented by 
items such as ‘If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as doing harm’. 
Likelihood beliefs can be self-referential, such as ‘If I think of myself being injured in 
a fall, this increases the risk that I will have a fall and be injured’. They can also relate 
to others, such as ‘If I think of a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk 
that they will lose their job’. Likelihood beliefs are typically combined into a single 
subscale (Shafran et al., 1996). Respondents endorse items using a five-point response 
format, where 0 = disagree strongly and 4 = agree strongly. The authors investigated 
the psychometric properties of the scale in obsessional, student and community 
samples. The internal consistency of the measure and its two subscales was high 
(Cronbach’s alpha range = .85-.96) in all samples and TAF was significantly higher 
amongst those who met criteria for obsessive compulsive disorder than those who 
formed the non-clinical group.  
 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation-II (BFNE-II) 
 The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) measures 
individuals’ tolerance for possible negative evaluations by others. Fearing negative 
evaluation is a key feature of social phobia. However, the measure may be a better 
predictor of social anxiety than phobia (e.g., Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The BFNE-II 
(see Appendix 18) is the result of attempts to improve the psychometric properties of 
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the original scale and consists of eight items, which require endorsement on a five-
point scale, where 0 = agree very little and 4 = agree very much (Carleton et al., 2006). 
The developers found, in a non-clinical sample, that the scale demonstrated excellent 
internal consistency (alpha = .96) and was significantly correlated with instruments 
related to social anxiety. 
 
Procedure 
Cognitive interviewing study 
Cognitive interviewing generally includes both verbal probing and think-aloud 
techniques to access the thought process of respondents (Willis, 2005). However, in 
order to minimise potential interviewer-imposed bias, the cognitive interview 
methodology adopted favoured think-aloud techniques (Ericson & Simon, 1984). As 
such, interviewer input was restricted to prompting interviewees to ‘keep talking’ if 
they were silent for more than ten seconds and the interviewer sat out of view. 
However, verbal probing was also deployed if considered appropriate (Willis, 2005). 
This was done retrospectively, after interviewees had responded to all questions on the 
AABS-R, in order to minimise interjections from the researcher and thus potential 
bias.  
 
The manner in which the researcher introduced and conducted the cognitive interview 
was standardized. The interview schedule (see Appendix 19) was adapted from Brown 
and Hawkes (2008) and is based on Campanelli and Collins’s (2002) recommendations 
for carrying out cognitive interviews. Each participant was interviewed in the same 
room at Royal Holloway, University of London, and all completed 53 items on the 
AABS-R while thinking aloud. The interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes 
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depending on the length of participants’ responses. The interviews were recorded and 
the researcher made notes of potentially important probes throughout the interview. 
 
On interview, the researcher met with a single participant and read through the 
cognitive interview schedule, which recapped information contained in the Information 
and Consent Sheet (see Appendix 20) and also informed the interviewees of the 
purpose of the interview. Subsequently, participants were provided with the 
information sheet to read. Once written consent was obtained, participants were 
introduced to the format and rationale of cognitive interviews as specified in the 
interview schedule. As recommended by Willis (1999), the researcher emphasised that 
she was interested in whether participants came upon any difficulties with 
understanding or answering the questions and that she was more interested in the 
thought process they engaged in than their actual responses.  
 
Participants were then given the opportunity to observe the interviewer answer two 
practice questions on the AABS-R while thinking aloud. Subsequently they were given 
a chance to practice themselves. However, all four participants declined and felt ready 
to begin. Participants were given the AABS-R and instructed to read aloud each 
question before thinking aloud about their responses. Upon completion of the cognitive 
interview, and if considered appropriate, the researcher used relevant pre-determined 
or spontaneous probes to clarify the thought processes that participants engaged in 
when responding to a specific question. The specific difficulties that a participant had 
encountered when responding to a question determined the choice of a probe. The 
probes were adapted from Brown and Hawkes (2008) and are based on a cognitive 
model, which indicates that responding to survey questions implicates the following 
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cognitive stages: Comprehension, retrieval, judgement formation and response 
selection (Tourangeau, 1984). The predetermined probes are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
Predetermined Cognitive Interview Probes 
 
Condition     Probe Examples 
 
Comprehension: significant    Take item X as an example. What did you 
hesitation at reading stage   think the question required you to do? 
 
     OR The questionnaire asked you about X. 
      What did you think of as X? 
 
     OR On Item X you gave it a score of X. How 
      did you arrive at your answer of X? 
 
Judgement formation is unreported:  On item X you gave it a score of X. How 
Response is immediate   did you arrive at your answer of X? 
 
OR How did you decide on your answer to 
this question? 
 
     OR How did you decide that you agreed or  
      disagreed? 
 
Significant hesitation at judgement   On item X you gave it a score of X. How 
formation stage    did you arrive at your answer of X? 
 
OR How did you decide on your answer to 
this question? 
 
     OR How did you decide that you agreed or 
      disagreed? 
 
Significant hesitation at response   What led you to choose that particular 
selection     answer rather than one of the others? 
 
OR On item X you gave it a score of X. What 
did that score of X mean to you? 
 
OR Was it easy or difficult to choose which 
score to give? What was easy/difficult? 
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Finally, participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
Cognitive interviews and the analytic approach 
The analytic approach adopted involved applying a coding scheme that was developed 
by Brown and Hawkes (2008). They analysed verbal reports from their cognitive 
interviewing study using Chi’s (1997) verbal analysis strategy, a quantitative approach 
for coding qualitative data. Chi suggests eight basic actions that can be taken – which 
of these are followed depends on the subject matter and aims of the study. In the 
Brown and Hawkes (2008) study and in order to develop a coding scheme, the authors 
viewed the following three stages as relevant: segmenting the verbal responses, 
developing a particular coding scheme and operationalizing the coded verbal report 
data. The coding scheme and its development will be discussed here whilst the 
operationalization of data relevant to the reported study is discussed in the Results 
section. 
 
In the Brown and Hawkes (2008) study verbal reports were first segmented by 
independent coders who were blind to the aims of the study and who listened to the 
verbal reports, identifying discrete ideas, thoughts or cognitive processes. The final 
coding scheme involved applying content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980) to think-aloud 
protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Green & Gilhooly, 1996) in order to develop 
categorical codes that described the cognitive processes that respondents engaged in 
when thinking aloud. When appropriate, these codes were then synthesized with codes 
from a pertinent questionnaire evaluation research study (Bickhart & Felcher, 1996) as 
well as with Tourangeau’s (1984) description of cognitive processes involved in 
responding to survey questions. As previously noted, he described and argued that 
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particular processes are implicated when individuals respond to self-report measures 
(i.e., comprehension, retrieval and judgement formation). When the codes did not 
match such conventional nomenclature, they were retained and formed a novel code. 
 
The final coding scheme (see Brown & Hawkes, 2008 for a full discussion) employs 
hierarchically organised codes. A three-digit code signifies coding categories.  The 
first digit denotes the processing stage occurring in a segment (i.e., comprehension, 
retrieval or judgement formation). The second digit indexes the particular process 
deployed (e.g., how difficult the item is to answer) and the third digit indicates the 
content of that processing. For example, a code of 120 represents an assessment of 
whether the question was easy or difficult to answer, indicating a particular 
comprehension process. A code of 220 refers to recalling an episode from episodic 
memory, which is a specific retrieval process. A code of 122 is employed when an 
interviewee has stated that the question is difficult to answer and 221 is used when a 
respondent is recalling episodes that have happened to herself and that are notable for 
the absence or presence of anxiety. Table 3 displays the cognitive interview coding 
system.  
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Table 3.  
The Cognitive Interview Coding System 
Stage Process Content 
 
100 Comprehension  
 120 Difficulty Assessment 
  121 Easy 
  122 Difficult 
 150 Ambiguity 
 160 Re-read Instructions 
200 Retrieval  
 210 Inapplicable 
 220 Recall Episode(s) 
  221 Recall Episode(s), Self, Anxiety-relevant 
 240 General Knowledge 
  241 General Knowledge, Self, Anxiety-relevant 
300 Judgement Formation 
 310 Appraisal 
  311 Reasoning 
  312 Imperative 
  313 Arbitrary Conclusion 
 330 Feeling Occurrence/Intensity Based 
  331 Feeling, non-zero frequency 
  333 Feeling, Positive Qualitative Frequency Assessment 
  334 Feeling, Negative Qualitative Frequency Assessment 
  335 Feeling, Positive Qualitative Intensity Assessment 
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  336 Feeling, Negative Qualitative Intensity Assessment 
 340 Cognition Occurrence/Frequency Based 
  341  Cognition, Non-zero Frequency 
  343 Cognition, Positive Qualitative Frequency Assessment 
  344 Cognition, Negative Qualitative Frequency Assessment 
 
 
Validation study 
All participant groups (students, members of web communities for specific anxiety 
disorders and NHS patients) accessed the survey through (separate) web addresses 
(posted on the relevant advertisement), read the information sheet and consented to 
taking part by ticking the appropriate box (see the information and consent sheets in 
Appendix 21). The information sheet provided the names and telephone numbers of 
organizations that could offer support should the need arise. Subsequently participants 
completed a descriptive information section, which required that they provide 
information on age, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment, employment 
status and optionally, history of mental health difficulties. NHS participants were 
additionally asked whether their visit to the clinic (from which they were recruited) 
was primarily for psychological or medical issues. Participants then completed the 
online battery of tests.  
 
In the first phase of the study, which included students and members of web 
communities for specific anxiety disorders, the AABS-R was the first administered 
measure. The DASS-21, BIPS-13, BSBS-30 and BARS-25 were then completed and 
in that order.  
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In phase two, which included members of web communities and NHS patients, the 
AABS-R was again the first administered measure. The ASI-3, BFNE-II, TAFS-R, 
PSWQ, DASS-21, BIPS-13, BSBS-17 and BARS-10 were then completed and in that 
order. 
 
Once participants had completed the battery they were provided with the option of 
logging onto a separate website. There they could provide contact details, which were 
kept separate from their answers, and could indicate whether they wanted to be sent  
the results of the study and/or the offered incentives. 
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Results 
Overview 
The data analysis process involved the following general steps. First, cognitive 
interview data were analysed in order to examine the acceptability and construct 
validity of the AABS. 
 
Initial steps in the quantitative data analysis phase involved an examination of all data 
distributions and, where applicable, the transformation of those that were not normally 
distributed. Subsequently, the internal reliability and characteristics of the AABS data 
from the full sample (N = 346) were determined and, at a later stage for criterion 
measures. 
 
The next step involved ascertaining the latent underlying structure of the AABS, using 
a principle factor analysis strategy for factor extraction. Subsequently, relationships 
between the AABS subscales and criterion measures were investigated in order to 
gauge the validity of the AABS. Finally, group comparisons were conducted in order 
to test criterion-related validity. 
 
Operationalizing Evidence in the Cognitive Interview Protocols 
First, the recorded verbal reports were reviewed qualitatively to enquire whether the 
measure was acceptable to respondents. Willis (2005) provides a framework for doing 
this. In short, the measure seemed acceptable as no obvious wording difficulties, 
problems related to ordering of items, length of the instrument, or difficulties with 
instructions were encountered.   
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Proponents of cognitive interviewing stipulate that interviews are best collected in 
‘rounds’, the outcome of which determines subsequent stages (Willis, 2005). Because 
the first round of interviewing did not indicate that participants had any significant 
difficulties with the AABS-R, no further cognitive interviews were collected. Verbal 
reports from four individuals were also deemed adequate for gauging the construct 
validity of the AABS-R given that some of its items had previously been validated 
with this procedure (Brown & Hawkes, 2008).  
 
Subsequently, the verbal protocols were analysed to estimate the construct validity of 
the measure. Given the previously mentioned study (Brown & Hawkes, 2008), there 
was an emphasis on verifying previous results as well as on analysing new and revised 
items. As noted, the analytic approach adopted here involved applying a coding 
scheme that was developed by Brown and Hawkes (2008) and this was done by an 
independent rater who was blind to the study aims. Also, a priori criteria were set for 
evaluating the AABS-R items in light of the cognitive interviewing protocols with 
reference to the conventional processing stages of comprehension, retrieval and 
judgement formation. The a priori criteria are summarized in Table 4.  
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Table 4.   
Cognitive Interviewing Item Evaluation Criteria 
Stage:  Comprehension 
Process Content Criterion Number of 
AABS items 
Meeting 
Criterion 
120 Difficulty              
       Assessment 
122     Difficult 
150 Ambiguity  
160 Re-reads 
       Instructions 
 
No more than 1 of 4 
protocols has any of 
these codes 
All but one; 
Item 27 
received 122 
codes in two 
protocols 
 
Stage:  Retrieval 
210 Inapplicable  
220 Recall episodes 221 Recall episodes, 
self, anxiety-relevant 
240 General knowledge 241 General 
knowledge, self, 
anxiety-relevant 
No more than 1 of 4 
protocols has any of 
these codes 
No 210 or 221 
codes.  Six 241 
codes, but no 
more than one 
protocol per 
item 
 
Stage:  Judgment formation 
 310 Appraisal 311 Reasoning 
 312 Imperative 
 313 Arbitrary conclusion
Either 310 or 340 
code for each 
protocol 
One item (#9) 
did not elicit 
either a 310 or 
340 code 
330 Feeling occurrence 331 Feeling, non-zero 
frequency 
 333 Feeling, positive 
qualitative frequency 
assessment 
 334 Feeling, negative 
qualitative frequency 
assessment 
No more than 1 of 
4 protocols has any 
of these codes 
Six 330 codes, 
but no more 
than one 
protocol per 
item 
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 335 Feeling, positive 
qualitative intensity 
assessment 
 336 Feeling, negative 
qualitative intensity 
assessment 
340 Cognition occurrence 341 Cognition, non-zero 
frequency 
       343 Cognition, positive 
qualitative frequency 
assessment 
 344 Cognition, negative 
qualitative frequency 
assessment 
Either 310 or 340 
code for each 
protocols 
See comment 
for 310 
Appraisal, 
above 
 
Comprehension 
Certain types of responses can suggest possible problems with item comprehension. 
The codes in the comprehension stage have to do with whether a respondent 
understands what she is being asked about. Here responses were categorized according 
to whether the question appeared to be easy or difficult to answer, whether it was 
perceived as ambiguous in any way and whether the AABS-R instructions had to be 
re-read. The criterion set for these codes was that no more than one in four verbal 
reports could contain such codes. This was realised for all AABS-R items, apart from 
one item (‘Disapproval is more likely than approval in most social interactions’), 
which received a 122 (Difficult) code in two of four protocols and was consequently 
removed, resulting in a 52-item measure. 
 
Retrieval 
As previously highlighted and as emphasised by Brown & Hawkes (2008), a measure 
aiming to operationalize the cognitive aspect of Beck’s formulation of emotional 
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disorders should generally index appraisal processes rather than recollections of 
affective experiences. This is particularly important for scales that are intended to be 
predictors of affective states. In order to evaluate the AABS-R in this regard, anxiety 
retrievals that were self-relevant (codes 221 and 241) were counted. An example of a 
221 (Recall episode, self, anxiety-relevant) code is a response such as “I sometimes get 
that from feeling anxious”. An example of a 241 (General knowledge, self, anxiety-
relevant code) code is exemplified by a response such as “my usual behaviour when 
I’m not feeling anxious”.  A final code of 210 (Inapplicable) was applied when a 
respondent indicated that an item was not applicable or irrelevant to her, for example 
because the experience or event represented by the item had not occurred. A response 
that typifies this categorisation is, for example, “I’ve never noticed my breathing 
becoming irregular”. The a priori criterion was that no more than one in four protocols 
would have these codes. This was observed. Thus, there were no 210 or 221 codes. 
Though six 241 codes were tallied there was no more than one protocol per item.  
  
Judgement formation 
Once individuals have comprehended and retrieved stored material from memory in 
order to respond, judgement formation processes come into play. In addition to not 
relying on anxiety episodes, a cognitive propositional measure should also involve 
appraisal processes in forming judgements. Three appraisal categories were identified: 
reasoning (logical inferences, code 311), imperatives (e.g., judgements of the “should” 
variety, code 312) and arbitrary conclusions (propositional judgements that are made 
without a specified basis, code 313).  Those judgement formations that remained and 
did not involve appraisal judgements, were categorised on the basis of perceived 
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incidence or intensity of feelings (code 330) or cognitions (340) within the 
interviewee’s experience.  
 
Appraisal and cognition occurrence were distinguished and coded on the basis of 
whether respondents made a demonstrable appraisal in response to the question (e.g., 
“I don’t think there is anything wrong with me”) or were noting previous cognition 
occurrence (“I don’t usually think, ‘there is something wrong with me’”). The a priori 
criterion was that either appraisals (code 310) or cognition occurrences (code 340) 
would be noted in each protocol. This was realised for all items, apart from one 
(‘Insanity can gradually creep up on you’), suggesting that the AABS-R is generally a 
measure of appraisals. 
 
For a measure that has been developed to predict affect, feeling-based judgements 
represent a grave validity threat. The criterion for such judgement formations (both 
intensity and occurrence) was that no more than one of four protocols would earn such 
codes. This was observed. There were six instances of feeling occurrences. However, 
there was not more than one protocol per item. 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
Data coding 
Data were entered into a database (SPSS version 14) for analysis. Negatively keyed 
items on the PSWQ were reversed and total and subscale scores calculated for the 
criterion measures.  
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Data distribution and preliminary analysis 
Criterion measures 
The data distributions for each measure were inspected. The distributions for the 
DASS-21 (Anxiety subscale), TAFS-R (Total scale and Likelihood subscale), BIPS, 
BARS (Total scale and Physical subscale) and BSBS (Total scale, General and 
Checking subscales) were positively skewed. The distributions for the PSWQ, BFNE-
II and ASI-3 (Social Concerns subscale) were negatively skewed. Skew significance 
was determined by calculating z scores for individual distributions. As recommended 
by Field (2005), a distribution was defined as skewed if z scores were larger than 2.58. 
Given that parametric statistics were planned, those distributions that were not normal 
were transformed. Those distributions that displayed moderate positive skew were 
successfully transformed with square root transformations, whilst substantial positive 
skewness was transformed using log transformations. Negatively skewed distributions 
were reflected and then either square rooted or transformed using a log transformation. 
 
Full sample AABS analysis 
Descriptive statistics and reliability 
The complete sample (N = 346) of participants responded to the 53 items on the 
AABS-R. However, given the cognitive interviewing study, one item was removed and 
thus 52 items were included in the analysis. The mean AABS-R scale score was 
215.96  (SD = 55.57). The internal reliability of the AABS-R was considered with all 
52 items. The measure was found to be highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .96). Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviation scores for the different 
AABS-R items as well as individual AABS-R item correlations with the total score 
and Cronbach’s alpha estimates should individual items be deleted. 
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Table 5.   
Means and Standard Deviations for AABS-R Items, Item-Total Correlations and 
Cronbach’s Alpa if Item Deleted 
AABS-R item M(SD) Item 
Total 
Corre-
lation 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
1. Things that you can imagine are more likely to come true 3.79(1.76) .25 .96 
2. Having negative thoughts means you are a bad person 2.53(1.75) .43 .96 
3. You can never have enough information for making the right 
          decision 
 
4.90(1.60) .38 .96 
4. If you don't make an effort, you can easily lose control of yourself 4.53(1.62) .48 .96 
5. It is important to always appear fully at ease 4.23(1.74) .53 .96 
6. Insanity can gradually creep up on you   4.19(1.82) .43 .96 
7. It is important to be on the lookout for the first, small signs of an    
          illness 
 
4.16(1.78) .54 .96 
8. In general, it is better to keep things the way they are than to take    
          the risk of making things worse 
 
3.82(1.76) .67 .96 
9. Thinking about bad things that have happened to other people    
          could cause the same thing to happen to you 
 
2.62(1.86) .66 .96 
10. You should always take as much time as possible when making a  
          decision in order to make the right choice 
 
4.68(1.57) .48 .96 
11. The way to avoid problems is not to take any risks 3.19(1.81) .66 .96 
12. Imagining things that might happen can help bring those things     
          about 
 
3.69(1.95) .44 .96 
13. If someone is concerned about something happening in the  
          future, they should take steps to insure that it does not come     
          true 
 
4.81(1.60) .49 .96 
14. It is better not to rock the boat than to make changes   3.44(1.79) .68 .96 
15. It is unwise to proceed with something unless you have all of the  
          possible information you might need 
 
4.42(1.62) .61 .96 
16. It is better to carry out your activities when nobody is watching 4.35(2.10) .61 .96 
17. Insanity can develop without warning  3.79(1.82) .43 .96 
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18. It is better to be over-prepared for a potential disaster than to be  
          caught unprepared         
 
4.90(1.69) .60 .96 
19. You should be constantly looking out for things happening within 
          your body so that you can detect things going wrong 
 
3.88(1.79) .66 .96 
20. It is possible to instantly lose control of your mind 3.42(1.96) .49 .96 
21. If you imagine something bad happening, then it is up to you to  
          make sure that it doesn’t come true 
 
4.03(1.82) .59 .96 
22. To avoid disasters, you need to be prepared for anything  4.01(1.80) .70 .96 
23. Ignoring feelings of anxiety means you risk overlooking    
          something serious 
 
4.27(1.74) .61 .96 
24. You should not allow yourself to be seen losing control of  
          yourself in any way     
    
4.63(1.85) .60 .96 
25. A medical catastrophe can happen to anyone at any time  5.65(1.59) .26 .96 
26. Planning every detail in advance is the only way to avoid  
          unpleasant surprises 
 
3.69(1.90) .71 .96 
27. One should always be on the lookout for trouble that might be  
          developing 
 
3.98(1.77) .76 .96 
28. You should not get involved in something if you’re not sure that  
          you can manage 
 
4.51(1.60) .62 .96 
29. It is essential to avoid being disapproved of by other people 4.01(1.93) .61 .96 
30. If you imagine something bad happening, it can help make it  
          come true 
 
3.15(1.86) .51 .96 
31. It is important always to keep in mind that a catastrophe can  
          happen to anyone at any time 
 
3.15(1.86) .63 .96 
32. It is best not to let on if you are in public and feel that something  
          is wrong with you 
 
4.66(1.90) .62 .96 
33. Anticipating the worst outcome prepares you for the worst  5.97(2.97) .63 .96 
34. It would be difficult to ever live down the embarrassment of  
          losing control of yourself or acting strangely in public 
 
4.66(2.00) .45 .96 
35. Picturing something happening might cause it to really happen 3.15(1.87) .59 .96 
36. Anxiety is generally a sign that something is wrong 4.43(1.82) .56 .96 
37. There is no such thing as being too careful when it comes to your  
          health 
 
4.18(1.67) .60 .96 
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38. You should avoid being seen acting awkwardly  4.60(1.98) .58 .96 
39. People will make negative judgments if they think something is  
          wrong           
         
5.26(1.60) .66 .96 
40. Disasters are a lot more likely than most people realize  3.66(1.83) .61 .96 
41. Minor difficulties can easily get out of control and grow into 
          major ones 
 
4.58(1.62) .58 .96 
42. If someone is feeling anxious, there must be something for them   
          to concerned about 
 
4.01(1.88) .74 .96 
43. It is crucial to anticipate potential difficulties so that you have a   
          better chance of avoiding them 
 
4.33(1.67) .47 .96 
44. It is possible to suddenly completely lose control of your  
          behaviour 
 
3.84(1.90) .66 .96 
45. An unusual physical sensation in your body is likely to be a sign  
          that something is seriously wrong with you 
 
3.38(1.75) .48 .96 
46. Anxiety does not happen without there being a reason for it  4.31(1.93) .67 .96 
47. Even with small problems, one thing can lead to another and  
          quickly turn into something huge 
 
4.46(1.70) .71 .96 
48. When making a decision, it is better to play it safe rather than  
          risk making the wrong choice 
 
4.16(1.60) .57 .96 
49. You should always maintain control of your thinking  4.95(1.61) .51 .96 
50. If you can foresee future problems you have a greater opportunity 
          to prevent them 
 
4.78(1.61) .54 .96 
51. People don’t experience anxiety unless there is actually  
          something they should be concerned about 
 
3.36(1.93) .66 .96 
52. It is necessary to continually be aware of signs that a health  
          problem is developing 
 
3.85(1.76) .66 .96 
 
 
 
The above information demonstrates that deleting any particular item would reduce, 
rather than improve, reliability. It is noteworthy that scores largely correlated well with 
the total scale score. Thus, 38 of the 52 items had item-total correlations above .50. 
Apart from two items, all other items had item-total correlations above .30. Given the 
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sample size, these two lesser correlation coefficients can be regarded as acceptable 
(Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  
 
Factor analysis 
Initial considerations  
As was previously noted, the sample size was adequate. Thus, “it is comforting to have 
at least 300 cases for factor analysis” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 640) as this will 
maximise the likelihood of achieving a stable solution and allows the interpretation of 
factors with a few loadings (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988). Despite the adequate 
sample size, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 
calculated for the AABS variables (Kaiser, 1970). The KMO statistic was .95, which is 
‘superb’ (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) and suggested that the sum of correlations 
was large relative to the sum of partial correlations and consequently factor analysis 
should generate reliable and discrete factors. As noted, the correlation matrix indicated 
that all the AABS-R items correlated fairly well and that no single coefficient was 
especially large, confirming that multicollinearity was not present. Finally, Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity was highly significant (p < .001), indicating that covariances were 
zero and the sphericity assumption was met.  
 
Distributions of the 52 AABS-R variables were considered.  A number of the variables 
were found to be negatively, and several, positively skewed. Expected normal and 
detrended expected normal probability plots suggested that the distribution of variables 
was largely normal, with some deviations. The approach used here for factor analysis, 
principal axis, does not require multivariate normality (Floyd & Widaman, 1995) and 
factor analysis is generally robust against normality violations (Gorsuch, 1983). Also, 
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given that the AABS has been published and is currently in use, no transformations or 
deletions were undertaken. However, the fact that transformations were not conducted 
limits the generalizability of findings (Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  
 
Full sample AABS-R principal factor analysis 
In order to ascertain the underlying structure of the AABS-R an exploratory strategy 
was adopted, using a common (or principal) factor analysis approach to extracting 
factors. This factor extraction method was preferred over principal components 
analysis, as it generates more precise final communality estimates, is less influenced 
by the number of items that load on the various dimensions and the level of variable 
communalities (Widaman, 1993). In their review, Floyd and Widaman (1995) 
conclude that this approach “should be strongly preferred” when a researcher is 
interested in understanding “a domain of phenomena in terms of a smaller number of 
underlying, latent variables” (p. 291). 
 
In order to aid in deciding on how many factors to extract, the scree plot was 
examined. Figure 1 displays a scree plot graph for the data. In total, nine factors had 
eigenvalues above one. 
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 Figure 1. AABS-R Scree Plot 
 
Kaiser (1960) argues that factors should be retained when they have eigenvalues that 
are greater than one. However, in many situations this is not optimal and can 
overestimate how many factors should be retained (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). Stevens 
(1992) reports that scree plots provide a reliable factor selection criterion with samples 
of over 200 participants and a visual inspection typically provides satisfactory results 
(Floyd & Widaman, 1995). The criterion for factor retention is decided by observing 
the position where the slope moves towards zero. This indicates beyond which point 
significant variance will not be discarded by excluding a particular factor (Floyd & 
Widaman, 1995).  
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The first four factors had associated eigenvalues all above 2.0 and changes in 
succeeding eigenvalues, beyond the sixth factor, were small. This indicated the 
existence of between four and six factors.  
 
Thus, an initial five-factor solution was sought. Table 6 presents total eigenvalues as 
well as how much of the variance was explained with this solution. The unrotated five-
factor solution resulted in eigenvalues above 1.0 for all unrotated factors and an 
inspection of communalities suggested the variables were defined well by this solution. 
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Table 6. 
Eigenvalues and Total Explained Variance for the Five-Factor Solution 
Factor Total Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative 
1 18.22 35.04 35.04 
2 3.06 5.89 40.93 
3 2.41 4.63 45.56 
4 1.66 3.19 47.75 
5 1.46 2.82 52.56 
 
Rotation 
Following factor extraction, retained factors were rotated to aide interpretation by 
maximising loading (of each variable) on one factor and minimizing loading on the 
other factors. An oblique solution (promax) was first obtained to help decide whether 
an orthogonal or oblique rotation was appropriate. Because the oblique solution 
resulted in mainly uncorrelated factors, an orthogonal solution was preferred 
(Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). Also, Floyd and Widaman (1995) argue that an 
orthogonal varimax procedure typically yields an acceptable simple structure when 
exploratory factor analysis is undertaken.  
 
Exploratory factor analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis of the 52-item correlation matrix was carried out using 
principal factor analysis. In exploratory strategies, factor loadings that exceed .30 or 
.40 are typically viewed as meaningful (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). Initially, items that 
loaded onto a factor below .37 were interpreted as loading significantly. These items 
were then removed one-by-one and the analysis conducted again on the subset of items 
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that remained, with the aim of observing whether variable loadings improved. This 
process was sustained until all items had loadings of more than .40 and resulted in a 
solution that was clearly interpretable with each factor recruiting a distinct item group.  
 
However, a number of items were multivocal and loaded on more than one factor. 
These were removed one-by-one and the analysis repeated. These complex items may 
be candidates for a short form of the AABS-R in the future. In total, 36 items were 
retained and these loaded onto five factors, with each individual item loading 
obviously on just one factor.  
 
The reliability analysis (see below) suggested that retained items were appropriately 
included but also indicated that three items could be removed to improve reliability. 
An inspection of these items highlighted that they were similar to other retained items 
and therefore redundant. The factor analysis was therefore run again without these 
three items and a final solution obtained. Thus, 33 items were retained and together, 
the five factors explained 57% of the overall variance.  
 
Table 7 displays each factor and its item content. Factor 1 items reflect a tendency 
towards caution, planning and vigilence. This Caution factor contained 13 items with 
an eigenvalue of 12.1, and accounted for 17.6% of the variance. The items that loaded 
on Factor 2 were around themes of anticipated social evaluation and judgement. This 
Evaluation Sensitivity factor contained 8 items, had an eiginvalue of 2.9 and accounted 
for 15.9% of the total variance in items. Factor 3 was comprised of 4 items, which had 
an associated eigenvalue of 2.2. These items represent metacognitive beliefs about the 
causal association between thoughts and negative outcomes. This Thought-Outcome 
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Fusion factor explained 8.5% of the variance. Factor 4 was called Anxiety-Based 
Reasoning and was comprised of four items. It had an eigenvalue of 1.8 and explained 
7.7% of the variance. Factor 5 had 4 items reflecting a propensity to expect 
catastrophic outcomes and was therefore called Catastrophizing. The factor had an 
eigenvalue of 1.7, accounting for 7.2% of the total variance.  
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Table 7. 
AABS-33 Item Analysis 
                              Factor  
 
Item 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factor 1: Caution 
 
It is better to be over-prepared for a potential disaster than  
          to be caught unprepared 
 
0.75     
To avoid disasters, you need to be prepared for anything 0.73     
It is crucial to anticipate potential difficulties so that you  
          have a better chance of avoiding them 
 
0.70     
One should always be on the lookout for trouble that might 
          be developing 
 
0.64     
Planning every detail in advance is the only way to avoid  
          unpleasant surprises 
 
0.62     
It is unwise to proceed with something unless you have all  
          of the possible information you might need 
 
0. 60     
It is important to always keep in mind that a catastrophe  
          can happen to anyone at any time 
 
0.59     
It is necessary to continually be aware of signs that a health  
          problem is developing. 
 
0.57     
You should always take as much time as possible when  
          making a decision in order to make the right choice 
 
0.55     
If you can foresee future problems you have a 
          greater opportunity to prevent them. 
 
0.55     
If someone is concerned about something happening in the 
          future, they should take steps to insure that it does      
          not come true 
 
0.54     
There is no such thing as being too careful when it comes  
          to your health 
 
0.50     
Disasters are a lot more likely than most people realize 0.52     
Factor 2: Evaluation Sensitivity 
 
You should avoid being seen acting awkwardly    0.85    
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It is best not to let on if you are in public and feel that  
          something is wrong with you. 
 
 0.78    
It would be difficult to ever live down the embarrassment    
          of losing control of yourself or acting strangely in  
          public 
 
 0.78    
You should not allow yourself to be seen losing control of  
          yourself in any way  
 
 0.74    
It is essential to avoid being disapproved of by other    
          people 
 
 0.71    
It is important to always appear fully at ease 
 
 0.70    
People will make negative judgments if they think  
          something is wrong with you 
 
 0.67    
It is better to carry out your activities when nobody is  
          watching you 
 
 0.62    
Factor 3: Thought-Outcome Fusion 
Picturing something happening might cause it to really  
          happen 
 
  0.88   
If you imagine something bad happening, it can help make  
          that thing come true 
 
  0.83   
Imagining things that might happen can help bring those  
          things about 
    
  0.74   
Thinking about bad things that have happened to other  
          people could cause the same thing to happen to you 
 
  0.58   
Factor 4: Anxiety-Based Reasoning 
If someone is feeling anxious, there must be something for  
          them to be concerned about 
 
   0.74  
People don’t experience anxiety unless there is actually  
          something they should be concerned about 
 
   0.74  
Anxiety does not happen without there being a reason for it 
 
   0.73  
Anxiety is generally a sign that something is wrong. 
 
   0.48  
Factor 5: Catastrophizing 
It is possible to instantly lose control of your mind     0.75 
It is possible to suddenly completely lose control of your 
behaviour 
    0.65 
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Insanity can develop without warning 
 
    0.63 
Insanity can gradually creep up on you 
 
    0.51 
Note. N = 346. 
 
Reliability 
A reliability analysis suggested that the 33 items that were retained on the basis of the 
factor analysis were highly internally consistent (Cronbach’s alpha = .94). 
A reliability analysis was then performed on the items that related to the separate 
factors (Cronbach, 1951).  The alpha coefficients for Factors 1 to 5 were .91, .93, 89, 
.86 and .79, respectively. Consequently, scale and subscale reliability of this 33-item 
scale (AABS-33) is supported in this population. 
 
Relationship between the AABS-33 and demographic information 
Full sample (N = 346) AABS-33 scores were studied in order to look for 
differentiations across the span of demographic information. To explore a possible 
connection between age and AABS-33 scores, a Pearson’s correlation was used. To 
investigate score differences related to gender, ethnicity and recruitment source, t-
test’s were deployed. One-way ANOVAs were employed to look for possible 
differences between AABS-33 scores related to education level as well as employment 
and marital status. 
 
The correlation between age and AABS-33 scores was not significant (r (344) = .06, 
n.s.), suggesting that generally participants’ age was not consistently associated with 
either high or low AABS-33 scores. 
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Table 8 displays the outcome of independent t-test’s investigating differences in 
AABS-33 scores across gender, ethnicity and recruitment source. The difference was 
not significant for gender or ethnicity, indicating that women and men did not, on 
average, differ in terms of how they used the response scale on the AABS-33. 
Similarly, ethnicity did not differentiate the groups in terms of AABS-33 scores. 
However, as expected, AABS-33 scores did differ significantly across recruitment 
source groups (i.e., whether participants heard about the study through Internet 
communities for specific anxiety disorders or from Royal Holloway, University of 
London). Here, separate estimates of variance were used because assumptions of 
homogeneity of variance were not met (F = 7.43, p < .05). The results were as 
expected and showed that members of anxiety disorder Internet communities, on 
average, scored higher on the AABS-33 than the students sample.  
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Table 8. 
Differences in AABS-33 Scores Across Gender, Ethnicity and Recruitment Source 
Group Subgroup M SD t df p 
Gender       
 Male 138.9 36.3 -.77 344 .44 (n.s.) 
 Female 134.9 35.8    
Ethnicity       
 White 135.5 36.7 -.47 344 .63 (n.s.) 
 Other 138.8 29.3    
Recruitment 
Source 
 
      
 
 
Anxiety Group 117.7 28.0    
 Students 142.8 36.6 -6.8 228 < .001 
Note. N = 346. Anxiety group, members of Internet communities for specific anxiety 
disorders. 
 
A series of one-way independent ANOVA’s were used to compare AABS-33 scores 
across educational level, employment and marital status. Table 9 displays the means 
and standard deviations for the various groups. AABS-33 scores were found to differ 
significantly depending on the education level of participants (F (3, 342) = 6.78, p < 
.001). Hochberg’s GT2 procedure for doing post hoc comparisons was performed, as 
the sample sizes were highly unequal. This revealed that the ‘no degree’ group scored 
significantly higher on the AABS-33 than the ‘vocational/’A level’ (p < .001) and 
‘degree or higher’ group (p < .001). Thus, AABS-33 scores reduced as education 
levels rose in this sample. 
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AABS-33 scores also differed across employment status groups (F (2, 343) = 4.1, p = 
.001). Hochberg’s GT2 post hoc comparisons suggested that participants who were 
unemployed or on leave scored significantly higher on the AABS-33 than students (p < 
.01). However, marital status did not differentiate between participants in terms of 
their scores on the AABS-33 (F (2, 343) = .57, n.s.). 
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Table 9. 
AABS-33 Means and Standard Deviations Across Education Level, Employment Status 
and Marital Status 
 M SD 
Level of Education   
          No Qualifications  168.9 32.1 
          GCSE / O’ level 144.9 38.9 
          Vocational / A’level 133.2 34.7 
          Degree or Higher  131.4 34.9 
Employment Status   
          Full/Part Time Employment 134.9 37.3 
          Unemployed/Leave 144.2 34.0 
          Full Time Student 124.9 32.9 
Marital Status   
          Married 136.5 39.2 
          Relationship/Cohabiting 138.9 34.5 
          Single/Separated/Divorced 134.0 35.6 
Note. N = 346. 
 
It is noteworthy that some of the above results are based on groups comprised of only a 
small number of participants (see Table 1, p. 48). Also, some of the observed effects 
are likely to be related, rather than independent. For example, it is likely that being 
unemployed or on leave may be related to having a mental health problem (and 
belonging to a web anxiety disorder community). 
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Criterion measures 
Before discussing the results of the correlational and validation analysis, relative 
descriptive statistics for the newly developed and established criterion measure will be 
presented. 
  
Newly developed scale descriptive statistics and reliability  
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics and internal reliability related to the three newly 
developed (total) scale scores and, where relevant, subscale scores. As can be seen, 
these scales appear to have acceptable internal consistency, which is comparable, 
though generally better, than that reported by Brown and Bohn (personal 
communication, February 24, 2008) (see pp. 52-53). 
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Table 10. 
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability for the BIPS, BARS and BSBS  
Scale Subscale M SD Chronbach’s alpha 
BIPS Total 
 
 25.88 8.21 .88 
BARS Total 
 
 30.84 13.01 .86 
 Social 16.94 7.59 .87 
 Physical 13.90 8.49 .87 
BSBS Total 
n = 173 
 
 35.57 9.70 .87 
 General 25.30 7.37 .85 
 Checking 10.27 3.73 .79 
 
Established criterion measure descriptive statistics and reliability  
Table 11 displays descriptive statistics for the relevant subscales of the ASI-3, DASS-
21 and TAFS-R, along with (total) scale scores and descriptives for the PSWQ and 
BFNE-II.  
 
 
 90
Table 11. 
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability for the ASI-3, DASS-21, PSWQ, TAFS-R and 
BFNE-II 
Scale Subscale n M SD Chronbach’s alpha 
ASI-3  190    
 
 
Social  21.72 6.22 .80 
 Physical  16.45 5.81 .88 
 Cognitive  15.52 6.58 .89 
DASS-21 
 
 322    
 Depression  17.37 6.64 .93 
 Stress  18.62 5.67 .88 
 Anxiety  15.34 6.17 .86 
PSWQ  179 64.11 12.15 .91 
TAFS-R  181    
 Moral  30.65 11.84 .96 
 Likelihood  14.67 7.68 .94 
BFNE-II  186 26.78 6.42 
 
.96 
The internal consistency of the ASI-3 subscales was adequate and compares to the 
conclusions recently reached by Taylor and colleagues (2007) (see p. 54). Similarly, 
the internal reliability of the DASS-21 subscales was satisfactory and corresponds to 
previous findings in both clinical (Henry & Crawford, 2005) and community (Antony 
et al., 1998) samples (see p. 55). The high internal consistency of the PSWQ was also 
in line with previous findings (e.g., Brown, 2003; Meyer et al., 1990, see p. 55). 
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The TAFS-R displayed excellent internal reliability, corresponding to previously 
reported findings in clinical, community and student samples (Shafran, et al., 1996) 
(see p. 56). Finally, the internal consistency of the BFNE-II was also excellent and 
identical to that reported by Carleton and his colleagues (2006) (see p. 57). 
 
Hypothesized relationships between AABS-33 subscales and criterion measures 
Table 12 presents hypothesized associations between the AABS-33 factors and 
criterion measures. These are based on a review of the literature. Predictions for the 
DASS-21 scales are not included here but are discussed below. 
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Table 12. 
Hypothesized Relationships between AABS-33 Factors, BIPS, BARS, BSBS, BFNE-II, 
PSWQ and the ASI-3 
Scale Subscale Caution EvSens ToF ABR Catas 
BIPS  H H H + H 
BARS  + + -- + -- 
      Social -- H -- -- -- 
 Physical H -- -- + -- 
BSBS  + + + + + 
 General H H + + H 
 Checking H -- H + -- 
BFNE-II  -- H -- + -- 
PSWQ  H H + + + 
TAFS-R  + -- + + -- 
       Moral -- -- H + -- 
      Likelih H -- H + -- 
ASI-3       
 Social + H -- -- -- 
 Physical H -- -- H H 
 Cognitive + -- -- H H 
Note. EvSens, Evaluation Sensitivity; ToF, Thought-Outcome Fusion; ABR, Anxiety-
Based Reasoning; Catas, Catastrophizing; Social, Social Concerns; Physical, Physical 
Concerns; Cognitive, Cognitive Concerns; Likelih, Likelihood. H = Hypothesized 
association; preferably, strongest association of subscale; + = Likely relationship; -- = 
No specific expectation. 
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In summary, and as can be seen, Factor 1 (Caution) was expected to correlate most 
highly with the BIPS, BARS (Physical subscale), BSBS (General and Checking 
subscales), PSWQ, TAFS-R (Likelihood) and the ASI (Physical Concerns subscale). 
Factor 2 (Evaluation Sensitivity) was expected to have the strongest association with 
the BIPS, BARS (Social), the BSBS (General), the BFNE-II, the PSWQ and the ASI-3 
(Social Concerns subscale). Factor 3 (Thought-Outcome Fusion) beliefs were expected 
to be most highly associated with the BIPS, BSBS (Checking subscale) and the TAFS-
R (Likelihood and Moral subscales), whereas Factor 4 (Anxiety-Based Reasoning) was 
expected to have a strong association with the ASI-3 (Physical and Cognitive 
Concerns) and possibly other anxiety correlates. Finally, Factor 5 (Catastrophizing) 
was expected to be associated with the BIPS, BSBS (General) and the ASI-3 (Physical 
and Cognitive Concerns).  
 
Hypothesized relationships between AABS-33 subscales and DASS-21 
A measure of cognitive vulnerability to anxiety, as specified by cognitive models, is 
expected to be related to anxiety, depression as well as stress. However, given the 
cognitive content-specificity hypothesis, the AABS-33 and its subscales, should be 
more highly associated with anxiety than depression. 
 
Correlational analysis: Convergent validity 
AABS-33 and newly developed criterion measures 
Table 13 displays the results of the Pearson’s correlational analysis looking at the 
relationship between the AABS-33 factors and the newly developed criterion 
measures. It should be noted that correlations are discussed in terms of being small (r 
= 0.10), moderate (r = 0.30) or large (r = 0.50) (Cohen, 1988).  
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Table 13. 
AABS-33, BIPS, BARS and BSBS Correlations 
Scale  AABS Caution EvSens ToF ABR Catas 
AABS         
      Caution  .90      
      EvSens  .74 .55     
      ToF  .62 .44 .35    
      ABR  .71 .58 .41 .41   
      Catas  .62 .44 .40 .34 .35  
BIPS  .52  .49      .40 .35 .31 .41 
BARS      -.38      -36     -.40     -.20     -.13    -.11 
      Social      -.33     -.23     -.50     -.21     -.05    -.17 
      Physical      -.30     -.36     -.23    -.12     -.15    -.04 
BSBS  .62 .59 .44 .31 .38 .52 
      General  .58 .51 .50 .32 .35 .50 
      Checking  .45 .49 .27 .18 .29 .35 
Note. Correlations above .15 are significant at p < .05. Correlations above .18 are 
significant at p < .01. The BIPS, BARS (Total and Physical) and BSBS (Total and 
subscales) have been transformed to offset for positive skew. EvSens, Evaluation 
Sensitivity; ToF, Thought-Outcome Fusion; ABR, Anxiety-Based Reasoning; Catas, 
Catastrophizing. Correlations in bold indicate hypothesized highest correlations 
between an AABS-33 factor and a newly developed criterion measure. 
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As expected, given the high internal consistency of the AABS-33, the subscales 
intercorrelated. All of the AABS-33 subscales were moderately to highly 
intercorrelated in the total sample. Thus, the beliefs and attitudes measured by the 
AABS-33 may not be well differentiated from one another. The total AABS-33 score 
was highly associated with the adoption of general safety behaviours (BSBS General) 
and a tendency to overestimate the probabilities of negative events (BIPS). The 
AABS-33 was moderately associated with risk aversiveness.  
 
As expected, Factor 1 (Caution) was (highly) related to reporting the use of general 
safety behaviours (BSBS General) and (moderately) related to checking safety 
behaviours (BSBS Checking), overestimating the probabilities of negative events 
(BIPS) and avoiding physical risks (BSBS Physical).  
 
As expected, Factor 2 (Evaluation Sensitivity) was highly associated with reporting the 
use of general safety behaviours (BSBS General) and avoiding social risks (BARS 
Social). Evaluation Sensitivity was also, as expected, associated (moderately) with a 
tendency to overestimate the occurrence of negative outcomes.  
 
As expected, Factor 3 (Thought-Outcome Fusion) was (moderately) related to 
reporting a tendency to overestimate the probability of the occurrence of negative 
events (BIPS). Though this subscale was significantly associated with reporting the 
use of safety behaviours in the form of checking (BSBS Checking) as expected, this 
association was not strong and the subscale was more strongly related to general safety 
behaviours (BSBS General).  
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No specific predictions were made for Factor 4 (Anxiety-Based Reasoning). However, 
it was moderately associated with reporting the use of safety behaviours (BSBS), both 
general and checking, and a tendency to overestimate the occurrence of negative 
outcomes. Finally, Factor 5 (Catastrophizing) was, as anticipated, associated 
(moderately) with overestimating the probabilities of negative events (BIPS) and 
highly associated with general safety behaviours (BSBS General). In conclusion, the 
relationships are in the predicted direction. 
 
AABS-33 and established criterion measures 
Table 14 displays the results of the correlational analysis between the AABS-33 (total 
and factor scores) and the established criterion scales (BFNE-II, PSWQ, TAFS-R and 
ASI-3) and relevant subscales. 
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Table 14. 
AABS-33, BFNE-II, PSWQ, TAFS-R and ASI-3 Correlations 
 
Measure  AABS Caution EvSens ToF ABR Catas 
BFNE  .47 .29 .66 .17 .21 .31 
PSWQ  .51 .46 .44 .26 .29 .35 
TAFS        
 Moral .46 .39 .27 .40 .39 .30 
      Likelih .56 .47 .29 .65 .43 .35 
ASI        
 Social .61 .46 .81 .25 .21 .39 
 Phys .58 .51 .46 .29 .42 .48 
      Cog .55 .40 .49 .30 .40 .53 
Note. Correlations above .17 are significant at p < .05. Correlations above .21 are 
significant at p < .01. The BFNE-II and ASI-3 (Social Concerns) have been 
transformed to offset for negative skew. The PSWQ and TAFS-R (Total and 
Likelihood) have been transformed to offset for positive skew. Likelih, Likelihood; 
Phys, Physical; Cog, Cognitive; EvSens, Evaluation Sensitivity; ToF, Thought-
Outcome Fusion; ABR, Anxiety-Based Reasoning; Catas, Catastrophizing. 
Correlations in bold indicate hypothesized highest correlations between an AABS-33 
factor and an established criterion measure. 
 
The total AABS-33 was moderately to highly related to all anxiety-related validation 
measures. As can be seen, correlations between criterion measures and Factor 1 
(Caution) were in the expected direction. The subscale was most highly associated 
with a tendency to be concerned about physical phenomena (ASI-3 Physical) as 
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expected. It was also moderately associated with a tendency to be concerned about 
Social and Cognitive phenomena (ASI-3 Social and Cognitive). A moderate 
association was also found between Caution and worry (PSWQ) as well as with 
reporting thought-action fusion beliefs in the form of believing that thoughts can 
increase the likelihood of negative events (TAFS Likelihood). Though not predicted, 
the subscale had a moderate association with moral TAF beliefs (TAFS Moral). 
 
Factor 2 (Evaluation Sensitivity), as anticipated, was (highly) associated with being 
concerned about social phenomena (ASI-3 Social) and fearing negative evaluation 
(BFNE-II). Also as expected, the subscale was (moderately) associated with worry 
(PSWQ). Predictions regarding Factor 3 (Thought-Outcome Fusion) were also 
confirmed. Thus, the subscale related highly to individuals reporting that thoughts 
about negative events increase the likelihood that these events will take place (TAFS-R 
Likelihood). The relationship between this factor and TAF Moral beliefs (TAFS-R 
Moral) was moderate.  
 
Predictions regarding Factor 4 (Anxiety-Based Reasoning) were supported. Thus, the 
subscale was most highly (moderately) associated with being concerned about physical 
and cognitive phenomena (ASI-3 Physical and Cognitive). Though not anticipated, this 
subscale was (moderately) related to holding thought-action fusion beliefs about the 
likelihood of negative events (TAFS-R Likelihood). Finally, Factor 5 was moderately 
to highly associated with being concerned about physical and cognitive phenomena as 
anticipated.  
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In terms of the general relationship between AABS-33 and ASI-3 subscales, all 
AABS-33 subscales were moderately to highly related to at least one subscale of the 
ASI-3. Thus, the AABS-33 demonstrated good convergent validity as specified by the 
literature, and in particular, the literature associated with the transdiagostic approach. 
 
Correlational analysis: Discriminant validity 
AABS-33 and DASS-21  
Table 15 displays the results of the correlational analysis between the AABS-33, its 
subscales and the DASS-21 scales. 
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Table 15. 
AABS-33 and DASS-21 Correlations 
Measure  DASS Anxiety Depression Stress 
DASS      
   Anxiety      
   Depression   .66   
   Stress   .76 .75  
AABS   .51 .52 .49 
   Caution   .36 .37 .36 
   Evaluation Sensitivity   .50 .56 .48 
   Thought-Outcome Fusion     .32 .26 .22 
   Anxiety-Based Reasoning     .31 .30 .32 
   Catastrophizing    .46 .43 .40 
Note. Correlations above .22 are significant at p < .01. The DASS-21 (Anxiety 
subscale) has been transformed to compensate for positive skew.  
 
As expected, the AABS-33 (total) was significantly associated with anxiety, 
depression and stress. The three correlation coefficients were large or close to large. 
Also, as expected, anxiety and depression were highly associated (r = .66). However, 
the total AABS-33 was not more highly related to anxiety than depression, though 
individual AABS-33 factors were generally more highly associated with anxiety than 
depression and the strength of the associations was moderate. Thus, Thought-Outcome 
Fusion, Anxiety-Based Reasoning and Catastrophizing were somewhat more highly 
associated with anxiety than Caution and Evaluation Sensitivity, both of which had a 
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slightly stronger association with depression than anxiety. In conclusion, the 
discriminant validity of the AABS-33 is only partly supported in this sample. 
 
Group comparisons 
Because both students and members of Internet support groups for specific anxiety 
disorders (i.e., anxiety group) completed the AABS and DASS -21, it was possible to 
explore group differences in order to further test convergent and discriminant validity. 
Table 16 displays descriptive statistics for the DASS-21 scales, the AABS-33 and its 
subscales across the groups. Full sample scores are included to aid ease of comparison. 
Using Lovibond and Lovibond’s (2002) cut-off values, students were characterised by 
mild depression and stress but moderate anxiety. The anxiety sample was characterised 
by moderate depression and stress but severe anxiety.  
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Table 16. 
Descriptive Statistics for the AABS-33 and DASS-21 Anxiety, Depression and Stress 
Scales for the Student, Anxiety and Total Group Samples 
                                             Students                Anxiety Group               Full Sample 
Scales Subscale n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) 
DASS 
 
 94  228  322  
 Depression  13.11(5.53)  19.13(6.27)  17.37(6.65) 
 Stress  14.86(5.10)  20.17(5.15)  18.62(5.67) 
 Anxiety  11.38(4.47)  16.90(5.95)  15.30(6.10) 
AABS  97 117.72(27.94) 249 142.80(36.58) 346 135.77(36.14) 
 Caution  50.87(13.69)  57.19(16.62)  55.42(16.09) 
 EvSens  28.22(10.20)  39.59(11.55)  36.40(12.29) 
 TOF  10.80(5.81)  13.32(6.66)  12.62(6.52) 
 ABR  13.79(5.38)  17.00(6.44)  16.10(6.32) 
 Catas  14.03(5.34)  15.70(5.99)  
Note. EvSens= Evaluation Sensitivity; TOF, Thought-Outcome Fusion; ABR, 
Anxiety-Based Reasoning; Catas, Catastrophizing. 
15.23(5.85) 
 
To investigate differences between the two groups in terms of symptoms, a series of t 
test’s were conducted. Table 17 displays the outcome of independent t-test’s 
investigating differences in DASS-21 scores across the student and anxiety groups.  
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Table 17. 
Differences in DASS-21 Scores Across Student and Anxiety Groups 
t df p Measure Group 
   DASS-21 Anxiety Students 
 Anxiety Group -9.11 229 < .001 
DASS-21 Depression Students    
 Anxiety Group -8.53 195 < .05 
DASS-21 Stress Students -8.44 320 < .001 
 Anxiety Group    
 
As can be seen, the difference between the groups was significant for anxiety, as 
measured by the DASS-21. Because homogeneity assumptions were not met (F = 
18.65, p < .001), separate variance estimates were used for this test. The difference 
was also significant for depression. Again, homogeneity assumptions were not met (F 
= 6.29, p < .05) and consequently separate variance estimates were deployed.  Finally, 
the difference between the groups was significant for reported stress. In summary, 
members of anxiety Internet support groups for specific anxiety disorders reported 
significantly higher levels of anxiety, depression and stress than students, as was 
expected. 
 
To test convergent and discriminant validity, a correlational analysis was performed 
across the two groups. Table 18 displays correlations between the AABS-33 and the 
DASS-21 scales, for the student and anxiety group samples. The full sample 
correlations are included to aid interpretation. 
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Table 18. 
AABS-33 and DASS-21 Correlations for the Student, Anxiety and Total Group Samples 
Measure 
 
A 
Student     AG       Total 
D 
Student      AG       Total 
S 
Student    AG      Total 
   A           
   D  .68 .57 .66       
   S  .67 .73 .76 .68 .71 .75    
AABS  .42 .45 .51 .43 .46 .52 .30 .45 .49 
   Caution  .19 .36 .36 .26 .35 .37 .16 .38 .36 
   EvSens  .44 .37 .50 .44 .47 .56 .37 .37 .48 
   TOF  .29 .28 .32 .15 .23 .26 .03 .22 .22 
   ABR  .15 .27 .31 .12 .27 .30 .03 .33 .32 
   Catas  .43 .46 .46 .49 .38 .43 .40 .38 .40 
Note. Student sample correlations above .26 are significant at p < .05 and correlations 
above .29 are significant at p < .01. Anxiety and total sample correlations above .22 
are significant at p < .01. The DASS-21 (Anxiety subscale) has been transformed to 
compensate for positive skew. A, DASS-21 Anxiety subscale; D, DASS-21 
Depression subscale; S, DASS-21 Stress subscale; EvSens, Evaluation Sensitivity; 
TOF, Thought-Outcome Fusion; ABR, Anxiety-Based Reasoning; Catas, 
Catastrophizing; AG, members of anxiety Internet support groups. 
 
As can be observed, depression (DASS-21 Depression scale) and anxiety (DASS-21 
Anxiety scale) were more highly associated in the student than the anxiety group, 
whereas stress (DASS-21 Stress scale) and anxiety were more highly related in the 
anxiety than student group. AABS-33 total scores were more highly associated with 
anxiety in the anxiety than the student group and, apart from Evaluation Sensitivity 
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and Thought-Outcome Fusion, AABS-33 factor – anxiety relationships were stronger 
in the anxiety than the student group. It should be noted that Anxiety-Based Reasoning 
did not have a significant relationship with anxiety in the student group and that 
Thought-Outcome Fusion had a similar relationship with anxiety in both groups. This 
generally supports the prediction that AABS-type items would have a stronger 
association with anxiety in more symptomatic groups, although differences are not 
large. 
 
Similarly, AABS-33 total and factor scores (apart from Catastrophizing) were more 
strongly related to depression scores in the anxiety than the student group. Thought-
Outcome Fusion and Anxiety-Based Reasoning were not significantly related to 
depression in the student group but these relationships were significant in the anxiety 
group. Finally, the relationship between reported stress and AABS-33 total and factor 
scores was generally stronger amongst anxiety group participants. Thus, it appears that 
the evidence for the validity of the AABS-33, in terms of its relationship to anxiety, 
was generally stronger in the symptomatic than the student group as predicted. 
However, the AABS-33 and its subscales were also generally more highly related to 
depression in the anxiety than the student group. Finally, and as predicted, AABS-33 
items were more highly associated with stress in the anxiety than the student group. 
 
In terms of discriminant validity, the AABS-33 total score was similarly related to both 
anxiety and depression in both the anxiety and student group.  Factor 1 (Caution) was 
slightly more related to anxiety than depression in the anxiety group but not in the 
student group, where beliefs about the value of caution were only significantly related 
to depression. 
 106
Factor 2 (Evaluation Sensitivity) was equally related to anxiety and depression in the 
student group, but more strongly associated with depression than anxiety in the anxiety 
group. Factor 3 (Thought-Outcome Fusion) was significantly related to anxiety but not 
depression in the student group. In the anxiety group this factor had a higher 
relationship to anxiety than depression. Factor 4 (Anxiety-Based Reasoning) was not 
significantly related with anxiety or depression in the student group but equally related 
to anxiety and depression in the anxiety group. Factor 5 (Catastrophizing) was more 
highly associated with anxiety in the anxiety group, but more related to depression in 
the student group. Thus, the discriminant validity of the AABS-33 appears to be 
problematic and only partially supported. Only Thought-Outcome Fusion beliefs were 
more highly associated with anxiety than depression in both groups. 
 
As previously noted (see Table 8, p. 85) members of anxiety groups, on average, 
scored higher on the AABS (total) than students. To further test criterion-related 
validity, mean scores on the AABS-33 subscales were compared across the anxiety 
and student groups. Table 19 presents the results of t-tests investigating the difference 
between groups in terms of AABS-33 factor scores.  
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Table 19. 
Differences in AABS-33 Subscale Scores Across Groups 
Measure Group t df p 
 Anxiety Group    
Caution Students 3.62 211  < .001 
 Anxiety Group 8.49 344  < .001 
Evaluation Sensitivity Students    
 Anxiety Group 3.27 344  < .001 
Thought-Outcome Fusion Students    
 Anxiety Group    
Anxiety-Based Reasoning Students 4.70 208  < .001 
 Anxiety Group 2.40 344  < .05 
Catastrophizing Students    
 
As can be seen, members of the anxiety groups scored significantly higher on all five 
AABS-33 factors than students. It should be noted that homogeneity assumptions were 
not met in the case of Caution (F = 5.93, p < .05) and Anxiety-Based Reasoning (F = 
8.22, p < .01) and therefore separate variance estimates were used. In conclusion, 
results showed that the AABS-33 assessed attitudes and beliefs that are related to 
anxiety (i.e., the anxiety group scored higher than students) in this sample. However, 
the AABS-33 also appeared to index beliefs that are related to depression.   
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Exploratory group comparisons 
As previously mentioned, participants were asked to indicate where they heard about 
the study. On the basis of the information participants provided it was possible to 
classify members of anxiety Internet groups into five separate categories according to 
the type of web community they belonged to. For example, participants who heard 
about the study from OCD Action and OCD UK were grouped into an OCD group. 
Those participants who belonged to a general anxiety web community such as Anxiety 
Care were grouped into a Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) group. Table 20 displays 
descriptive information for the various groups on the DASS-21 scales, the AABS-33 
total scale and subscales. Descriptive information for the student group can be 
observed in table 16 (see p. 100). 
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Table 20. 
Descriptive Statistics for the DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales and 
AABS – 33 across the NOS, Social Anxiety, OCD, Phobia and Panic Groups 
 NOS Social Anxiety OCD Phobia Panic 
Scale M(SD) M(SD M(SD) M(SD M(SD) 
DASS      
D 18.65(6.48) 20.45(5.96) 19.26(6.03) 19.32(6.76) 17.27(5.96) 
A 16.20(6.35) 17.59(5.47) 15.95(5.24) 18.64(6.76) 18.23(5.55) 
S 19.25(5.40) 20.77(4.95) 20.90(4.90) 20.45(5.96) 20.82(3.91) 
AABS 138.57(37.56) 146.76(26.69) 147.07(40.65) 145.96(45.43) 139.96(36.90) 
Cau 54.66(16.72) 57.93(14.88) 61.55(16.48) 56.74(20.81) 58.11(15.53) 
EvS 37.71(11.89) 44.83(7.30) 37.64(12.34) 41.22(14.05) 36.81(11.16) 
TOF 13.72(6.60) 12.07(5.84) 14.16(7.71) 12.91(7.57) 13.54(5.87) 
ABR 17.14(6.61) 16.12(5.81) 17.41(7.14) 18.26(6.68) 16.65(5.84) 
Catas 54.66(16.72) 57.93(14.88) 61.55(16.48) 56.74(20.81) 
Note. NOS, n = 89; Social Anxiety group, n = 56; OCD group, n = 39; Phobia group, n 
= 22; Panic group, n =22. D, DASS-21 Depression scale; A, DASS-21 Anxiety scale; 
S, DASS-21 Stress scale; Cau, Caution; EvS, Evaluation Sensitivity; TOF, Thought-
Outcome Fusion; ABR, Anxiety-Based Reasoning; Catas, Catastrophizing. 
58.12(15.53) 
 
 
Using Lovibond and Lovibond’s (2002) criteria, all the anxiety groups could be 
characterised as experiencing moderate depression and stress levels, but severe anxiety 
symptoms. Those participants who were recruited from social anxiety web 
communities appeared to report the highest depression levels, whilst the Phobia and 
Panic groups reported the highest level of anxiety symptoms. Reported stress was 
similar across groups. 
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In order to explore differences in depression, anxiety and stress levels across groups, a 
one-way ANOVA was conducted for each of the DASS-21 scales, comparing the 
scores across groups. To explore criterion-related validity across analogue diagnostic 
groups and controls (students), the mean AABS-33 total and factor scores were 
compared across the five anxiety and single student groups. Table 21 presents the 
results of the ANOVA’s comparing the groups on DASS-21 and AABS-33 scores as 
well as displaying the results of post hoc comparisons. For ease of visualisation, 
groups are rank ordered according to means (from highest to lowest) and significant 
post hoc comparisons highlighted.  
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Table 21. 
DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale and AABS-33 scores for NOS, Social 
Anxiety, OCD, Phobia, Panic and Student Groups 
Scale F df Significant Tukey post hoc 
DASS  
D 14.23*** 5, 316 Social Anxiety, Phobia, OCD, NOS, Panic>Students 
S 15.24*** 5, 316 OCD, Panic, Social Anxiety, Phobia, NOS>Students 
A 15.42*** 5, 316 Phobia, Panic, Social Anxiety, NOS, OCD>Students 
AABS 8.07*** 5, 340 OCD, SocialAnxiety, Phobia, Panic, NOS>Students 
Cau 3.44** 5, 340 OCD, Panic, Social Anxiety, Phobia, NOS>Students 
EvS 19.02*** 5, 340 Social Anxiety, Phobia>NOS, OCD>Panic>Students 
TOF 2.83* 5, 340 OCD, NOS, Panic, Phobia, Social Anxiety>Students 
ABR 4.26** 5, 340 Phobia, OCD, NOS, Panic, Social Anxiety>Students 
Catas .16 5, 340 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
As can be observed, apart from Catastrophizing, each ANOVA was significant. Tukey 
post hoc comparisons were conducted to determine which groups differed significantly 
from one another. Students scored significantly lower than all the analogue clinical 
groups on depression (p < .05 for all significant comparisons), stress (p < .001) and 
anxiety (p <. 001). 
 
Students also scored significantly lower than all other groups on the total AABS-33  
(p < .05 for all comparisons). The OCD group scored significantly higher (p < .01) on 
Caution than students. Students scored significantly lower than all other groups (p < 
.01 for all comparisons) on Evaluation Sensitivity and the Social Anxiety group scored 
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significantly higher on Evaluation Sensitivity than the NOS (p < .01), OCD (p < .05) 
and Panic (p < .01) groups.  
 
The OCD and NOS groups reported significantly more Thought-Outcome Fusion 
beliefs than students (p < .05 for both comparisons). The Phobia, OCD and NOS 
groups scored significantly higher (p < .05 for all comparisons) than students on 
Anxiety-Based Reasoning. Thus, apart from Catastrophizing, the criterion-related 
validity of the AABS-33 is supported in that members of web communities for anxiety 
disorders scored significantly higher than students on the AABS-33 and its subscales. 
The fact that the Social Anxiety and the OCD groups scored significantly higher than 
students on Evaluation Sensitivity and Thought-Outcome Fusion beliefs, respectively, 
supports the validity (and specificity) of these subscales.  
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Partial Correlations 
Given the differences observed in AABS scores across education level and 
employment status (see pp. 85-86), partial correlations between the AABS-33 and 
newly developed criterion measures, with the two demographic factors controlled for, 
were performed and are displayed in Table 22.  
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Table 22. 
AABS-33, BIPS, BARS and BSBS Partial Correlations 
Measure  AABS Caution EvSens ToF ABR Catas 
AABS 
      
 
 
 
 
      Caution  .90      
      EvSens  .74 .53     
      ToF  .62 .51 .31    
      ABR   .66 .54 .31 .44   
      Catas  .62 .44 .42 .40 .28  
BIPS  .50 .47 .31 .38 .27 .36 
BARS     -.34    -.34    -.38    -.23    -.08    -.05 
      Social     -.30    -.21    -.43    -.22    -.009    -.12 
      Physical     -.27    -.34    -.20    -.14    -.12    -.01 
BSBS  .60 .58 .41 .35 .34 .50 
      General  .55 .49 .42 .34 .30 .44 
      Checking  .43 .47 .24 .19 .26 .31 
Note. Correlations above .15 are significant at p < .05. Correlations above .18 are 
significant at p < .01. The BIPS, BARS (Total and Physical) and BSBS (total and 
subscales) have been transformed to offset for positive skew.  
 
As can be observed, these correlations are generally somewhat smaller than the 
relevant Pearson’s correlations but generally produce similar results. Therefore no 
further partial correlations were performed.  
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Discussion 
This paper has described the development and validation of the AABS-33, a measure 
of attitudes and beliefs that are thought to play a role in anxiety problems. More 
specifically, the research aimed to determine the factor structure, reliability and 
validity of the measure. In terms of validity, construct validity was considered in a 
cognitive interviewing study. Convergent and discriminant validity were considered 
through more traditional means. Here the findings will be discussed in relation to the 
aims of the study and the literature that has been reviewed. First, the results of the 
cognitive interviewing study will be discussed. Subsequently, quantitative data 
analysis results will be discussed in terms of psychometric properties and validation 
correlations, and the implication of these considered. Finally, limitations are 
acknowledged and areas of future research identified before concluding with a general 
summary. 
 
Cognitive Interviews and Construct Validity 
The cognitive interviewing aspect of the study represents an attempt to directly 
examine the thought processes of respondents, whilst they considered questions on the 
AABS-R, in order to gauge what particular processes accounted for AABS-R score 
variations. The results support the findings of Brown and Hawkes (2008) in that 
respondents largely did not retrieve past anxiety episodes in order to formulate an 
answer and generally did not base their responses on the intensity or occurrence of 
feelings. Instead, responses were mostly based on the appraisal of likely consequences 
of phenomena and situations described in items. This corresponds to the findings of 
Brown and Hawkes (2008) who, in comparing the ASI-R and the AABS found that 
17.4% of ASI, but 6.3% of AABS protocols involved anxiety retrievals, which was a 
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significant difference in proportions. In terms of judgement formation, they found that 
only a minority of ASI-R protocols (20.8%) but a majority (52.9%) of AABS protocols 
contained appraisals, indicating that AABS items were more likely to prompt cognitive 
appraisals than the ASI-R. Instead, ASI-R items were more associated with 
judgements based on the frequency of feelings (56.9%), whereas this was largely not 
true of AABS protocols (12.1%).  
 
Arguably, cognitive interviews and the analytic approach deployed in the reported 
study, when compared to traditional validation procedures, represent a simpler and 
more intuitive way of understanding the processes that participants engage in when 
they respond to questionnaire items. Such an approach, as opposed to traditional 
validation methods, which were born within the then influential behavioural paradigm 
(e.g., Chronbach & Meehl, 1955), allows intervening mechanisms to be considered. 
This approach is fit for purpose given that AABS-type items are purported to engage 
participants in a cognitive, rather than an affective retrieval process, as specified by 
Beck’s model.  
 
In conclusion, the findings support the construct validity of the AABS-33 as a 
cognitive index that is relatively uncontaminated by the experience of affect. L. A. 
Clark and Watson (1995), supported by a previously noted neurological study (Keller 
et al., 2000), observe that a measure that includes negative mood terms (e.g., I am 
disturbed by…), will have a significant neuroticism element.  In effect this almost 
assures a relationship with measures of affect. On the basis of reported findings, this 
confound is largely not a difficulty for the AABS.  
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Quantitative Study 
AABS factor structure 
One of the aims of the reported study was to perform a factor analysis to determine the 
factor structure of the AABS using a large sample. An exploratory principal factor 
analysis was used to extract factors and a five factor initial solution was obtained. The 
factors explained almost 53% of the variance in scores and the variables appeared to be 
well defined by this five-factor solution.  
 
Three of the factors, Caution, Catastrophizing and Anxiety-Based Reasoning are 
similar to those found by Brown and his colleagues (2000) in the initial validation 
study. However, Thought-Outcome Fusion and Evaluation Sensitivity emerged as 
separate factors, which may be the result of duplicative and redundant items being 
dropped and other items being reworded as a result of a later validation study (Brown 
& Hawkes, 2008). The explanatory power of the solution that was obtained was better 
(53% of variance explained) than the one obtained by Brown and his colleagues 
(2000), which explained 32.3% of the total variance. 
 
Thus, the factor structure of the AABS was obtained and underlying factors appeared 
to represent theoretically-relevant domains. The beliefs indexed by the AABS-33 are 
conceptually similar to cognitive constructs described in the anxiety literature. Beliefs 
about the importance of caution, planning and certainty (Ladouceur et al., 2000), a 
tendency towards self-preoccupation and to anticipate social evaluation and judgement 
(Wells & Mathews, 1994; Wells & Clark, 1997), metacognitive beliefs about the 
relationship between thoughts and negative outcomes (Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group, 2003; Shafran et al., 1996; Zucker, Craske, Barrios & 
 118
Holguin, 2002), basing inferences on subjective anxiety responses (Arntz et al., 1995) 
and beliefs about catastrophic outcomes (Moses & Barlow 2006; Weems, Costa, 
Watts, Taylor & Cannon, 2007) have all been described in the literature as possible 
maintenance or causal factors in anxiety, and some possibly in the emotional disorders 
generally (see Moses & Barlow, 2006; Harvey et al., 2004). 
 
Reliability 
Another aim of the study described here was to establish the reliability of the AABS-
33 and its subscales in a student and anxiety group sample. Glass and Arnkoff (1997) 
emphasise that internal consistency is the appropriate estimate of reliability for self-
report measures. A reliability analysis, in terms of Chronbach’s alpha, a measure of 
internal consistency, indicated excellent total AABS-33 reliability. The British 
Psychological Society’s Steering Committee on Test Standards (1992) suggests that an 
alpha value of .70 or higher is acceptable and all AABS-33 factors well exceeded this 
as alpha coefficients for Factors 1 to 5 were between .79 and .93. Also, the reliability 
of the AABS-33 was higher than that reported for the initial AABS scale (Brown et al., 
2000), where alpha coefficients ranged from .72 to .86. Therefore, the AABS-33 and 
its subscales had adequate to excellent internal reliability in this population. 
 
Discriminant validity 
An important aspect of the reported study concerned investigating the relationship 
between the AABS-33 (and its subscales) and both anxiety and depression in order to 
establish discriminant validity. It is only in the last ten years that researchers have 
started to tackle the thorny issue of discriminant validity in order to establish whether 
particular cognition measures are uniquely associated with certain emotional states 
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(Clark, 1997). According to Beck’s cognitive content-specificity hypothesis, particular 
anxiety-related cognitions should be specific to anxiety symptoms, just as depression-
related cognitions have generally been found to be specific to depressive symptoms. 
 
However, given the reviewed literature, this hypothesis was operationalized in such a 
way as to take into account comorbidity, the fact that most measures of anxiety and 
depression have been found to correlate highly and therefore the possibility that these 
disorders share common features (perhaps both affective and cognitive) and variance. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that AABS-33 items would be associated with both 
anxiety and depression symptoms, but more strongly associated with anxiety 
symptoms.  This was only partially supported in the total sample.  
 
The DASS-21 Depression and Anxiety Scales were highly correlated in both the 
student (r = .68) and anxiety group samples, but somewhat less so in the anxiety group 
(r = .57). This corresponds to L. A. Clark & Watson’s (1991) findings of concurrent 
correlations of .70 and .66 between measures of anxiety and depression symptoms, in 
non-clinical and clinical populations, respectively. Regarding discriminant validity, in 
the total sample AABS-33 total scores were similarly and highly related to both 
anxiety and depression, though slightly more so to depression. The Caution factor was 
similarly (and moderately) related to both depression and anxiety, though minimally 
more so to depression. Evaluation Sensitivity was highly related to both anxiety and 
depression, but somewhat more so to depression. However, Thought-Outcome Fusion 
beliefs, Anxiety-Based Reasoning and Catastrophizing were all more highly related to 
anxiety, though in the case of Anxiety-Based Reasoning this was slight. Thus, total 
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sample correlations only partially supported the discriminant validity of the AABS-33 
and its factors. 
 
Given that Caution appears to be conceptually related to (intolerance of uncertainty) 
beliefs that individuals with generalized anxiety may hold, and given that Evaluation 
Sensitivity appears to be related to beliefs held by many individuals who experience 
social anxiety and phobia, these presenting problems may represent a confound. In 
particular, it has been suggested that social phobia is one of the most severe conditions 
in adulthood and it is highly comorbid with depression. Generalized anxiety disorder is 
another chronic, severe and disabling classification (e.g., Andlin-Sobocki, 2005). This 
disorder is also commonly comorbid with depression (Barlow, 2002) and may share a 
genetic diathesis with it (e.g., Kendler, 1996).  As previously noted, cognitions 
associated with generalised anxiety have been found to be associated with both 
depression and anxiety (Woody et al., 1998). In fact, generalised anxiety disorder may 
be more highly related to depression than to any alternative anxiety disorders (Brown, 
Moras, Zinbarg & Barlow, 1993; Brown, Marten and Barlow; 1995; Brown, Anson & 
DiBartolo, 1996).  
 
It has been suggested that mixed (anxiety and depression comorbid) samples generally 
experience more severe symptoms and have a mixed cognitive profile (Clark et al., 
1990).  As noted, participants who were recruited from social anxiety web 
communities reported the highest depression levels, lending some support to the 
hypothesis that Evaluation Sensitivity may represent beliefs held by socially phobic 
individuals who are generally more depressed and severe than other anxiety group 
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members. Given that there was no analogue generalized anxiety disorder category, the 
severity hypothesis remains more speculative for the Caution subscale.  
 
A correlational analysis was also performed in order to investigate possible group 
differences in terms of the relationship between the AABS-33, anxiety and depression, 
in both the student and anxiety group subsamples. Again, AABS-33 total scores were 
similarly related to both anxiety and depression in both groups, though marginally 
more so to depression. The Caution subscale was slightly more highly associated with 
anxiety than depression in the anxiety group. In the student group, Caution was only 
significantly related to depression. Evaluation Sensitivity was equally associated with 
anxiety and depression in the student group but more highly associated with depression 
in the anxiety group. This may again suggest that symptom severity and depression 
comorbidity play a part. Thought-Outcome Fusion beliefs were significantly associated 
with anxiety in the student group but not with depression.  In the anxiety group, 
Thought-Outcome beliefs were more highly associated with anxiety than depression.  
Catastrophizing was more highly associated with anxiety in the anxiety group only, 
whilst in the student group, catastrophizing was more highly related to depression. 
Finally, Anxiety-Based Reasoning was equally related to anxiety and depression in the 
anxiety group but not significantly related to either anxiety or depression in the student 
group.   
 
Thus, only Thought-Outcome beliefs were more related to anxiety than depression in 
both groups, whilst Caution and Catastrophizing were more associated with anxiety 
than depression in the anxiety group only. It should be noted that reported differences 
were generally small. In conclusion, the discriminant validity of the AAABS-33, 
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operationalizing the cognitive content-specificity hypothesis in terms of strength of 
association with anxiety, is only partly and not strongly supported in this sample. 
Arguably, the AABS-33 may however be more specific to anxiety than depression.  
 
It is possible to offer several hypotheses for why the AABS-33 was not consistently 
more highly associated with anxiety than depression. Beck’s theory suggests that 
cognitive content should enhance a measure’s ability to discriminate between the two 
emotional disorders. The AABS-33 was developed specifically to index beliefs and 
attitudes thought to be causally related to anxiety only. Also, the cognitive content-
specificity hypothesised was operationlized in such a way as to be sympathetic to the 
fact that comorbidity is common and common factors have been suggested. Thus, one 
possibility is that the cognitive model is flawed. For example, Ellis (e.g., Ellis & 
Bernard, 1985) suggests that all emotional difficulties are the result of several 
irrational beliefs. Authors associated with the transdiagnostic perspective have also 
recently emphasised that the emotional disorders may share a common cause (e.g., 
Harvey et al., 2004; Moses and Barlow, 2006).  
 
However, Ambrose and Rholes (1993) have suggested that anxiety and depression may 
be developmentally related in that threat cognitions lead to anxiety when the threat is 
appraised as relatively low, but lead to depression when threat is appraised as high. In 
this sense, high levels of threat cognitions may, in effect, take the form of loss 
cognitions and become associated with depression. It should be noted that their 
findings were based on a study that employed a nonclinical sample of children and 
adolescents.  Their findings are supported by the observation that, though both 
depression and anxiety may be risk factors for later developing the other, anxiety is 
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more likely to be diagnosed first and depression later. Also, relatively pure depression 
is less common than a relatively pure anxious state. This raises the possibility that the 
emotional disorders exist on a single spectrum, with anxiety disorders representing the 
less severe variety (Mineka et al., 1998). Thus, it is possible that depressive cognitive 
content themes are uniquely associated with depression, and anxiety-related cognitive 
content is shared amongst the two emotional disorders. This was the conclusion 
reached by R. Beck and Perkins (2001) in their meta-review and may arguably explain 
the fact that the treatment of a particular anxiety disorder can result in improved mood 
(Barlow, Allen & Choate, 2004). 
 
The findings of Ambrose and Rholes (1993) indicate a potential qualification to the 
specificity hypothesis. As noted, they found that the relationship between anxiety-
related content, in the form of threat cognitions, and anxiety symptoms was a 
curvilinear one. Thus, when negative cognition levels are relatively low, anxiety is the 
result. However, when negative cognition levels are high, symptoms of depression 
predominate. From this hypothesis it follows that symptom severity may be an 
important consideration for those investigating cognition – anxiety relationships. 
 
In the reported study, correlations between the AABS-33, its subscales and the DASS-
21 Depression and Anxiety scales for the different analogue clinical groups suggested 
that Caution, Thought-Outcome Fusion and Catastrophizing were all more highly 
related to anxiety than depression in the analogue clinical group. Exploratory group 
comparisons suggested that beliefs about the importance of caution (Caution) and 
about the importance of thoughts (Thought-Outcome Fusion) were most highly 
endorsed by individuals recruited from OCD Action and OCD UK. Though mean 
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differences between the groups were not significant for Catastrophizing beliefs, the 
OCD group also most highly endorsed such beliefs (based on non significant mean 
differences). The Panic group also endorsed these beliefs highly. It should be noted 
that the OCD group scored lower, in terms of anxiety symptoms, than any other group, 
apart from students. In terms of depressive symptoms they were in the mid range as 
compared to the anxiety groups, whilst the Panic group had the lowest depression 
score of the anxiety groups. This may suggest that the OCD and Panic groups were 
less severe than some of the other groups and therefore that negative cognitions were 
more clearly linked to anxiety than depression. Alternatively, the findings may suggest 
that beliefs (Caution, Thought-Outcome Fusion and Catastrophizing) associated with 
OCD and perhaps panic disorder, are more specific to anxiety than depression 
generally.  
 
The above discussion has focused on the product level (i.e., cognitions). However, the 
reported study is of course concerned with the propositional level (i.e., beliefs and 
attitudes). It is possible to imagine that similar processes may operate when it comes to 
causal factors in anxiety. As an example, consider two items from the AABS-33 
Caution subscale, ‘One should always be on the lookout for trouble that might be 
developing’ and ‘Planning every detail in advance is the only way to avoid unpleasant 
surprises’. It is not difficult to imagine how holding such beliefs can result in anxiety. 
An individual who holds these beliefs is likely to be hypervigilant and to experience 
increased autonomic arousal levels and symptoms. In addition, this person may 
experience frequent threat-related negative automatic thoughts, resulting in negative 
affect. Also, safety behaviours such as checking and planning may both strengthen this 
vicious cycle as well as limit an individual’s ability to engage in enjoyable activities 
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and thus experience positive emotions. Eventually, this cycle may culminate in low 
mood and depression. In this example, the initial beliefs are a definite causal factor and 
specific to anxiety, which then acts as a mediator in the relationship between beliefs 
and depression.  As noted by Baron and Kenny (1986) in their influential review of the 
distinction between moderators and mediators, mediator relationships are best 
introduced and investigated when there is a strong relationship between an assumed 
predictor (here the AABS-33) and the criterion (i.e., depression). Supposing such a 
relationship exists, anxiety-related attitudes and beliefs cause and are specific to 
anxiety. However, continued anxiety may then result in cognitive, behavioural and 
affective changes that perpetuate established difficulties and culminate in low mood. 
As noted, similar processes have been proposed to suggest for the persistence of 
depression (Bower, 1981; Brewin, 1996; Teasdale, 1993). This account is also 
consistent with Beck’s model (e.g., 1987) and confirmatory factor analysis studies that 
have found significant pathways between negative affect and both mood and anxiety 
disorders (e.g., Brown, Chorpita & Barlow, 1998).  
 
Supposing that this account is realistic, it is of course not clear for how long an 
individual may present with solely symptoms of anxiety, before distress develops into 
depression. As Feldman (1993) writes “Anxiety and depression may be distinct mood 
states, but they may also covary to such a degree that they are rarely found alone” (p. 
639). The fact that Brown and his colleagues (2000) found statistical evidence for the 
predictive validity of the AABS supports the hypothesis that the beliefs indexed by the 
AABS-33 are antecedents to anxiety.  
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As noted, cognitive content-specificity findings have been found to be less robust in 
non-clinical than symptomatic samples (e.g., Steer et al., 1994). The findings of 
Ambrose and Rholes (1993) can potentially account for this in that at least a certain 
level of negative cognitions may be required for specificity to occur. However, Clark 
et al. (1996) replicated their study in a more symptomatic sample. Their findings 
suggested a linear rather than a curvilinear relationship in a depressed inpatient, and (a 
weaker relationship) in a medical sample.  The authors conclude that specificity 
findings may not be as consistent in samples that experience lower symptom distress. 
Thus, “it may be that cognition and symptom constructs are not as well differentiated 
at lower levels of distress because of reduced scoring variability leading to less 
distinction between measures” (Clark et al., 1996, p. 150).  
 
In the reported study, there was some evidence for such a view as AABS-33 factor - 
anxiety relationships were generally stronger in the analogue clinical than the student 
group. This will be discussed further when convergent validity is considered. Thus, 
and in conclusion, it is unclear how to account for the inconsistent findings regarding 
cognitive content-specificity predictions in the reported study. However, symptom 
distress may be an important consideration and may qualify the relationship between 
cognitions and affect, but not necessarily between causal factors and anxiety.  
 
Do the reported findings suggest that the AABS-33 is not valid? Glass and Arnkoff 
(1997) strongly encourage researchers to investigate discriminant relationships and 
suggest that not finding such evidence is of value in contributing to a knowledge base 
regarding common factors across disorders. Concurrent associations between the 
AABS-33, anxiety and depression may suggest that the two emotional disorders share 
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common cognitive features, though this again does not preclude cognitive content-
specificity at the causal level. Of course it is also possible that the AABS-33 does not 
index beliefs that are truly anxiety-specific and in accordance with the cognitive 
model, despite the care taken to do exactly that during its development. Also, the 
results of the cognitive interviewing study and previous findings (Brown et al., 2000; 
Brown & Hawkes, 2008) lend support to the construct validity of the measure as an 
index of cognitive propositional content that is predictive of anxiety disorders.  
 
In conclusion, the reported findings regarding the relationship between anxiety-related 
beliefs and anxiety and depression appear to add to earlier findings that contradict the 
cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. The question that Dobson (1985) raised, over 
20 years ago, of whether the distinction between anxiety and depression is “more 
conceptually satisfying than empirically demonstrated”, appears to remain relevant (p. 
526). Generally, reported findings thus far may provide more support for a 
transdiagnostic approach to conceptualising the emotional disorders, than a disorder-
specific approach, in student and analogue anxiety groups. However, the prospective 
relationship between the AABS-33 and anxiety disorders is of course the key validity 
index of the measure and in effect, would also have a bearing on the validity of Beck’s 
cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. Thus, it is clear that the beliefs and attitudes 
indexed by the AABS-33 are related to both anxiety and depression. However, whether 
these beliefs are “antecedents, concomitants or consequences” of these disorders has 
not been established (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988). 
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Convergent validity 
A key prediction was that the beliefs indexed by the AABS-33 would be related to 
anxiety symptoms. This was clearly the case for the full sample where the AABS-33 
and DASS-21 Anxiety scale correlated highly. The measure also had a significant 
(moderate) relationship with anxiety symptoms in the student group, and a somewhat 
higher relationship with anxiety in the anxiety group sample. This supports the validity 
of the AABS-33 as a measure of beliefs that are associated with anxiety symptoms. 
 
Another prediction of the current study was that the relationship between AABS-33 
items and anxiety symptoms would be stronger in the (analogue) clinical than student 
sample. This hypothesis was supported in that, as noted, the total AABS-33 score was 
somewhat more highly associated with the DASS-21 Anxiety scale in the anxiety than 
the student group. In terms of individual subscales, Caution and Anxiety-Based 
Reasoning had a significant association with anxiety in the anxiety group sample, 
whereas in the student sample these relationships did not reach significance. Though 
Catastrophizing was significantly associated with anxiety in both groups, this 
relationship was stronger in the anxiety than the student group. However, Evaluation 
Sensitivity was clearly more highly associated with anxiety in the student than the 
anxiety group, which may indicate that in the anxiety group, anxiety had developed 
into depression, given that the group that endorsed these beliefs the most (Social 
Anxiety group) had the highest depression scores. Thought-Outcome Fusion was 
similarly related to anxiety symptoms in both groups. Thus, the expectation that the 
association between the AABS-33 and anxiety symptoms should be stronger in more 
symptomatic groups is generally supported and supports vulnerability predictions. It 
appears that it is possible to hold some of the beliefs that are indexed by the AABS-33 
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without endorsing highly the symptomatic (purported) consequences of those beliefs. 
This tentatively supports the construct validity of the AABS-33 as a measure of beliefs 
that precede symptoms.  
 
Questions about the convergent validity of the AABS-33 also had to do with 
confirming a predictable pattern of relationships between the measure and various 
proposed correlates of anxiety, such as safety behaviours, risk avoidance, worry and 
social evaluation. These predictions were mostly established on the basis of 
transdiagnostic research and theorizing as well as, for the concept of stress, Beck’s 
stress-vulnerability predictions. 
 
The correlational findings regarding the relationship between the AABS-33 and the 
various criterion measures were encouraging. First, the relationship between the 
AABS-33 and the DASS-21 Stress scale was substantially higher in the anxiety than 
the student group. Given that DASS-21 Anxiety scale scores were higher in the anxiety 
than student group, this can be seen to tentatively support Beck’s model, which implies 
that stress, in interaction with certain dysfunctional beliefs, may result in increased 
symptoms. AABS-33 subscale scores were mostly more highly associated with stress 
in the anxiety than student group, lending tentative support to Beck’s predictions.  
 
The intercorrelations between anxiety-related beliefs and attitudes as indexed by the 
AABS-33 and anxiety sensitivity were as predicted. Thus, the AABS-33 and its 
subscales were all significantly related to the ASI-3 and its subscales. As predicted, 
beliefs about the importance of Caution were (highly) related to Physical AS concerns. 
Evaluation Sensitivity was also, as predicted, highly related to Social AS concerns and 
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Catastrophizing was moderately related to Physical and highly related to Cognitive AS 
concerns. Anxiety-Based Reasoning was (moderately) associated with Physical and 
Cognitive AS concerns as predicted. No specific predictions were made for Thought-
Outcome Fusion. However, this subscale was moderately related to Cognitive and 
Physical Concerns. In conclusion, these associations support the validity of the AABS-
33 and are consistent with it being a distal predictor of anxiety sensitivity, which is 
arguably a proximal predictor of anxiety problems, given that the content of the ASI-3 
subsumes both cognitive and affective dimensions. It should be noted that though the 
associations of the AABS-33 and the ASI subscales are consistent with this hypothesis, 
neither the direction of the relationship nor causality was determined. 
 
Other concurrent correlation predictions were also observed. Caution was moderately 
associated with worry and thought-outcome fusion (Likelihood) beliefs as predicted. 
However, it was also moderately associated with moral thought-action fusion beliefs. 
This is not surprising given that these two types of thought-action fusion belief 
commonly co-occur (Shafran et al., 1996).  The Caution factor was also highly related 
to adopting general safety behaviours and moderately associated with a tendency to 
check. Given that the OCD group endorsed beliefs about the importance of caution 
highly, the finding that such beliefs are associated with checking is not unexpected. 
Caution was also moderately associated with a tendency to being aversive to taking 
physical risks and to overestimating the occurrence of negative outcomes.  
 
Evaluation Sensitivity beliefs were highly associated with a measure of social anxiety, 
AS social concerns, avoiding social risks and adopting general safety behaviours. A 
moderate association was observed between this subscale and a tendency to expect 
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negative outcomes as well as worry. These associations are all in the predicted 
direction. 
 
Thought-Outcome Fusion beliefs were, as expected, highly associated with thought-
action fusion (Likelihood) beliefs, which have been found to be implicated in 
obsessive compulsive disorder. These beliefs were also (moderately) related to 
expecting negative outcomes and holding moral thought-action fusion beliefs. 
Although this subscale was associated with checking behaviours as anticipated, this 
association was weak and other subscales, in particular Caution, were more highly 
associated with this form of safety behaviours. This may support the transdiagnostic 
perspective in that particular beliefs (as measured by the AABS-33) may not map onto 
traditional diagnostic categories but rather be relevant to various classifications and 
their correlates. 
 
Apart from a predicted relationship with anxiety sensitivity, which was demonstrated, 
no predictions were made for Anxiety-Based Reasoning. However, given that such 
beliefs have been suggested as causal factors in anxiety presentations generally, 
concurrent correlations between this subscale and anxiety correlates were of interest. 
This subscale was most clearly (moderately) associated with adopting safety 
behaviours and over-expecting the occurrence of negative outcomes. In terms of 
established measures, this subscale was most highly (and moderately) associated with 
holding TAF beliefs. 
 
Exploratory group comparisons involved comparing differences in AABS-33 factor 
scores across groups (according to which web community they were recruited from). 
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Significant findings suggested that Caution and Thought-Outcome Fusion were most 
highly endorsed by the OCD anxiety group. The Social Anxiety group was most likely 
to report holding Evaluation Sensitivity beliefs, whilst the Phobia and OCD groups 
highly endorsed holding Anxiety-Based Reasoning beliefs. The Phobia group endorsed 
these items significantly more highly than the OCD, NOS and Student groups and 
previous studies have confirmed that clinically diagnosed phobic groups employ 
reasoning strategies such as these (de Jong, Mayer & van den Hout, 1997). Though 
this finding suggests specificity, it is important to note that these beliefs were also held 
highly by individuals recruited from OCD communities (as well as the undefined 
individuals who made up the category of NOS). This is an observation echoed by 
researchers (e.g., Emmelkamp & Aardema, 1999) who report that emotional reasoning 
biases are significantly associated with OCD symptom measures. Thus, and resonating 
Arntz and his colleagues (1995), the “tendency to infer danger on the basis of 
subjective anxiety… may play a role in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders” generally (1995, p. 917).  
 
Overall, the pattern of findings is consistent with the transdiagnostic perspective in that 
the beliefs indexed by the AABS-33 appeared to be shared among analogue anxiety 
disorder groups and related to various anxiety correlates. This is consistent with 
emerging evidence, previously discussed, that suggests the anxiety disorders overlap 
considerably (Moses & Barlow, 2006). However, certain beliefs may be more highly 
associated with certain anxiety disorders (e.g., Thought-Outcome and Evaluation 
Sensitivity beliefs were highly associated with OCD and Social Anxiety group 
membership, respectively) and perhaps more specific to them, which would support 
the cognitive model in terms of content specificity. However, the findings generally 
 133
diverge from predictions derived from Beck’s specificity hypothesis in terms of 
discriminant relationships, but not vulnerability-stress predictions. The clinical 
implication of these findings is that recent efforts to create transdiagnostic treatments 
(see Moses & Barlow, 2006) may be a useful endeavour. The AABS-33 may be 
valuable in providing clinical material for such a unified treatment approach by 
allowing practitioners to identify and modify attitudes and beliefs that underlie more 
than one presenting concern (e.g., both OCD and panic). More generally, the AABS-
33 can be used in clinical settings to identify problematic beliefs and attitudes that are 
associated with anxiety and depression. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions   
The study reported here has limitations. The cognitive interviewing study employed 
think-aloud protocol analysis, which is an established methodology. However, it has 
not often been used to evaluate the construct validity of clinical measures. In addition, 
the sample size was small and this limits the generalizability of findings. However, as 
noted, a previous larger study had validated many of the items on the AABS, and also 
the four respondents each, in effect, produced multiple protocols that were analysed. 
Finally, though the rater was blind to the aims of the study and endeavoured to be 
impartial, the results need to be viewed as provisional until replicated, preferably by 
more than one rater, and interrater reliability confirmed. 
 
In terms of the quantitative validation study, there are possible limitations. First, 
because this is a self-report, cross-sectional survey, it is not possible to assert that any 
relationships observed are causal and there is a risk of response consistency bias and 
that common method variance of the measures inflated results (Spector, 1981). Thus, 
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further testing is required, preferably on a longitudinal basis. An estimate of test-retest 
reliability is required and generally, a prospective element is of course also essential 
for supporting the validity of the AABS-33 as a distal measure of cognitive 
vulnerability. Abramson and Alloy (1992) argue that such studies should involve a 
sample selected on the grounds of a particular cognitive style that are then assessed in 
terms of symptom status at a later point. It is also important to acknowledge that no 
procedures were applied to correct for multiple testing, increasing the risk of type 1 
errors. 
 
Despite the encouraging findings of the cognitive interviewing study regarding the 
construct validity of the AABS, whether items on the AABS-33 index beliefs that 
predispose individuals to develop anxiety disorders remains an empirical question. 
Brown et al. (2000), using structural modelling, settled on a final structural model that 
was consistent with the prediction that AABS items index phenomena that are more 
related to anxiety than depression and are precursors of anxiety. Therefore, there is 
support for the overall validity of the AABS. Also, an index of anxiety sensitivity has 
been found to predict later panic disorder (Ehlers, 1995). Given that the AABS-33 was 
highly associated with the ASI subscales it is not unlikely that it has a prospective 
relationship with anxiety as well.  
 
However, given that it has been difficult to demonstrate the causal role of 
dysfunctional attitudes in anxiety (e.g., Burns & Spangler, 2001), whether the effort 
put into developing the AABS as a measure of beliefs, not contaminated by affect, has 
paid off, will need to be further investigated.  
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The Internet recruitment method requires a discussion. Technology advances have 
extended possibilities for psychological research (BPS, 2007). Collecting data on the 
Internet has obvious appeal, as it is possible to approach a potentially large and diverse 
group of people. However, important questions are raised by such an approach to data 
collection. A key concern is whether individuals’ behaviour changes as a result of 
being online (Cleland, 2006). In fact, there is evidence that Internet administered 
surveys (when compared to paper methodologies) are associated with a reduction in 
socially desirable responses (Frick, Bachtiger & Reips, 2001; Joinson, 1999), an 
increased readiness to respond to sensitive questions (see Tourangeau, 2004) and 
higher rates of self-disclosure (Weisband & Kiesler, 1996).  
 
Despite such encouraging findings there are various possible limitations associated 
with this approach. Here, the most noteworthy potential limitation is that, though 
participants recruited through web communities for specific anxiety disorders reported 
elevated anxiety levels, it was not possible to determine whether these were clinically 
significant. Arguably, these participants had self-selected to each web community for a 
reason and their scores on the anxiety and depression symptom measures suggested 
elevated levels of both, but higher anxiety levels. Thus, these individuals may be 
similar to the typical clinical patient, given the large degree of anxiety and depression 
comorbidity in clinical samples. However, before these results can be generalised they 
obviously need to be replicated in a clinical sample and by establishing formal 
diagnoses. It would also be of interest to examine whether the beliefs and attitudes 
indexed by the AABS-33 are sensitive to the effects of treatment and whether mood 
induction results in different endorsement patterns on the AABS-33. Given that the 
Internet anxiety group sample included only a few definable disorders (i.e., social 
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anxiety, specific phobias, panic disorder and OCD), it would be of interest to replicate 
this study in a sample that comprised other diagnosable anxiety disorders (e.g., post-
traumatic stress disorder, agoraphobia with and without panic and generalized anxiety 
disorder). 
 
In addition, given that the anxiety sample displayed elevated depression as well as 
anxiety symptoms, the sample or a subset of the sample (such as the social anxiety 
group) may have been a severe one in terms of symptomatology. It has been frequently 
suggested that samples that are both anxious and depressed represent a distinct and 
more severe diagnostic group (e.g., Clark et al., 1990). As such, it will be important to 
investigate the cognitive specificity prediction in such samples, as well as relatively 
pure depressed and anxious samples. Future studies will need to examine the effect of 
comorbid depression on anxiety-related beliefs and whether the beliefs assessed by the 
AABS-33 are more specific in particular samples. As noted, Brown and his colleagues 
(2000) reported that the AABS had a more specific relationship with anxiety than 
depression in a student sample, which may suggest that the AABS behaves differently, 
depending on symptom severity. Also, L. A. Clark and Watson (1991) report that 
clinical ratings of depression and anxiety result in better discrimination between the 
two constructs, suggesting that future studies may well have to employ separate 
diagnostic assessment methods. 
 
In terms of generalizability and sampling bias, despite Internet samples being more 
heterogeneous than samples recruited by traditional methods, it is not possible to target 
potential participants randomly (Birnbaum, 2004; Duffy, 2002; Kraut et al., 2004). 
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava and John (2002), in their review, found that Internet users 
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and nonusers did not differ in terms of depression ratings. However, they concluded 
that, despite Internet samples typically being more diverse than typically derived 
samples, they are not always representative and the generalizability of findings is 
therefore a concern (Birnbaum, 2004; Kraut et al., 2004).  
 
The sample employed in the current study was predominantly young, female and 
white. Despite this, the sample was more heterogeneous than the typical student 
sample and also, research findings suggest that analogous conclusions can be reached 
between offline and online samples (Gosling, et al., 2004; Pettitt, 2002). Finally, 
student samples represent a highly select sample, which reduces the generalizability of 
findings to the population as a whole. However, as noted, such samples allow initial 
vulnerability predictions to be tested and in addition, allowed some comparisons to be 
made with regards to a previous AABS validation study.  
 
Another potential but related limitation concerns the measures used. If the constructs 
were not indexed in a valid manner, the findings will be suspect. However, the 
established measures were all well validated and reliable measures that have been used 
in a large number of previous research studies. The three measures of transdiagnostic 
processes however are currently being validated (Brown & Bohn, personal 
communication, February 24, 2008), the conclusions of which have obvious bearings 
on the reported study.  Nonetheless, because no other such measures have been 
developed with a transdiagnostic perspective in mind, these were appropriate.  
 
As noted by Henry and Crawford (2005) the DASS Stress scale’s construct validity 
has at times been questioned. In particular it has been suggested that the scale indexes 
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general distress. However, Henry and Crawford (2005) found the DASS-21 Stress 
scale to be a valid index of stress, supporting the validity of the findings reported here. 
Yet, it should be noted that it is the interaction between attitudes and beliefs on the one 
hand, and stress on the other, that is the essential test of the predictive validity of the 
AABS-33. Also, though reported stress was higher in the anxiety group, stress may of 
course be a concomitant or consequence of anxiety, rather than an antecedent. Thus, a 
predictive study will be required to investigate stress - vulnerability interactions. 
 
In the current study there was an emphasis on selecting measures that could 
differentiate anxiety from depression, given that most such measures correlate highly. 
Thus, if mood questionnaires lack discriminant validity and are comprised of 
overlapping items, cognitive-affective specificity predictions cannot be determined. 
The DASS-21 scales have been found to display better discriminant (as well as 
convergent) validity than many well-validated measures of anxiety and depression 
(Henry & Crawford, 1995). However, it is possible that future studies would benefit 
from using the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson & L. A. 
Clark, 1991), which has demonstrated excellent discriminant validity between 
symptoms of anxiety and depression, with correlations as low as .25 and as high as .49 
(Watson & L. A. Clark, 1995). It is possible though that such discriminant power may 
be at the prize of reduced convergent validity (Burns & Eidelson, 1998).  
 
An obvious limitation of the study resulted from splitting the anxiety groups for 
exploratory group comparisons, which resulted in a very small sample size for some of 
the groups (e.g., the Panic and Phobia group only had 22 individuals). Thus, the 
findings should be regarded as tentative and need to be replicated using larger specific 
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anxiety disorder samples. Also, due to the interaction of demographic variables (in the 
form of employment and educational status) with the AABS-33, partial correlations 
were obtained in order to control for effects of these. Given that these resulted in 
similar results to the Pearson’s correlations and that it is likely that observed effects 
were not independent, it is possible to conclude that demographic interactions largely 
did not influence observed relationships. 
 
Despite the noted shortcomings, reported findings support the reliability and, partially, 
the validity of the AABS-33 as a self-report index of anxiety-related phenomena, 
which may have research and clinical utility for testing aspects of the cognitive model 
as well as the extent to which dysfunctional beliefs improve following cognitive 
restructuring. However, further research is clearly necessary. Until such investigations 
are undertaken, reported current findings suggest the AABS-33 provides a plausible 
foundation for the study of propositional constructs and anxiety.  
 
A good theory can be recognised by the degree to which it stimulates and generates 
productive research avenues. In this sense, Beck’s theory has succeeded. It has led to 
significant insights in describing and explaining many aspects of the anxiety disorders, 
thus perhaps paving the way for the study of comorbidity, a long recognised challenge 
in clinical psychology.  
 
Clinical practitioners may find it difficult to buy into the transdiagnostic approach 
given that individuals experiencing depression or anxiety often present in strikingly 
different ways. For example, it is possible to imagine two clients, one presenting with 
endogenous depression and another presenting with a recent episode of panic disorder 
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and perceptual derealization. The two seem to share few presenting concerns, apart 
from negative affect.  Such clinical observations have arguably strengthened the face 
validity of Beck’s cognitive content-specificity hypothesis. Just as researchers, keen to 
explore predictions of the cognitive model, have struggled to explain comorbidity and 
similarities, so will researchers associated with the transdiagnostic approach face their 
biggest challenge in trying to account for differences between psychological disorders. 
However, as Harvey et al. (2004) notes, a transdiagnostic approach mirrors 
developments in cognitive theory and science, which has recently concerned itself with 
a more complex conceptualization of how cognition and behaviours interact (e.g., 
Teasdale & Barndard, 1993). Thus, the reported study contributes to a growing 
research and clinical literature concerned with complex phenomena and consequently 
with complex answers. 
 
Conclusion 
The reported study set out to further develop the Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale, 
which is a measure of attitudes and beliefs thought to be causal in anxiety problems. 
The aims of the study were met. The factor structure and reliability of the AABS was 
determined and the resultant AABS-33 measure was found to show adequate construct 
validity. The measure appears to index beliefs and attitudes, which are associated with 
anxiety and various correlates of anxiety. Some of the beliefs and attitudes indexed by 
the measure may be more specific to certain anxiety disorders than others, though they 
generally appear to be shared among the anxiety disorders.  Though the discriminant 
validity of the measure was only partly supported in the total sample, suggesting that 
depression and anxiety may share common factors, the measure was found to be more 
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highly related to anxiety in the analogue clinical samples. This supports vulnerability 
predictions and is in line with previous findings (Brown et al., 2000).  
 
In conclusion, the AABS-33 appears to be a psychometrically sound, reliable and valid 
measure of anxiety and its correlates. However, discriminant validity was not 
established and this requires further consideration.  
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Appendix 1: Recruitment information sheet for cognitive interview participants 
 
Title:  The Development of a Questionnaire assessing the link between Thinking and 
Emotions. 
 
Experimenter’s name:   Solveig Jonsdottir 
Experimenter’s position. Student. Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 Supervisor. Dr Gary Brown, Senior Lecturer. 
 
Description of research session: You will be asked to complete questions on a questionnaire,  
which assesses the link between thinking and emotions, whilst you ‘think aloud’ about your 
answers. After completing the questionnaire your will be asked a few a few questions about your 
experience of completing it. The session will be taped and the recording (anonymous) will be 
destroyed after coding has been completed. 
 
 
Number of research sessions needed (in half-hour blocks): 2 
 
To participate:     SIGN UP on the attached time sheet  
                            COPY DOWN the following: 
Experimenter’s name Solveig Jonsdottir 
 Experimenter’s phone/office 
Experimenter’s email address S.Jonsdottir@rhul.ac.uk 
Room where research is held  
Day and time you are booked  
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Appendix 2:  Recruitment message for students and web community members  
 
 
THINKING AND ANXIETY: Participants are needed for an online ANONYMOUS 
SURVEY of how ways of thinking may be related to experiencing anxiety. It should 
take between 30-45 minutes to complete. ** Those participating will be eligible for a 
prize draw with one £50 prize, two £25 prizes, and three £10 prizes. 
 
** If you think that you might be interested, please follow this link for more 
information: 
http://tinyurl.com/XXXX
 
Thank you in advance. 
 
Solveig Jonsdottir (S.Jonsdottir@rhul.ac.uk) 
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Appendix 3: E-mail sent to web community moderators  
 
ANXIETY STUDY 
My name is Solveig Jonsdottir and I am working on research with my supervisor Dr 
Gary Brown as a part of my Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. 
We have developed a series of questionnaires aimed at unravelling what places certain 
people at greater risk for developing problems with anxiety.  We also hope to better 
characterize the nature of anxiety problems.  The set of measures to date has profited 
greatly from the input of individuals with anxiety problems.  We hope to continue this 
collaborative relationship, and are currently seeking participants for an online survey 
furthering this line of research.  The Royal Holloway University Research Ethics 
Committee has approved this study. 
The entire study is being administered on the Internet, is anonymous and should take 
about 30-45 minutes. Those participating will be entered into a prize drawing of one 
£50 prize, two £25 prizes, and three £10 prizes. 
Would it be possible to advertise the study on your website? 
Many thanks for your consideration, 
Solveig Jonsdottir 
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Appendix 4: Participating Internet communities and forums 
 
Anxiety Care - http://www.anxietycare.org.uk/
Anxiety Support - http://www.anxietysupport.org.uk/
National Phobics Society - http://www.phobics-society.org.uk/
No Panic - http://www.nopanic.org.uk/
No More Panic - http://www.nomorepanic.co.uk/
OCD-UK - http://www.ocduk.org/
OCD Action - http://www.ocdaction.org.uk/ocdaction/index.asp
Social Anxiety UK - http://www.social-anxiety.org.uk/
Social Anxiety Forums - http://www.socialanxietyforums.com/
The Anxiety Community Forum - http://www.anxietyhelp.org/index.html
Uncommon Knowledge - http://www.uncommonforum.com/viewforum.php?f=7
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Appendix 5: NHS recruitment flyer  
 
 
    
             RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS NEEDED 
 
Participants are needed for an online ANONYMOUS SURVEY of how ways of 
thinking may be related to experiencing anxiety. It should take between 30-45 minutes.  
Anyone can participate.  The study is being conducted at Royal Holloway University 
of London. 
 
Those who take part will receive a £5 voucher, which can be used at high street shops. 
If you think that you might be interested, please take one of the slips and log on to the 
listed website at your convenience. 
The link is http://tinyurl.com/XXX
 
Your help would be greatly appreciated. 
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Appendix 6: Information letter sent with NHS opt-in letters 
 
 
 
       RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS NEEDED 
 
 
This service is involved in the recruitment of participants for a research study and 
would appreciate your help. The research is being carried out by Solveig Jonsdottir, as 
a part of her Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, and Dr Gary Brown (both at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
They have developed a series of questionnaires aimed at unravelling what places 
certain people at greater risk for developing emotional difficulties.  They also hope to 
better characterize the nature of such problems.  The set of measures to date has 
profited greatly from the input of individuals like you.  They are currently seeking 
participants for an online survey furthering this line of research.  The Royal Holloway 
University Research Ethics Committee has approved this study. 
The entire study is being administered on the Internet, is anonymous and should take 
about 30-45 minutes. Please note that public libraries have Internet access should you 
not have a home computer. Anyone can take part. Those who take part in the study 
will receive a £5 voucher, which can be used at high street shops. 
 
It is important to note that participation is voluntary and your decision about whether 
to take part or not will not affect your care in any way. 
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For further information and/or to take part please go to 
http://tinyurl.com/XXX  
Thank you in advance. We very much appreciate your help. 
** If you have questions please contact:  s.jonsdottir@rhul.ac.uk
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Appendix 7: Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee approval 
 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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Appendix 8: Royal Holloway, Psychology Department Ethics Committee approval        
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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Appendix 9: Riverside Research Ethics Committee approval 
 
Riverside Research Ethics Committee 
Room 4W/12, 4th Floor West 
Charing Cross Hospital 
Fulham Palace Road 
London 
W6 8RF 
Telephone: 020 8846 7282  
Facsimile: 020 8846 7280 
Ms. Solveig Jonsdottir 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Royal Holloway University of London 
Psychology Department 
Egham, Surrey 
TW20 0EX        02 October 2007 
Dear Ms. Jonsdottir 
Full title of study: Validation of the revised Anxiety Attitude and Beliefs 
Scale 
REC reference number: 07/H0706/66 
 
Thank you for your letter of 14 September 2007, responding to the Committee’s 
request for further information on the above research and submitting revised 
documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for 
the above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and 
supporting documentation as revised. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
 The Committee has designated this study as exempt from site-specific assessment 
(SSA.  There is no requirement for [other] Local Research Ethics Committees to be 
informed or for site-specific assessment to be carried out at each site. 
 
Conditions of approval 
 
The favourable opinion is given provided that you comply with the conditions set out 
in the attached document.  You are advised to study the conditions carefully. 
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Approved documents 
 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
Application  1  19 June 2007  
Investigator CV    19 June 2007  
Protocol  1  22 June 2007  
Questionnaire: AABS-R  1  19 June 2007  
Questionnaire: Brief Safety Behaviour Scale       
Questionnaire: Brief Inflation of Probability Scale  1  19 June 2007  
Questionnaire: Brief Aversion to Risk Scale  1  19 June 2007  
Questionnaire: The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSQW)    05 January 2006  
Questionnaire: thought-Action Fusion Scale    01 January 1996  
Questionnaire: DASS21  1  19 June 2007  
Questionnaire: ASI-3  1  19 June 2007  
Questionnaire: Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale    01 January 1983  
Advertisement  1  19 June 2007  
Participant Information Sheet  2  14 September 2007  
Participant Consent Form  1  19 June 2007  
Response to Request for Further Information  1  14 September 2007  
Appendix A - Changes to Specific Questions       
Insurance Arrangements    01 August 2007  
Supervisor CV    19 June 2007  
 
R&D approval 
 
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research at 
NHS sites should apply for R&D approval from the relevant care organisation, if they 
have not yet done so.  R&D approval is required, whether or not the study is exempt 
from SSA.  You should advise researchers and local collaborators accordingly. 
 
Guidance on applying for R&D approval is available from 
http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk/rdform.htm. 
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard 
Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
Feedback on the application process 
 
Now that you have completed the application process you are invited to give your view 
of the service you received from the National Research Ethics Service.  If you wish to 
make your views known please use the feedback form available on the NRES website 
at: 
 
 180
https://www.nresform.org.uk/AppForm/Modules/Feedback/EthicalReview.aspx 
 
We value your views and comments and will use them to inform the operational 
process and further improve our service. 
 
07/H0706/66 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Dr Sabita Uthaya 
Chair 
 
Email: james.murphy@imperial.nhs.uk 
 
 
Enclosures: Standard approval conditions SL-AC2  
 
Copy to: Dr Gary Brown 
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Appendix 10: The Anxiety Attitude and Belief Scale-R (AABS-R) 
INSTRUCTIONS:  This inventory lists different beliefs that people sometimes hold.  Please 
read each statement carefully, decide how much you believe what is stated, and circle the 
number corresponding to how much you agree.  Please try not to think too much about each 
item--people are different, so there is no right or wrong answer.  To decide how much you 
agree with a statement, simply keep in mind what you are like most of the time.    
 
EXAMPLE
I DON’T 
BELIEVE  THIS 
AT ALL 
 I BELIEVE THIS 
COMPLETELY 
You should not put off until tomorrow what you 
can do today. 
 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
In the example, the number “80” has been circled, indicating strong, but not complete, agreement 
with the statement. 
 
Please now make a rating for each of the following items.  
 
 I DON’T 
BELIEVE      
THIS AT         
ALL 
 I BELIEVE THIS 
COMPLETELY 
1. Things that you can imagine are more likely 
to come true      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
2. Having negative thoughts means you are a 
bad person.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
3. You can never have enough information for 
making the right decision.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
4. If you don't make an effort, you can easily 
lose control of yourself.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
5. It is important to always appear fully at ease.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
 
6. Insanity can gradually creep up on you      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
7. It is important to be on the lookout the first, 
small signs of an illness.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
 
8. In general, it is better to keep things the way 
they are than to take the risk of making things 
worse. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
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9. Thinking about bad things that have happened 
to other people could cause the same thing to 
happen to you. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
10. You should always take as much time as 
possible when making a decision in order to 
make the right choice. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
11. The way to avoid problems is not to take any 
risks.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
12. Imagining things that might happen can help 
bring those things about.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
13. If someone is concerned about something 
happening in the future, they should take 
steps to insure that it does not come true 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
14. It is better not to rock the boat than to make 
changes.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
15. It is unwise to proceed with something unless 
you have all of the possible information you 
might need.  
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
 
16. It is better to carry out your activities when 
nobody is watching you.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
17. Insanity can develop without warning.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
18. It is better to be over-prepared for a potential 
disaster than to be caught unprepared.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
19. You should be constantly looking out for 
things happening within your body so that 
you can detect things going wrong. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
20. It is possible to instantly lose control of your 
mind.       0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
21. If you imagine something bad happening, 
then it is up to you to make sure that it 
doesn’t come true. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
22. To avoid disasters, you need to be prepared 
for anything.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
23. Ignoring feelings of anxiety means you risk 
overlooking something serious.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
 183
24. You should not allow yourself to be seen 
losing control of yourself in any way      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
25. A medical catastrophe can happen to anyone 
at any time.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
26. Planning every detail in advance is the only 
way to avoid unpleasant surprises.        0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
27. One should always be on the lookout for 
trouble that might be developing.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
 
28. You should not get involved in something if 
you’re not sure that you can manage it      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
29. It is essential to avoid being disapproved of 
by other people.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
30. If you imagine something bad happening, it 
can help make that thing come true.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
31. It is important always to keep in mind that a 
catastrophe can happen to anyone at any time.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
32. It is best not to let on if you are in public and 
feel that something is wrong with you.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
33. Anticipating the worst outcome prepares you 
for the worst.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
34. It would be difficult to ever live down the 
embarrassment of losing control of yourself 
or acting strangely in public.   
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
35. Picturing something happening might cause it 
to really happen.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
36. Anxiety is generally a sign that something is 
wrong.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
37. There is no such thing as being too careful 
when it comes to your health.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
38. You should avoid being seen acting 
awkwardly.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
39. People will make negative judgments if they 
think something is wrong with you.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
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40. Disasters are a lot more likely than most 
people realize.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
41. Minor difficulties can easily get out of control 
and grow into major ones.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
42. If someone is feeling anxious, there must be 
something for them to be concerned about.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
43. It is crucial to anticipate potential difficulties 
so that you have a better chance of avoiding 
them. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
44. It is possible to suddenly completely lose 
control of your behavior.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
45. An unusual physical sensation in your body is 
likely to be a sign that something is seriously 
wrong with you.  
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
46. Anxiety does not happen without there being 
a reason for it.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
47. Even with small problems, one thing can lead 
to another and quickly turn into something 
huge. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
48. When making a decision, it is better to play it 
safe rather than risk making the wrong 
choice. 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
49. You should always maintain control of your 
thinking      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
50. If you can foresee future problems you have a 
greater opportunity to prevent them.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
51. People don’t experience anxiety unless there 
is actually something they should be 
concerned about 
     0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
52. It is necessary to continually be aware of 
signs that a health problem is developing.      0        20        40        50        60        80        100 
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Appendix 11: The Brief Inflated Probabilities Scale-13 (BIPS-13) 
The items below present odds of certain undesirable events happening to someone.  Please 
circle the answer that you believe best reflects your idea of how likely each event is to take 
place.  Keep in mind that with odds, the bigger the number, the less the likelihood.   
 PROBABILITY 
EVENT Least likely                                                 Most likely 
 
Chance of being injured on the job in 
the next year. 
1 in 100 1 in 50 1 in 25 1 in 12 
 PROBABILITY 
EVENT Least likely                                                 Most likely 
1. Chance of you getting the flu in the next 
year.   
1 in 20 1 in 10 1 in 5 1 in 3 
2. Chance of having a stroke in your 
lifetime. 
1 in 12 1 in 6 1 in 3 1 in 2 
3. Chance of dying from heart disease 
(lifetime). 
1 in 6 1 in 3 1 in 2 1 in 1 
4.  Chance of developing Alzheimer’s 
Disease in your lifetime.  
1 in 150 1 in 75 1 in 36 1 in 18 
5. Chance of developing schizophrenia in 
your lifetime.  
1 in 200 1 in 100 1 in 50 1 in 25 
6. Chance of being the victim of a burglary 
in the next year. 
1 in 280 1 in 140 1 in 70 1 in 35 
7. Chance of being physically assaulted in 
the next year.
1 in 600 1 in 300 1 in 150 1 in 75 
9.  Chance of you dying from any kind of 
accidental injury during the next year.  
1 in 3,600 1 in 1,800 1 in 900 1 in 450 
10. Chance of dying in a car accident 
(lifetime). 
1 in 
36,000 
1 in 18,000 1 in 9,000 1 in 4,500 
10. Chance of dying from any kind of fall 
(lifetime). 
1 in 
40,000 
1 in 20,000 1 in 10,000 1 in 5,000 
11. Chance of dying in an airplane 
accident (lifetime). 
1 in 
700,000 
1 in 350,000 1 in 175,000 1 in 87,500 
12. Chance of dying from choking on food 
(lifetime). 
1 in 
750,000 
1 in 370,000 1 in 185,000 1 in 
142,500 
13. Chance of dying from food poisoning 
(lifetime). 
1 in 
6,000,000 
1 in 
3,000,000 
1 in 
1,500,000 
1 in 
750,000 
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Appendix 12: The Brief Safety Behaviour Scale -17 (BSBS-17) 
 
Please indicate how often you engage in the following behaviours. 
 
 Never or 
almost 
never 
Some- 
times 
Often Always 
1. Make sure you know where exits are 
located in public places. 
    
2. Check more than once that the door is 
locked before leaving. 
    
3. Memorize what you might say before 
going into a social situation 
    
4. Check that the gas is turned off more 
than once before leaving home. 
    
5. Grip the railing when walking down 
stairs. 
    
6. Closely monitor your pulse or 
heartbeat. 
    
7. Check rubbish to make sure you have 
not thrown something away without 
intending to. 
    
8. Make sure you know where the nearest 
toilet is. 
    
9. Eat very slowly and carefully      
10. Check forms and applications several 
times after completing. 
    
11. Take deep breaths before going into a 
social situation. 
    
12. Make sure something is nearby to hold 
onto when walking 
    
13. Make sure to have someone with you 
when you are out in public 
    
14. Double-check water taps to make sure 
they are turned off. 
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15. Get up slowly and carefully so as not 
to fall over. 
    
16. Avoid making eye contact in social 
situations 
    
17. Keep things instead of deciding what 
should be thrown away. 
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Appendix 13: Brief Aversiveness to Risk Scale-10 (BARS-10) 
 
The following items describe behaviors that might be considered risky in some respect.  
Please rate the percent likelihood that you would engage in the behaviors described if 
given the opportunity.   
 
 NOT AT       
ALL 
LIKELY 
 EXTREMELY 
LIKELY 
1.  Ask someone to stop causing a  
       disturbance.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
2.   Complain about unacceptable service.         0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
3.   Take a turn at piloting a small plane.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
4.   Disagree with an authority figure about    
       something important.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
5.   Go scuba diving.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
6.   Go camping in an isolated wilderness.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
7.   Go rafting down a fast-moving river.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
8.    Complain to someone in charge about  
       having to wait too long in a line or      
       queue. 
      0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
9.    Dive off a high board.       0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
10.  Openly take the unpopular side of an  
       issue in a group of people.        0     20     40     50     60     80     100 
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Appendix 14: Anxiety Sensitivity Index -3 (ASI-3)  
Please circle the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. 
If any items concern something that you have never experienced (e.g., fainting in 
public), then answer on the basis of how you think you might feel if you had such an 
experience. Otherwise, answer all items on the basis of your own experience. Be 
careful to circle only one number for each item and please answer all items. 
 
 Very
little 
A 
little
Some Much Very 
much
1. It is important for me not to appear 
nervous.  
0 1 2 3 4 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I 
worry that I might be going crazy. 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly.  0 1 2 3 4 
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I 
might be seriously ill. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my 
mind on a task. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. When I tremble in the presence of others,  
 I fear what people might think of me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that 
I won’t be able to breathe properly.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that 
I’m going to have a heart attack.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. I worry that other people will notice my 
anxiety.  
0 1 2 3 4 
10. When I feel “spacey” or spaced out I worry 
that I may be mentally ill.  
0 1 2 3 4 
11. It scares me when I blush in front of 
people.  
0 1 2 3 4 
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I 
worry that there is something seriously 
wrong with me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. When I begin to sweat in a social situation,  
 I fear people will think negatively of me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I 
worry that I might be going crazy.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I 
could choke to death.  
0 1 2 3 4 
16. When I have trouble thinking clearly, I 
worry that there is something wrong with 
me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
 
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint 
in public.  
0 1 2 3 
Scoring: Physical concerns = sum of items 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 15. Cognitive concerns = sum 
of items 2, 5, 10, 14, 16, 18. Social concerns = sum of items 1, 6, 9, 11, 13, 17. 
4 
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is 
something terribly wrong with me.  
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 15: The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale- 21 (DASS -21) 
DAS S 21 Name: D
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend 
too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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Appendix 16: Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
Please select the answer that best fits you.  
 
        1........2........3........4........5 
 Not at all                         Very typical  
typical of me                           of me 
   1 2 3 4 5 
1. If I don't have enough time to do everything, I don't worry 
about it    
2. My worries overwhelm me    
3. I don't tend to worry about things    
4. Many situations make me worry    
5. I know I shouldn't worry about things, but I can't help it    
6. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot    
7. I am always worrying about something    
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts    
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about 
everything else I have to do    
10. I never worry about anything    
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I 
don't worry about it anymore    
12. I've been a worrier all my life    
13. I notice that I have been worrying about things    
14. Once I start worrying I can't stop    
15. I worry all the time    
16. I worry about projects until they are all done    
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Appendix 17: Thought-Action Fusion Scale-R (TAFS-R) 
 
Do you disagree or agree with the following 
statements? 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree  Agree 
Strongly 
1. Thinking of making an extremely critical 
remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable 
to me as actually saying it………. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. If I think of a relative/friend losing their 
job, this increases the risk that they will 
lose their job………………………… 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. Having a blasphemous thought is almost as 
sinful to me as a blasphemous 
action………………………………………
… 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. Thinking about swearing at someone else is 
almost as unacceptable to me as actually 
swearing…………………. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car 
accident, this increases the risk that he/she 
will have a car accident……. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. When I have a nasty thought about 
someone else, it is almost as bad as 
carrying out a nasty 
action………………………. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. If I think of a friend/relative being injured 
in a fall, this increases the risk that he/she 
will have a fall and be injured. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. Having violent thoughts is almost as 
unacceptable to me as violent 
acts…………………………………………
………… 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this 
increases the risk that he/she will fall 
ill……………………………………….. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. When I think about making an obscene 
remark or gesture in church, it is almost as 
sinful as actually doing it…………… 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as 
bad as doing harm. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. If I think of myself being injured in a fall, 
this increases the risk that I will have a fall 
0 1 2 3 4 
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and be injured……………………. 
13. When I think unkindly about a friend, it is 
almost as disloyal as doing an unkind 
act………………………………………. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. If I think of myself being in a car accident, 
this increases the risk that I will have a car 
accident…………………………… 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. If I think about making an obscene gesture to 
someone else, it is almost as bad as doing 
it…………………………………… 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. If I think of myself falling ill, this increases 
the risk that I will fall 
ill…………………………………………
………….. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. If I have a jealous thought, it is almost the 
same as making a jealous 
remark……………………………………
…………... 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. Thinking of cheating in a personal 
relationship is almost as immoral to me as 
actually cheating………………………….. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. Having obscene thoughts in a church is 
unacceptable to me… 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 18: Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation -II (BFNE-II) 
 
 
For each statement below, please circle the number beside it which best represents how 
well the statement describes you. 
 
 Agree 
very little
Agree 
a little 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree 
a lot 
Agree very
much 
1. I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 0 1 2 3 4 
2. I am concerned about other people’s opinions of me. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be 
thinking of me. 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I am afraid that others will not approve of me. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I am usually worried about the kind of impression I make. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things. 0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 8. If I know that someone is judging me, it tends to bother me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195
Appendix 19: Cognitive interviewing schedule 
 
 
Checklist: 
 
- Room quiet, comfortable, sunlight, seating (out of sight) 
- Watch, recorder, batteries, speak ID number onto recorder and test 
- Questionnaire, forms, writing material 
 
Introduction 
 
Thank you for coming in. 
My name is X and I’m carrying out this study as a part of my Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology. We are trying to develop a new questionnaire, and the rationale for today 
is to test the questions that may be included. 
Before we start I want to emphasise several things: 
- Participation is voluntary. If you decide to go ahead, the interview will take 60 
minutes at most, for which you will get 2 credits. You can stop whenever you 
like and if there is something you don’t want to say or do just say so, you don’t 
have to give me a reason.  
- Your answers will be kept confidential. I’ll record what you say, so that I have 
a complete record. The recording and your answers will only be identified with 
an ID number. Once we have analysed the information, the recording will be 
deleted. 
- I should also let your know that this study has been approved by the RH 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Do you have any questions for me at this point? 
 
Consent 
 
Here is the information sheet, which summarises what I have said and gives you some 
additional information. Have a read and if you are happy to go ahead then please sign 
the consent sheet. 
 
Do you have any questions about for me at this point (for example about consent and 
why it is important to gain informed consent)? 
 
Instructions to participant 
 
I’ll tell you a bit more about what we’re doing today 
 
Like I said, we’re testing a questionnaire and trying to understand how the questions 
work. I’ll give you the questionnaire to complete but what I’m most interested in is 
what you are thinking about whilst you complete it. So I want you to think aloud and 
tell me everything you’re thinking about as you go through the questions. This can feel 
un-natural to do at first but just take as long as you need and say whatever goes 
through your mind.  
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I also need to explain that this isn’t a typical interview, as mostly you won’t be talking 
to me directly. To make this clear I’ll sit slightly away from you. Just act like you’re 
all by yourself and talking to yourself whilst you complete the questionnaire. Also, I 
didn’t write the questions but am trying to find out if they get at what they are intended 
to get at – so don’t hesitate to tell me if something is hard to answer or unclear. If you 
are silent for long, I’ll say ‘please keep talking’.   
 
Training to criterion 
Let’s begin by practicing a bit. 
 
First, I’ll demonstrate how I think aloud whilst I complete two questions on the 
questionnaire you will be completing later. 
 
Do you understand what I want you to do? Would you like to practice? 
 
Practice  
Ok now you try it doing a very different task. I’d like you to visualise the flat or house 
where you live and work out how many windows it has. Please think out loud as you 
do this.  
 
Very good. Do you understand what I would like you to do? Here is a pen and the 
questions we are testing. I’ll start recording. Please read out the questions and then 
think aloud as you work out you answers. 
 
During administration 
IF RESPONDENT IS SILENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 SECONDS, SAY: 
‘PLEASE KEEP TALKING’. 
PROMPT TO MOVE FROM A QUESTION TO THE NEXT. 
 
Probing 
Thank you for that. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about some of 
statements and how it was answering them. Ask any of the conditional probes (or 
write down hypothesis-driven probes). 
 
Ending 
Thank the participant and debrief  (describe the research methods, sign record of 
research participation and answer any questions she may have about the task or the 
study). 
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Appendix 20: Information and consent sheet for cognitive interview respondents 
 
Please take time to read the following carefully 
You have been invited to participate in a research survey and you might have some questions. 
Please read the following information carefully. Should you decide to take part, you will be 
asked to tick the consent box below and to sign your name.  
 
What is this study about? 
We are developing a measure, which aims to assess whether certain ways of thinking are 
related to experiencing anxiety. Initially, we are interested in whether the measure functions as 
intended. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire, which requires you to respond to various 
questions and you will be required to tick the appropriate boxes to choose your responses. 
Whilst you complete the questionnaire you will be asked to ‘think aloud’ about your answers 
and I will record this. In the unlikely event that any of the questions cause distress, please let 
me know. Once you have completed all the questions you will be offered feedback about the 
study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You are not under any obligation to participate. If you do decide to take part, tick the consent 
box below and sign the consent form, to show you have agreed to participate. You are free to 
withdraw at any time and this will not affect your academic status.  
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Will the information be confidential? 
You will not be asked to give any information that can identify you. Your answers will be kept 
strictly confidential and only seen by the researchers. When the research is complete we will 
destroy your answers. Also, the consent form will be kept separate from the information you 
provide. 
 
How do I know it is safe to take part? 
This study has been approved by a group of independent people (Research Ethics Committee) 
to protect your rights, dignity, well-being and safety. This particular study has been given a 
favourable opinion by Royal Holloway, University of London Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Are there any benefits for participating? 
You will get two research credits for taking part and will learn something about conducting 
research. There is no other direct benefit to you. However, we hope the information we get 
from the study will help improve the identification of people with anxiety problems. 
 
Who can I contact? 
Solveig Jonsdottir (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) is the chief investigator. Please contact her 
at: 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, TW20 OEX 
Tel: 078 1558 0296 Email: S. Jonsdottir@rhul.ac.uk 
 
If you want to discuss any aspect of this study, please call or email. 
 
PRIVATE AND COFNIDENTIAL 
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You have been asked to participate in a study. Have you: 
 
   Read the information about the study? 
   
   Had the opportunity to ask questions? 
 
 Understood that you are free to withdraw from  
the study at any time without giving a reason and 
that your participation is voluntary? 
 
 Understood that your responses will be recorded? 
  
 Understood what you are required to do? 
 
 
 
Top of Form 
 
       I have read the above information and agree to take part in the study 
  
 
 
 
Signature:     Date:   
 
Consent obtained by:    
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 Appendix 21: Information and consent sheet for validation study participants 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
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